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I. THE DEBATE ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE ARM’S
LENGTH STANDARD AS A CASE STUDY OF THE PROBLEM
OF THE NORMATIVE AUTHORITY OF CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A.  Introduction
When driving down an open and winding two-lane highway, with
no other cars in sight, some drivers may be tempted to cross the
double yellow line into the left-hand lane—to enjoy a better view,
perhaps, or just to experience the thrill of rounding a curve without
worrying about the nuisance of staying in the right-hand lane.  And
some drivers may even believe, on principle, that all drivers would be
better off driving on the left, like the British.  Of course we know that
the law requires all drivers to stay on the right (at least in the United
States and most countries in the world).  But if the coast seems clear,
why shouldn’t drivers be allowed to use their own judgment that it is
safe to cross the double yellow line?
States may also experience the allure of the open road and may
well ask the same question of international law.  While in many cases
they may see a benefit to conforming their behavior with certain
norms that are prescribed by international law, in other situations
they will perceive no reason to conform when their own independent
judgment tells them that some other course of action will better
promote their national interests.  What justification is there,
normatively, for states to recognize the authority of international law
and comply with international legal norms—that is, stay in the right-
hand lane—even when they believe that crossing the double yellow
line is safe and in their best interests?
This Article explores this complex question in a very preliminary
way.  It does so, first, by utilizing methods and considering insights
from a number of disciplines, including general legal philosophy,
social psychology, international relations theory, game theory, and
the philosophy of international law.  Second, the Article employs this
theoretical analysis in a specific case study of the authority of the
arm’s length standard as an international legal norm for allocating
income of multinational groups of corporations to particular national
taxing jurisdictions.  The Article uses this issue as a lens through
which to examine broader theoretical questions about the authority
that treaties and customary international law ought to enjoy.
The balance of Part I reviews the problem of income allocation
and alternative allocation methods, the current policy debate on the
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merits of the arm’s length standard compared to other allocation
methods, especially “formulary apportionment,” and the
contemporary controversy over the authority of the arm’s length
standard under treaties and customary international law.  Part II then
briefly reviews the history of efforts to codify the arm’s length
standard in both model treaties and existing bilateral treaties.
Part III examines, from a conceptual perspective, what it means
to speak of the “authority” of a norm, including its legal authority.
This Part distinguishes among different types of authority, including
“binding authority” and “persuasive authority.”  Most importantly,
Part III explores various theories about which reasons ought to justify
the acceptance of authority.  It outlines a normative theory of
authoritative international norms drawing on legal philosophy,
international relations theory, and game theory.
Based on the conceptual and normative framework developed in
Part III, Part IV sketches a normative theory of the authority of
treaties.  In light of this theory, it examines whether the arm’s length
standard should be regarded as having legal authority pursuant to the
terms of U.S. tax treaties; the precise character of any such authority;
and how, if at all, this authority constrains Congress’ discretion to
adopt an alternative method of allocation, such as formulary
apportionment.
Part V develops a normative theory regarding the authority of
customary international law, including a system for determining when
norms rise to the level of customary international law.  It applies this
theory to investigate whether, in part because of its universality, the
arm’s length standard should be considered to have independent legal
authority as a norm of customary international law.
Finally, Part VI summarizes the Article’s conclusions about the
authority of the arm’s length standard under contemporary
international law and the freedom of Congress to modify its use.  The
Article suggests that U.S. treaties do not impose a binding obligation
to adhere to the standard and that the arm’s length standard is not yet
a binding norm under customary international law.  Nevertheless, the
Article concludes that, under current U.S. tax treaties, the arm’s
length standard has persuasive authority.  Thus, Congress is legally
obligated to give great deference to the standard and to attempt, in
good faith, to make the arm’s length standard work.  Ultimately, this
legal obligation is strengthened and supported by the value that
Congress ought to place on harmonizing U.S. taxing policies with
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those of other states out of recognition that the United States is a
member of a community of states.
B.  The Problem of Allocating Income Among Related U.S. and
Foreign Corporations for Tax Purposes
One of the most vexing problems in international tax policy is
determining how to allocate a corporate group’s income among its
constituent corporations where those corporations are engaged in
business in diverse countries.  The problem of income allocation has
become even more troublesome in the new era of globalization.1  The
allocation of income among the constituent parts of a multinational
group is important because it affects how much of the income from
the group that a country will claim to tax.  For example, except for
particular types of income received by foreign corporations under
U.S. control,2 under the current rules of the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code (“tax code”), the United States does not tax income allocated to
a foreign corporation if the income is derived from a foreign “source”
and if the corporation does not do business in the United States; the
United States only taxes U.S.-source income allocated to such foreign
corporations.3  By contrast, the United States taxes all income,
regardless of its source, allocated to a U.S. corporation, subject to the
allowance of a tax credit for foreign taxes paid on income from
foreign sources.4
The current international standard for allocating income among
related corporations is the arm’s length standard (also sometimes
referred to as the “independent enterprise standard”), which is one
method for implementing the “separate accounting” principle.
Rather than allocating each corporation a percentage of the
worldwide group’s total income, the separate accounting principle
treats the corporations as separate taxpayers, each earning its “own”
income.  A corporation’s “own” income is initially determined by
taking into account transactions with other members of the group at
the actual “transfer prices” paid for goods or services.
1. See generally Survey: Globalisation and Tax, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 1-22;
Transfer Pricing Tops List of International Tax Issues in Ernst & Young Survey, 1999 TAX
NOTES TODAY 213-15 (Nov. 4, 1999).
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 951-64 (rules on taxation of so-called “Subpart F income” of
“controlled foreign corporations”).
3. See I.R.C. §§ 881-82 (1994).
4. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 901 (1994 & 1998 Supp.).
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Of course, even if a separate accounting principle is recognized, a
particular method must be adopted for checking whether a
corporation’s separate accounts reflect its true income.  The arm’s
length standard looks to whether a corporation dealing with a related
corporation would have reported different profit figures had the
related corporation been an independent enterprise.  In practice, the
arm’s length standard is often considered identical to the “separate
accounting” principle.
This broad, umbrella concept of an “arm’s length standard” is
distinguishable from the “arm’s length method.”  The term “arm’s
length method” refers to a particular method for implementing the
arm’s length standard.  The arm’s length method focuses on the prices
of individual transactions between a corporation and related
corporations.  Transfer prices are respected as reflecting true income
so long as these prices are comparable to the prices that would have
been paid by unrelated corporations dealing with one another at
“arm’s length.”  If a taxing agency, such as the IRS, determines that
the actual price paid differs from the arm’s length price, each
corporation’s “own” income will be adjusted using the agency-
determined arm’s length price.  In the absence of a requirement that
corporations use the arm’s length method (or at least the arm’s length
standard), corporate groups may have an incentive to manipulate
transfer prices to shift the group’s income to corporations organized
in low-tax jurisdictions.5
Application of the arm’s length method ideally involves an initial
search for comparable uncontrolled transactions that establish an
arm’s length price—a search often referred to as the “comparable
uncontrolled price” (“CUP”) method.6  It should be emphasized that
other allocation techniques, including the “comparable profits” and
“profit split” methods discussed below, could be compatible with the
arm’s length standard, so long as their ultimate objective is to
determine the amount of income that the corporation would have
earned had it been independent.
5. See Example 1 in the attached Appendix.
6. See Example 2 in the attached Appendix.  In this connection, U.S. Treasury
Department regulations provide in this connection that the “comparable uncontrolled price
method evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is arm’s length by
reference to the amount charged in a comparable uncontrolled transaction.”  Treas. Reg. §
1.482-3(b)(1) (1994).  For this purpose, in evaluating comparability, “similarity of products
generally will have the greatest effect.”  Id. § (2)(ii)(A).
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An alternative to the arm’s length method of allocation (and the
arm’s length standard/separate accounting principle) is the classic
“formulary” or “fractional” apportionment method, sometimes
known as the “unitary business” method.  For decades, American
states have used this method to allocate income of domestic
corporations operating in more than one state.7  The formulary
apportionment method (occasionally referred to in this Article simply
as the “formulary method”) mandates that the income of all related
corporations engaged in the same business be treated as income from
a single business.8  A mathematical formula is then used to allocate a
portion of this total income to each corporate entity in the group.
Common factors used in this formula include property value, payroll,
and sales; many formulas give these factors equal weight.  Unlike the
arm’s length method and arm’s length standard, formulary
apportionment eschews a focus on individual inter-corporate
transactions and does not purport to allocate income among related
corporations in the same way that corporations acting at arm’s length
would agree to do.
Other methods of allocation lie along a spectrum between classic
formulary apportionment on the extreme left and the CUP method of
implementing the arm’s length method on the extreme right.9  These
methods differ: (1) in the extent to which they focus on the prices of
individual taxpayer transactions rather than the overall profits of the
taxpayer or related entities; (2) in the extent to which they take into
account the transfer prices charged by unrelated entities engaged in
similar transactions, the profits earned by unrelated entities from
similar transactions, or the overall profits of unrelated entities
engaged in similar businesses; and (3) in the degree of “similarity” or
“comparability” they require.  Many of these methods employ
formulas in some way.
Moving leftward along the above-mentioned spectrum, just to
the left of the CUP method lie two methods, the “resale price”10 and
7. See generally, e.g., David M. Hudson & Daniel C. Turner, International and Interstate
Approaches to Taxing Business Income, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 562, 582-606 (1984).
8. See Example 3 in the attached Appendix.
9. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of
U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 93 (1995) (discussing the existence of such a
continuum).
10. Under the resale price method, an arm’s length price is determined by subtracting an
appropriate gross profit (derived from the gross profit margin earned in comparable
uncontrolled transactions) from the resale price of the item involved in the controlled
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“cost plus”11 methods, that concentrate on establishing the arm’s
length character of particular transactions and that accordingly are
considered traditional arm’s length methods.  If comparable
uncontrolled transactions are unavailable, these two methods can be
used in place of the CUP method. Unless otherwise noted, in the
balance of this Article references to the “arm’s length method”
include the resale price and cost plus methods as well as the CUP
method.
The Treasury Department has recently endorsed other methods
as consistent with the arm’s length standard, although they have not
been considered “traditional” arm’s length methods.  These include
the “comparable profits” method and a variety of “profit split”
methods.  Under the comparable profits method, a transfer price
must yield a level of operating profit that falls within an arm’s length
range of comparable operating profits.12
Under profit split methods, the relative value of each related
corporation’s contribution to the success of a business activity is
determined and used to allocate the combined operating profit
derived by the related corporations from particular transactions (or a
business activity of which the transactions form a part).  The relative
value of a corporation’s contribution will depend on factors such as
the functions performed, risks assumed, and resources employed by
that corporation.  One type of profit split method, the “comparable
profit split” method, determines a profit split ratio by ascertaining the
ratios of combined operating profit agreed upon by comparable
uncontrolled taxpayers.  This ratio is then applied to the combined
operating income of the related corporations to arrive at an
appropriate profit split.13  As the profit split method departs from a
transaction.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c)(1)-(3) (1994).  See Example 4 in the attached
Appendix.
11. Under the cost plus method, an arm’s length price is determined by adding an
appropriate gross profit (derived from the gross profit markup earned in comparable
uncontrolled transactions) to a controlled taxpayer’s production costs for the property involved
in the controlled transaction.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(1)-(3) (1994).  See Example 5 in the
attached Appendix.
12. To determine this range, objective measures of profitability (often referred to as “profit
level indicators”) are derived from uncontrolled taxpayers that engage in similar business
activities under similar circumstances.  These indicators are applied to the controlled taxpayer’s
own financial data to determine its comparable operating profits.  Profit level indicators can
include the rate of return on capital employed, the ratio of operating profit to sales, and the
ratio of gross profit to operating expenses.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5 (1994).  See Example 6 in
the attached Appendix.
13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6 (1994).  See Example 7 in the attached Appendix.
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focus on the combined operating profit from particular transactions
and encompasses all of a controlled group’s combined profits, it
begins to resemble a form of formulary apportionment.
The methods that lie between the traditional arm’s length
method and classic formulary apportionment are often referred to as
“empirical” methods.  As discussed later in this Article, many U.S.
trading partners believe that some of these empirical methods depart
from the arm’s length standard, particularly those methods that do
not concentrate on the profit from particular transactions between
related corporations (and from comparable transactions between
unrelated entities), but rather focus on profits from larger business
categories.
Finally, it should be emphasized that double taxation of the
combined economic profits of related corporations may occur
whenever countries use different allocation methods or use the same
method but produce different transfer prices or different profits
allocable to the corporations.14  As we will soon see in more detail, the
problem of potential double taxation has given rise to international
efforts to adopt a common allocation norm, namely, the umbrella
arm’s length standard and the arm’s length method of implementing
that standard.
C.  The Current Policy Debate on Use of the Arm’s Length Standard
Versus Formulary Apportionment as an Allocation Method
While the above review of different allocation methods suggests
that the issue of allocation is highly technical (which it undoubtedly
is), it has simultaneously generated tremendous political heat.  For
the last several years, a debate had raged in the United States over
whether the U.S. Government should maintain the traditional arm’s
length standard or adopt classic formulary apportionment to allocate
the income of multinational enterprises subject to U.S. taxing
jurisdiction.  Although the focus of this Article is on the legal
authority of the arm’s length standard under contemporary
international law, this section highlights some of the main policy
arguments in this debate.15
14. See Example 8 in the attached Appendix.
15. These policy questions have already been exhaustively debated.  For works
emphasizing the advantages of formulary apportionment, see, for example, Benjamin F. Miller,
None Are So Blind as Those Who Will Not See, 66 TAX NOTES 1023 (Feb. 13, 1995); Jerome R.
Hellerstein, Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals: Replacement of Separate Accounting
with Formulary Apportionment, 60 TAX NOTES 1131 (Aug. 23, 1993); Louis M. Kauder,
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Many members of the U.S. Congress have charged that the
challenges of enforcing the arm’s length standard have permitted
foreign-owned multinational enterprises to escape U.S. tax
jurisdiction by siphoning profits away from their U.S.-incorporated
subsidiaries, resulting in Treasury Department losses of as much as
$40 billion annually.16  Largely at the urging of Senator Byron Dorgan
(D-N.D.), House and Senate conferees adopted a “Sense of the
Senate” provision in a concurrent fiscal 1995 budget resolution that
expressed the belief that “deficit reduction should be achieved, in
part, by ending loopholes and enforcement breakdowns.”17  The
provision suggested that the Treasury Department could reduce these
loopholes by employing “a formulaic approach in cases in which the
current ‘arm’s length’ transaction rules do not work.”18  At the same
time, Senator Dorgan attempted to delay ratification of new tax
treaties until the Treasury Department conceded that it would
interpret those treaties to permit the use of formulary
apportionment.19
In May 1998, the Senate unanimously approved an amendment
to Senator Dorgan’s IRS restructuring bill that required the Treasury
Department to study transfer pricing abuses.20  Although the
amendment was struck from the final bill by the Conference
Committee, in July 1998 the Senate Appropriations Committee
approved Treasury Department spending recommendations that
called for the IRS to analyze revenue lost as a result of transfer
Intercompany Pricing and Section 482: A Proposal to Shift from Uncontrolled Comparables to
Formulary Apportionment Now, 58 TAX NOTES 485 (Jan. 25, 1993); Stanley I. Langbein, A
Modified Fractional Apportionment Proposal for Tax Transfer Pricing, 54 TAX NOTES 719 (Feb.
10, 1992).  For works advocating the retention of the arm’s length standard, see, for example,
William J. Wilkins & Kenneth W. Gideon, Memorandum to Congress: You Wouldn’t Like
Worldwide Formula Apportionment, 65 TAX NOTES 1259 (Dec. 5, 1994); Eric J. Coffill &
Prentiss Willson, Jr., Federal Formulary Apportionment as an Alternative to Arm’s Length
Pricing: From the Frying Pan to the Fire?, 59 TAX NOTES 1103 (May 24, 1993).  On the debate
generally, see, for example, John Turro, The Battle Over Arm’s Length and Formulary
Apportionment, 65 TAX NOTES 1595 (Dec. 26, 1994).  The following discussion of the main
arguments in the policy debate draws on many points raised in these works.
16. See, e.g., Dorgan Testifies at Senate Foreign Relations Hearing on Tax Treaties, 99 TAX
NOTES TODAY 218-40 (Nov. 12, 1999); Dorgan Wants to Give IRS Ammunition to Combat
Transfer Pricing Abuse, 99 TAX NOTES TODAY 38-4 (Feb. 26, 1999).
17. H.R. Con. Res. 218, 103d Cong., H.R. REP. NO. 103-490, pt. 1, § 38 (1994).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Nancy Loube, Senators Grill Administration on Seven Pending Tax Accords,
67 TAX NOTES 1570 (June 19, 1995).
20. See JCT Compares House, Senate Versions of IRS Restructuring Bill, 98 TAX NOTES
TODAY 96-25, ¶¶ 558-61 (May 19, 1998).
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pricing and to report its findings to Congress within the next year.21
The following February, Senator Dorgan “once again declared
war . . . on transfer pricing abuse,” and during a hearing on the
Internal Revenue Service’s fiscal year 2000 budget, he called on
Commissioner Charles Rossotti to report on the extent of the
problem.22
A number of scholars have echoed the growing congressional
sentiment that formulary apportionment is a viable solution to
transfer pricing abuses that are made possible by lax enforcement of
the arm’s length standard.  They have maintained that formulary
apportionment is both theoretically and practically superior to the
arm’s length standard and, accordingly, that Congress should amend
the tax code to implement formulary apportionment—unilaterally, if
necessary.23
As just suggested, scholars and other observers have made
several arguments for and against the arm’s length standard on policy
grounds.24  The above-mentioned opponents of the arm’s length
standard (to the extent it is understood as generally requiring the
arm’s length method) have rejected it for a variety of reasons.  First,
they contend that it has proven exceedingly difficult to apply in
practice.  Finding “comparable uncontrolled transactions” can be
enormously challenging, particularly when the transactions involve
intangibles such as patents and know-how.  Even the resale price and
cost plus methods may be difficult to apply because of the difficulties
of locating appropriate comparable transactions.  Further, opponents
maintain that the standard’s practical deficiencies lead to intense,
expensive litigation and voluminous Tax Court opinions.
Second, critics of the arm’s length standard emphasize its
susceptibility to abuse.  In principle, section 482 of the tax code
provides a weapon against unscrupulous transfer pricing practices.
Section 482 provides that in the case of organizations, trades, or
businesses under common control, the Secretary of the Treasury
may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades,
or businesses, if he determines that such distribution,
21. See Senate Panel Calls for IRS Study on Transfer Pricing, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 135-1
(July 15, 1998); Conference Committee Explanation of IRS Restructuring Bill: Titles II-IV (Part 2
of 4), 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 123-11, ¶¶ 876-80 (June 26, 1998).
22. Dorgan Wants to Give IRS Ammunition to Combat Transfer Pricing Abuse, 99 TAX
NOTES TODAY 38-4 (Feb. 26, 1999).
23. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 159.
24. See generally authorities cited supra note 15.
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apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such
organizations, trades, or businesses.25
Early in the twentieth century, the Treasury Department adopted
regulations providing that an adjustment could be made under the
predecessor of section 482 if the IRS determined that a transfer price
was not arm’s length, thus formally endorsing the arm’s length
standard and the arm’s length method.  Over the years, the Treasury
Department has made a number of far-reaching revisions to the
regulations under section 482 in an attempt to provide greater
specificity in particular contexts and to clamp down on transfer
pricing abuses.  Moreover, Congress has enacted rigorous penalty
provisions applying to multinational corporations that adopt transfer
prices that are sufficiently removed from arm’s length prices.26
Nevertheless, critics argue that these attempts to deter transfer price
manipulation are inadequate.
Supporters of formulary apportionment also emphasize that it
has, in their view, a number of strengths.  First, they argue that it is
simpler than the arm’s length method.  Formulary apportionment
focuses on identifying the existence and income of a unitary business,
rather than on trying to find a market price for each and every
transaction between members of a multinational group.  Advocates
contend that this system is better suited to the realities of the global
economy, where numerous cross-border transactions occur daily
between economically-integrated multinational businesses.  Second,
they maintain that formulary apportionment can avoid manipulation
of transfer prices, and many suggest that it therefore would produce
more tax revenue for the United States.
Formulary apportionment supporters can also point to the
practice of American state governments, which have long used the
method.  California, for example, has successfully employed it to tax
the worldwide income of a multinational group.  In its 1994 Barclays
Bank decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that formulary
apportionment was a reasonable method for California and other
states to use in computing the income of a foreign-based
multinational corporate group, rejecting challenges based on the
Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.27  Eleven
years earlier, in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,
25. I.R.C. § 482 (1994 & 1998 Supp.).
26. See I.R.C. § 6662(e) (1994).
27. Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
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the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of California’s
system as it applied to a U.S.-based multinational corporate group
with foreign subsidiaries.28 In both these cases, the Court found that
tax treaties did not regulate state taxation and that Executive Branch
pronouncements in favor of the arm’s length standard were not
sufficient to override Congress’ failure to prohibit states from using
formulary apportionment.
Supporters of formulary apportionment argue that its adoption
at the federal level would be permissible under the existing language
of section 482.29  They point out that section 482 even mentions
“apportionment” of gross income and deductions.30
On the other side of the policy debate, defenders of the arm’s
length standard contend that the standard’s widespread acceptance
facilitates coordination with trading partners and reduces the risk of
double taxation, whether economic or juridical.31  They further
maintain that even if other countries eventually agree to use
formulary apportionment, uniform approaches and conflict resolution
mechanisms would have to be devised to avoid multiple taxation
resulting from different definitions of a “unitary business,” different
ways of computing the income of a unitary business, and different
formulas for allocating the income of a unitary business.  Each
country would also be tempted to develop and apply a formula that
allocates more income to it.  In light of the huge potential compliance
costs of collecting information from foreign businesses, arm’s length
standard supporters also question the purported simplicity of the
formulary method.  Finally, supporters argue that the arm’s length
standard is more flexible.
D.  The Current Debate on the Authority of the Arm’s Length
Standard under Contemporary International Law
While critical, the policy debate among scholars and politicians
about the benefits and weaknesses of the arm’s length standard takes
place in a legal context.  The balance of this Article focuses on the
following question: Even if formulary apportionment is desirable
from a policy viewpoint, does contemporary international law grant
28. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
29. See generally authorities cited supra note 15.
30. See I.R.C. § 482.
31. “Economic double taxation” results when the same item of income is taxed more than
once, although in the hands of different corporations; “juridical double taxation” occurs when
the same income is taxed more than once in the hands of the same corporation.
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the arm’s length standard (and the arm’s length method) authority
that limits the discretion of Congress to move to a formulary
apportionment system?  This problem, too, has elicited a robust
debate between the defenders of the arm’s length standard and its
detractors.
The Treasury Department has been one of the staunchest
advocates for the proposition that the United States is obligated to
use the arm’s length standard, regardless of its policy merits or
shortcomings.  The Treasury Department has contended that
numerous U.S. tax treaties mandate use of the arm’s length standard
and method.  In its 1988 “White Paper” on inter-company pricing, the
Treasury Department argued in favor of continued adherence to the
arm’s length standard because the standard “is embodied in all U.S.
tax treaties; it is in each major model treaty, including the U.S. Model
Convention; [and] it is incorporated into most tax treaties to which
the United States is not a party.”32  At a one-day conference on
formulary apportionment organized by the Treasury Department in
1996, Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers “summarily
dismissed the notion that the United States should make a unilateral
move to formulary apportionment and hope that the rest of the world
would follow, because such a move would severely affect world trade
and destroy the U.S. network of tax treaties.”33  Indeed, Treasury
Department officials have consistently maintained that the adoption
of formulary apportionment is simply prohibited by U.S. tax treaties.34
The 1988 White Paper not only cited the widespread use of the
arm’s length standard in tax treaties, but also emphasized that “it has
been explicitly adopted by international organizations that have
addressed themselves to transfer pricing issues . . . and virtually every
major industrial nation takes the arm’s length standard as its frame of
reference in transfer pricing cases . . . .”35  The Treasury Department
has apparently not, however, gone so far as to assert that the status of
the arm’s length standard, as the world de facto standard, gives it the
force of customary international law.  Nonetheless, as Part V of this
32. A Study of Intercompany Pricing under Section 482 of the Code, I.R.S. Notice 88-123,
1988-2 C.B. 458, 475 [hereinafter 1988 White Paper].
33. Dorgan Blasts Arm’s Length Transfer Pricing Method, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 249-4
(Dec. 24, 1996).
34. See, e.g., John Turro, Treasury Continues to Champion Worldwide Arm’s Length
Standard, 66 TAX NOTES 316 (Jan. 16, 1995).
35. 1988 White Paper, supra note 32, at 475.
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Article discusses in detail, some defenders of the arm’s length
standard have made this claim.36
Opponents of the arm’s length standard dispute its status as an
authoritative norm under either international treaties or customary
international law.  Some argue that U.S. tax treaties do not mandate
continued adherence to the arm’s length standard and, by their terms,
permit the United States to adopt a system of formulary
apportionment.37  Others contend that mere uniformity of
international practice should not constrain U.S. policy-making,38 and
that the arm’s length standard has not achieved the status of
customary international law. These opponents conclude that the
United States may unilaterally adopt formulary apportionment under
international law.
For example, Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah, while apparently
conceding that existing U.S. tax treaties mandate the use of the arm’s
length standard, has urged that
[a]s an initial matter, the solution [to any treaty-related problems]
would be to propose the formulary approach as a discussion draft
and invite other countries to enter negotiations, but announce that
the approach will be adopted unilaterally if no agreement is
reached within a specified time period (e.g., five years).39
Along with other proponents of formulary apportionment, Professor
Avi-Yonah supports Congress’ freedom unilaterally to change the tax
law and casts doubt on the authority of the arm’s length standard
under contemporary international law, either as a treaty rule or as a
customary norm.
36. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Customary International Law and State Taxation of
Corporate Income: The Case for the Separate Accounting Method, 14 BERK. J. INT’L L. 99
(1996).
37. See, e.g., Louis M. Kauder, The Unspecific Federal Tax Policy of Arm’s Length: A
Comment on the Continuing Vitality of Formulary Apportionment at the Federal Level, 60 TAX
NOTES 1147 (Aug. 23, 1993).  Senator Dorgan has persistently argued that treaties should be
interpreted as permitting formulary apportionment.  See, e.g., Dorgan Testifies at Senate Foreign
Relations Hearing on Tax Treaties, supra note 16; Interview with Sen. Byron Dorgan on
Formulary Apportionment, 65 TAX NOTES 1598 (Dec. 26, 1994).  And this argument was
supported by Senator Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., who until 1995 was Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.  See Recently Approved Treaties Do Not Prevent Formulary
Apportionment, 61 TAX NOTES 1513, 1513 (Dec. 20, 1993).
38. See, e.g., Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length, 30
TAX NOTES 625, 670-71 (Feb. 17, 1986).
39. Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 159.
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E. The Debate on the Arm’s Length Standard as a Case Study of the
Problem of Determining the Normative Authority of Treaties and
Customary International Law
The debate on the authority of the arm’s length standard under
international treaties and customary international law raises a
number of challenging questions about the authority of international
law that go beyond the specific issues associated with the problem of
income allocation.  For example, how should treaty language be
interpreted?  Can treaties impose different levels of legal obligations,
including what might be called “persuasive obligations” (defined in
Part III below) as well as binding obligations?  And, even if treaties
do impose legal obligations of some kind, why should these
obligations be allowed to displace the independent judgment of states
about what course of action (for example, adopting classic formulary
apportionment as opposed to the arm’s length standard) is best from
a policy standpoint?
Similar questions can be asked about customary international
law.  How should we in practice determine whether a norm, like the
arm’s length standard, ought to be considered to have achieved the
status of customary international law?  And, again, even if a norm is
part of customary international law, why should states recognize an
obligation to follow it?
This Article critically examines the contentions made by both
proponents and opponents about the arm’s length standard’s
authority, or lack of authority, under contemporary international law.
As noted in the Introduction, it engages in this examination as a
means of probing, using tools from a variety of disciplines, the above
types of questions about the degree of authority treaties ought to
enjoy, and when and how norms ought to be treated as acquiring
authority under customary international law.  It thus has two
interrelated purposes.  First, the Article attempts to develop the
broad outlines of a normative theory regarding the authority of
treaties and customary international law, including a methodology for
identifying the existence of customary international legal norms.  This
theory takes into account existing rules on the interpretation of
treaties, their binding force, and the identification of customary
international law.
Second, the Article applies this theory to the particular problem
of determining the degree of authority the arm’s length standard
ought to be considered to have under contemporary international
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law—that is, of determining the extent to which treaties and
customary international law limit the discretion of Congress to
replace the standard with a system of formulary apportionment.
Examination of this particular problem in turn sheds light on the
broader theoretical problem of determining the normative authority
of treaties and customary international law.40
To begin to address these complex issues, the Article now turns
to a brief survey of the history of attempts to codify the arm’s length
standard and arm’s length method in international treaties.
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO CODIFY THE
ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD IN INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES
At the beginning of the twentieth century, few countries had
adopted rules for the allocation of corporate income.41  After World
War I, however, this situation quickly changed.  Trading activity
between countries expanded and gave rise to new claims of extra-
territorial tax jurisdiction.  A number of countries, particularly former
states of the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires, concluded
bilateral treaties aimed at eliminating double taxation based on rival
claims.42  And in 1921, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, and
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes signed a multilateral
convention in Rome; however, only Italy and Austria actually ratified
the treaty.43
40. The scope of this Article’s study is limited in a few respects.  First, with respect to its
theoretical analysis of the authority of international law, the Article can only scratch the surface
of an extraordinarily complex and vast subject; its conclusions therefore must necessarily be
viewed as preliminary and tentative in character.  Second, because the focus of the Article is on
the status of the arm’s length standard under international law, it pays only brief attention to
relevant norms under the U.S. Constitution regarding the status of international law in relation
to congressional legislation.  Third, the Article concentrates on the role of the arm’s length
standard in allocating income among related corporations, rather than among branches or
permanent establishments of a single corporation.  Finally, although the Article briefly discusses
the status of certain other allocation methods, its primary concern is the authority of the general
arm’s length standard and the arm’s length method.
41. See generally Langbein, supra note 38, at 629-30.
42. One of the first bilateral treaties apparently was an 1899 agreement to prevent double
taxation between Austria-Hungary and Prussia.  See MITCHELL B. CARROLL, GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES OF AN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAWYER 11 (1978).
43. See Double Taxation and Tax Evasion: Report and Resolutions Submitted by the
Technical Experts to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, League of Nations Doc.
F.212 (1925) [hereinafter 1925 Report on Double Taxation], reprinted in 4 JOINT COMMITTEE
ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX
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In response to pressure from the international business
community, the League of Nations Financial Committee appointed
several panels of experts to study the problem of double taxation.
Commenting on the issue of income allocation, an influential 1923
study noted that “the experience of more advanced countries in these
matters could profitably be collected and collated and used as the
basis of conventions for countries to whom they are more or less
novel.”44  The authors of the report declined, however, to endorse
particular allocation criteria.45
These early League of Nations initiatives focused primarily on
the allocation of income of a single corporation between its head
office located in one state and one or more branches or permanent
establishments located in other states.  With respect to this problem,
in a 1925 report on double taxation, a committee of technical experts
supported the principle of division of income between affected states
and acknowledged the existence of formulary methods in several
treaties, including those between Austria and Czechoslovakia and
between Danzig and Poland.  But it expressed no preference for
either the formulary or arm’s length methods.46
In a 1927 report,47 a newly constituted and enlarged committee of
technical experts drafted a “Convention for the Prevention of Double
Taxation” (the “1927 Model Convention”), which was framed as a
bilateral treaty.  The committee defended its decision to propose a
bilateral convention as opposed to a multilateral one, “signed by as
many States as possible,” on the ground that, while it would
eventually be desirable to conclude one or more multilateral
conventions, “the fiscal systems of the various countries are so
fundamentally different that it seems at present practically impossible
to draft a collective convention, unless it were worded in such general
terms as to be of no practical value . . . .”48  The committee expressed
CONVENTIONS 4057, 4071-72 (1962) [hereinafter CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY];
CARROLL, supra note 42, at 30.
44. Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors Bruins,
Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp, Addendum, at 52, League of Nations Doc.
E.F.S.73.F.19. (1923).
45. See id. at 52-53.
46. See 1925 Report on Double Taxation, supra note 43, at 4076, 4091.
47. Double Taxation and Tax Evasion: Report Presented by the Committee of Technical
Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.216.M.85.1927.II.
(1927), reprinted in CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4111 [hereinafter
1927 Report on Double Taxation].
48. Id. at 4122.
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the view that through model bilateral treaties “a certain measure of
uniformity will be introduced in international fiscal law and, at a later
stage of the evolution of that law, a system of general conventions
may be established which will make possible the unification and
codification of the rules previously laid down.”49
Article 5 of the 1927 Model Convention provided principles for
allocating income of one corporation among permanent
establishments in different states.  It provided generally that
each of the two States shall tax the portion of the income produced
in its territory.  In the absence of accounts showing this income
separately and in proper form, the competent administrations of the
two Contracting States shall come to an arrangement as to the rules
for apportionment.50
Again, the committee did not recommend a specific allocation
method.  Instead, it suggested establishing a standing committee on
taxation to draw up model allocation rules.51
Following submission of the committee’s report, the League
Council requested the Secretary-General to convene a General
Meeting of Government Experts to discuss the 1927 Model
Convention.  Although the 1928 General Meeting endorsed the
Model Convention, it also recommended certain changes and
developed three versions of the text to accommodate differences in
the fiscal systems of the two countries party to the conventions
(collectively known as the “1928 Model Conventions”).52  On the
question of allocation, article 5 of the first 1928 Model Convention
closely corresponded with article 5 of the 1927 Model Convention.53
Also in 1928, Congress added to the tax code the predecessor of
what is now section 482.  In the intervening seven decades, only a few
49. Id.
50. Draft of a Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation art. 5, reprinted
in CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4124-25 (emphasis added).
51. See 1927 Report on Double Taxation, supra note 47, at 4145.
52. See Double Taxation and Evasion: Report Presented by the General Meeting of
Government Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc.
C.562.M.178.1928.II. (1928), reprinted in CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43,
at 4151, 4159-61 [hereinafter 1928 Report on Double Taxation].
53. See Bilateral Conventions for the Prevention of Double Taxation in the Special Matter
of Direct Taxes, Text of Draft Convention No. 1a art. 5, reprinted in CONVENTIONS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4161, 4162.  However, unlike its 1927 predecessor, the
1928 Model Convention provided generally that the “competent administrations” of the two
states “shall come to an arrangement as to the basis for apportionment” and did not limit such
agreement to cases where the corporation failed to keep accounts showing the separate income
of the two permanent establishments in proper form.  See id.  Because of similarities among the
allocation provisions of the 1928 Model Conventions, only the first convention is discussed here.
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changes have been made to the text of that section.54  The original
section did not provide a particular method for determining the
permitted “distribution, apportionment, or allocation,” and for the
next seven years, no Treasury Department regulations indicated a
specific method.55
In 1929, a newly-constituted League Fiscal Committee began to
consider how to deal with rules for income allocation, but it “soon
came to the conclusion that, in order to do any useful work, it would
be essential to have a detailed knowledge of the present practice in
various countries.”56  It asked Professor Thomas S. Adams of Yale
University to prepare a report based on information supplied by
member countries.57
In his report, Professor Adams observed that in the case of
allocations to local subsidiaries, “[p]ractically all the replies state
categorically that the local company, which is a subsidiary of a foreign
corporation, is a separate legal entity and enjoys the same treatment
as other national companies.  It is therefore taxed on the basis of its
own accounts.”58  Adams noted, however, that some countries used
empirical or formulary methods if the separate accounts were
inadequate or misleading.  For example, he stated that in such a case
some national taxing authorities ascribed profits “to the subsidiary
company based on a comparison with the profits of other companies
engaged in a similar business.”59  In Germany and Spain, “[w]hen the
subsidiary and the foreign parent constitute a ‘single economic unit,’
the subsidiary may be treated as a branch,”60 while in the United
States “the fiscal authorities may allocate income as between the
foreign parent company and the local subsidiary.”61  In Great Britain
and Spain, “[w]here the profits of a subsidiary are artificially
concealed, a charge may be made upon the parent company based
54. See generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 95-97 (discussing the history of this
provision).
55. See id. at 96-97.
56. Report to the Council on the Work of the First Session of the Committee, Held in Geneva
from October 17th to 26th, 1929, League of Nations Doc. C.516.M.175.1929.II. (1929), reprinted
in CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4195, 4199.
57. See id.; Report to the Council on the Work of the Second Session of the Committee, Held
in Geneva from May 22nd to 31st, 1930, League of Nations Doc. C.340.M.140.1930.II. (1930),
reprinted in CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4203, 4207, 4212
[hereinafter 1930 Committee Report].
58. Id. at 4214.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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upon the true profits of the subsidiary.”62  Professor Adams also
reported, at least with respect to the allocation of profits to
permanent establishments, that Austria proposed the adoption of
conventional percentages as an international allocation method, while
other countries, such as the United States, considered “the method of
‘separate accounting’ as decidedly preferable to any hard-and-fast
formula for allocation.”63
Based in part on Professor Adams’ report, the Fiscal Committee
recommended the adoption of a multilateral convention on double
taxation, arguing that “it would materially encourage the movement
to reduce double taxation by uniform law—a method which in
important respects is obviously superior to the method of reducing
double taxation through the instrumentality of bilateral
conventions.”64  The Committee appointed a subcommittee to
prepare a study and to draft a multilateral convention.65
Following Professor Adams’ death, the subcommittee gave
responsibility for the study to his assistant, Mitchell B. Carroll.  At its
1933 session, the Fiscal Committee discussed Carroll’s final report on
allocation issues (the “Carroll Report”), which succeeded a
preliminary report released in 1931.66  Carroll obtained information
on allocation methods used in twenty-seven countries and three U.S.
states (Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and New York).  He found that
with respect to the allocation of the income of a single corporation
among its branches, “[a] predilection for the method of separate
accounting is evinced by the great majority of countries.”67  In
particular, he characterized the typical practice of countries as
“complete liberty of methods of assessment, but recourse in the first
instance to the declaration and separate accounts, subject to
verification and adjustment, or, if this [was] impossible, to the making
62. Id.
63. Id. at 4218-19.
64. Id. at 4210.
65. See id.
66. MITCHELL B. CARROLL, TAXATION OF FOREIGN AND NATIONAL ENTERPRISES
(VOLUME IV): METHODS OF ALLOCATING TAXABLE INCOME (1933).  On the 1931 preliminary
report, see Report to the Council on the Work of the Third Session of the Committee, Held in
Geneva from May 29th to June 6th, 1931, League of Nations Doc. C.415.M.171.1931.II.A. (1931),
reprinted in CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4225, 4229-30.  For a
personal account by Carroll of his work, see CARROLL, supra note 42.
67. CARROLL, supra note 66, ¶ 293, at 88.
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of an assessment by employing empirical methods or the method of
fractional apportionment.”68
On the other hand, Carroll’s review of state practice regarding
allocation of income between related corporations “expressed no
conclusion as to preferred methods.”69  He described three common
methods: (1) “readjustment on [the] basis of independent persons—
i.e., the legal fiction is respected, but the relations between the two
are examined in order to divide the joint profit between them in the
measure that each would have earned had the two been dealing with
each other as independent persons;”70 (2) “assessment of the parent in
the name of the subsidiary as agent;”71 and (3) “assessment on [the]
basis of economic unity” of the parent and subsidiary.72  Carroll noted
that the United States adopted the first “independent persons”
method under the predecessor of section 482, and that Canada’s law
contained a similar provision, permitting the redetermination of
income based on fair market prices.73  He also observed that Austrian
practice called for the adjustment of prices between a subsidiary and
a parent “based on a comparison with information furnished by
similar enterprises, at existing market prices, or, in the absence of
such evidence, on the opinion of experts.”74
In his conclusion, Carroll indicated as a matter of policy a strong
preference for the separate accounting method of allocating income
between branches of a single corporation, because he viewed it as
more consistent with the principle that a state should only have
authority to tax income from sources within its own territory.75  He
also cited many of the practical difficulties with formulary
apportionment previously discussed, including the problem that states
would likely choose formulas that allocate more income to their tax
jurisdiction.76  In addition, Carroll argued that the separate accounting
method was “preferred by the great majority of Governments, and
business enterprises represented in the International Chamber of
Commerce, as well as by other authoritative groups.”77
68. Id. ¶ 288, at 87.
69. Langbein, supra note 38, at 633.  See CARROLL, supra note 66, ¶¶ 384-406, at 109-15.
70. CARROLL, supra note 66, ¶ 386, at 110 (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. ¶¶ 387-88, at 110.
74. Id. ¶ 389.
75. See id. ¶ 666, at 187-88.
76. See id. ¶¶ 666-70, at 187-89.
77. Id. ¶ 671, at 189.
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Presumably on similar grounds, Carroll recommended that
corporations be treated as independent legal entities and that
allocations between related corporations be based on an independent
enterprise standard: “[I]f it is shown that inter-company transactions
have been carried on in such a manner as to divert profits from a
subsidiary, the diverted income should be allocated to the subsidiary
on the basis of what it would have earned had it been dealing with an
independent enterprise.”78  Carroll contended that “the conduct of
business between a corporation and its subsidiaries on the basis of
dealings with an independent enterprise obviates all problems of
allocation.”79
Legal scholar Stanley Langbein has faulted the Carroll Report
for what he contends is its bias in favor of the arm’s length standard.
According to Langbein, the report ignores the statutory imposition of
formulary methods among certain countries or states.  Langbein
argues that “Carroll conceived his role to be one of developing an
international approach which would truncate any movement of the
international community to the development, on a general scale, of
working rules of fractional apportionment, rather than one of
evaluating, in an unbiased way, alternative approaches to the
problem.”80
In light of the Carroll Report, the subcommittee on allocation
issues recommended adoption of a draft convention specifying
methods of allocation, and the entire Fiscal Committee approved the
text of this convention (the “1933 Draft Convention”).81  The
Committee proposed to the League Council that its draft could serve
as the basis for a multilateral convention.  It recommended that the
draft be transmitted to governments so that they could submit
comments and indicate their interest in such a multilateral
convention.82
78. Id. ¶ 628, at 177.
79. Id.
80. Langbein, supra note 38, at 637-38.
81. See Draft Convention Adopted for the Allocation of Business Income between States
for the Purposes of Taxation [hereinafter 1933 Draft Convention], in Report to the Council on
the Fourth Session of the Committee, Held at Geneva from June 15th to 26th, 1933, League of
Nations Doc. C.399.M.204.1933.II.A. (1933), reprinted in CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4241, 4243 [hereinafter 1933 Committee Report]; see also 1933
Committee Report at 4241-42.
82. See 1933 Committee Report, supra note 81, at 4242.
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Regarding the problem of allocating the income of a single
company to particular permanent establishments, the 1933 Draft
Convention provided in article 3:
If an enterprise with its fiscal domicile in one contracting State has
permanent establishments in other contracting States, there shall be
attributed to each permanent establishment the net business
income which it might be expected to derive if it were an
independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities
under the same or similar conditions.  Such net income will, in
principle, be determined on the basis of the separate accounts
pertaining to such establishment.83
Further, the 1933 Draft Convention called for adjustments of
accounts to reflect arm’s length prices, thus formally adopting the
arm’s length standard and the arm’s length method:
The fiscal authorities of the contracting States shall, when
necessary, in execution of the preceding paragraph, rectify the
accounts produced, notably to correct errors or omissions, or to re-
establish the prices or remunerations entered in the books at the
value which would prevail between independent persons dealing at
arm’s length.84
The 1933 Draft Convention permitted the use of various
empirical methods as fallback methods, including a percentage of
turnover “fixed in accordance with the nature of the transactions in
which the establishment is engaged and by comparison with the
results obtained by similar enterprises operating in the country.”85  It
provided that, if neither these empirical methods nor the arm’s length
method could be applied, the “net business income of the permanent
establishment” could be determined by various formulaic factors
based on the “total income derived by the enterprise from the activities
in which such establishment has participated . . . provided such factors
be so selected as to ensure results approaching as closely as possible to
those which would be reflected by a separate accounting.”86
The 1933 Draft Convention was the first model treaty to contain
a specific provision on the allocation of profits from one company
(including a subsidiary) to a related company.  Article 5 provided:
When an enterprise of one contracting State has a dominant
participation in the management or capital of an enterprise of
another contracting State, or when both enterprises are owned or
controlled by the same interests, and as the result of such situation
83. Id. at 4244 (art. 3) (emphasis added).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
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there exists [sic], in their commercial or financial relations,
conditions different from those which would have been made
between independent enterprises, any item of profit or loss which
should normally have appeared in the accounts of one enterprise,
but which has been, in this manner, diverted to the other enterprise,
shall be entered in the accounts of such former enterprise, subject
to the rights of appeal allowed under the law of the State of such
enterprise.87
It should be noted that while the 1933 Draft Convention clarified that
the use of formulary apportionment as a fallback method was
permissible with respect to allocations to permanent establishments
under article 3, it did not clarify whether formulary apportionment
was permissible with respect to inter-corporate allocations under
article 5.
The 1933 Draft Convention was never formally promulgated as
an official model.  The Fiscal Committee circulated it to governments
for their comments,88 and based on the responses of thirty-three
governments, the Committee reported in 1935 that the general
sentiment was favorable to the text.89  Nevertheless, only a small
number of governments expressed an immediate desire to become
party to a multilateral convention along the lines of the 1933 Draft
Convention.90  In view of this meager response, the Fiscal Committee
concluded that “progress is more likely to be achieved by means of
bilateral agreements . . . .  Governments consider . . . that bilateral
agreements are likely to prove more appropriate.”91  The Committee
endorsed this bilateral approach, believing that the promulgation of
the model convention as the basis for bilateral treaties would
“automatically [create] a uniformity of practice and legislation,” while
remaining “sufficiently elastic to be adapted to the different
conditions obtaining in different countries or pairs of countries,”92
since it could be modified in particular bilateral agreements.
The genesis of article 5 of the 1933 Draft Convention is unclear.
The first bilateral convention incorporating a provision on the
87. Id. at 4245 (art. 5) (emphasis added).
88. See Report to the Council on the Fifth Session of the Committee, Held at Geneva from
June 12th to 17th, 1935, League of Nations Doc. C.252.M.124.1935.II.A. (1935), reprinted in
CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4249, 4251 [hereinafter 1935
Committee Report].
89. See id.
90. See CARROLL, supra note 42, at 70 (discussing relative lack of interest in a multilateral
convention).
91. 1935 Committee Report, supra note 88, at 4251-52.
92. Id. at 4252.
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allocation of profits between related corporations appears to have
been the 1932 treaty between the United States and France, the first
such bilateral tax convention entered into by the United States.93
Article IV of the treaty provided:
When an American enterprise, by reason of its participation in the
management or capital of a French enterprise, makes or imposes on
the latter, in their commercial or financial relations, conditions
different from those which would be made with a third enterprise,
any profits which should normally have appeared in the balance
sheet of the French enterprise, but which have been in this manner,
diverted to the American enterprise, are, subject to the measures of
appeal applicable in the case of the tax on industrial and
commercial profits, incorporated in the taxable profits of the
French enterprise.94
Under the treaty, the same principle applied in the case of profits
similarly diverted from an American enterprise to a French
enterprise.95
Carroll has observed that the language of article IV of the 1932
U.S.-France treaty was “modeled on” the statutory predecessor of
section 482.96  Further, article 5 of the 1933 Draft Convention may
have been inspired by article IV of the 1932 U.S.-France treaty, as
evidenced by textual similarities between the two provisions.
Importantly, both imply some form of obligation: the 1932 U.S.-
France treaty provided that diverted profits “are” to be included in
the profits of the enterprise from which they have been diverted, and
the 1933 Draft Convention provided that they “shall” be so included.
The adoption of the 1933 Draft Convention, and perhaps the
ratification of the 1932 U.S.-France treaty, apparently prompted other
countries to include provisions similar to article 5 of the 1933 Draft
Convention in their bilateral treaties, with one significant
modification—they changed the imperative “shall” in the 1933 Draft
Convention to the permissive “may.”  For example, in their tax treaty
concluded on June 17, 1936, Hungary and Sweden included an article
with such a modification.97  Indeed, nearly all bilateral tax treaties
93. See Convention Concerning Double Taxation, Apr. 27, 1932, U.S.-Fr., art. IV, 49 Stat.
3145, 3146-47 (1935) (the United States ratified the treaty in 1932, France in 1935).
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. See id.
96. See Mitchell B. Carroll, Evolution of U.S. Treaties to Avoid Double Taxation of Income,
Part II, 3 INT’L LAW. 129, 150 (1968).
97. See Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation in the Matter of Direct Taxes,
June 17, 1936, Hung.-Swed., Final Protocol, ¶ 9, reprinted in 1 WALTER H. DIAMOND &
DOROTHY B. DIAMOND, INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATIES OF ALL NATIONS 210, 214 (1975).
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concluded after 1933 that contain provisions on the allocation of
income among related enterprises have used the permissive term
“may” (except for certain successors to the 1932 U.S.-France treaty).98
Perhaps not coincidentally, just two years after the Carroll
Report had recommended adoption of the arm’s length standard, the
U.S. Treasury Department, in 1935, promulgated regulations under
the predecessor of section 482 calling for the use of the arm’s length
standard.  Those regulations provided in part that “[t]he standard to
be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at
arm’s length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.”99  Until major
revisions were made in 1994, this language remained essentially
unchanged in subsequent regulations issued under section 482.100
In the next decade and a half, the provisions of the 1933 Draft
Convention relating to profit allocation found their way into two
model bilateral conventions formulated under the auspices of the
League Fiscal Committee, the “1943 Mexico Model” and the “1946
London Model.”101  Article VII of the Protocol to both Models,
dealing with the allocation of profits between related enterprises, was
essentially identical to article 5 of the 1933 Draft Convention.102
The League of Nations Fiscal Committee recommended the
continued conclusion of bilateral tax treaties in its 1946 report:
[I]t is becoming increasingly evident that the conclusion by an
increasing number of States of bilateral treaties along the lines of
the Model Conventions of London and Mexico constitutes the most
adequate means of removing the existing serious tax obstructions to
the international flow of capital and foreign trade.103
Following the 1943 Mexico and 1946 London Models, the next
major model treaty was the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) draft convention, adopted in 1963 (“1963
98. See generally the collected treaties reproduced in the multi-volume series including 1
DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 97.
99. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 45-1(b) (1935).
100. Compare id. with Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (as amended by T.D. 8552, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,990
(1994)).
101. See London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions: Commentary and Text, League of
Nations Doc. C.88.M.88.1946.II.A. (1946), reprinted in CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 43, at 4319 [hereinafter London and Mexico Models].
102. Compare article VII of both models in London and Mexico Models, supra note 101, at
4402-3, with article 5 of the 1933 Draft Convention in 1933 Committee Report, supra note 81, at
4245.
103. Report on the Work of the Tenth Session of the Committee, Held in London from March
20th to 26th, 1946, League of Nations Doc. C.37.M.37.1946.II.A. (1946), reprinted in
CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4295, 4315.
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OECD Model”).104  This draft convention was the product of several
years of work by the Fiscal Committee of the OECD’s predecessor,
the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).105
In its 1958 report, the OEEC Fiscal Committee recommended the
elaboration of a new model bilateral convention acceptable to all
OEEC member states106 and envisioned additional harmonization by
replacing the existing bilateral conventions with one multilateral
convention.107
In 1960, the OEEC Fiscal Committee proposed model articles
(articles XV and XVI) relating to the allocation of profits to
permanent establishments and associated enterprises.  These
provisions closely tracked the 1943 Mexico and 1946 London Models.
Article XV reiterated application of the independent enterprise
standard to the allocation of profits to permanent establishments, but
provided that it would not prohibit a state’s use of formulary
apportionment where the state had a custom of doing so.108  At the
same time, the article affirmed that “the method of apportionment
adopted shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance
with the principles laid down in this Article.” 109
Article XVI, on the allocation of profits to associated
enterprises, also reiterated the independent enterprise standard:
Where
a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or
indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of
the other Contracting State, or
b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the
management, control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting
State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State,
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ
from those which would be made between independent enterprises,
then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have
104. See DRAFT DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL: REPORT OF
THE O.E.C.D. FISCAL COMMITTEE (1963) [hereinafter 1963 OECD MODEL].
105. See id. at 7.
106. See The Elimination of Double Taxation: Report of the Fiscal Committee of the
O.E.E.C. (1958), reprinted in CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4445,
4460 [hereinafter 1958 Report of the Fiscal Committee].
107. See id.
108. See The Elimination of Double Taxation: Third Report of the Fiscal Committee, art. XV
(1960), reprinted in CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4565, 4587
[hereinafter Third Report of the Fiscal Committee].
109. Id. art. XV(4).
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accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of
that enterprise and taxed accordingly.110
In the Commentary to article XVI, the OEEC Fiscal Committee
indicated that the taxation authorities of a particular country “may”
re-write the accounts of the enterprises for purposes of calculating tax
liabilities
[i]f as a result of the special relations between the enterprises the
accounts do not show the true taxable profits arising in that
country.  It is evidently appropriate that rectification should be
sanctioned in such circumstances, and the Article seems to call for
very little comment.  It should perhaps be mentioned that the
provisions of the Article apply only if special conditions have been
made or imposed between the two enterprises. 111
The Fiscal Committee went on to emphasize that “no re-writing of
the accounts of associated enterprises is authorised if the transactions
between such enterprises have taken place on normal open market
commercial terms.”112
Article XVI departed from the language of the 1933 Draft
Convention and the 1943 Mexico and 1946 London Models by
providing that a reallocation of profits “may” be made rather than
“shall” be made.  This change paralleled the use of “may” in the vast
majority of actual bilateral treaties, as noted above.113  The Fiscal
Committee did not explain this change in its Commentary, however.114
The Fiscal Committee simply reiterated that it had attempted to
reflect standards that already had found their way into state practice
and bilateral tax conventions among European countries.115
At its 1961 meeting, the OEEC Fiscal Committee adopted the
text of an article on a mutual agreement procedure.116  Generally, this
article permitted taxpayers to present their cases to the relevant
“competent authority” of their home state if they believed they would
be subjected to double taxation not in accordance with the
Convention.117  The relevant competent authority was directed to
110. Id. art. XVI, at 4588 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 4606.
112. Id.
113. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
114. See Third Report of the Fiscal Committee, supra note 108, at 4581, 4606.
115. See id. at 4597-98.
116. See The Elimination of Double Taxation: Fourth Report of the Fiscal Committee, art.
XXV (1961), reprinted in CONVENTIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4619, 4651
[hereinafter Fourth Report of the Fiscal Committee].
117. See id.
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attempt to solve the problem on its own, but if this was not possible, it
was to work toward a resolution “by mutual agreement with the
competent authority of the other Contracting State.”118  In its
Commentary on this provision, the Fiscal Committee recommended
that the mutual agreement procedure could be applied in cases
involving the allocation of profits among associated enterprises.119
After the OECD superceded the OEEC in 1961 (at which time
the United States and Canada joined its ranks) the above-mentioned
articles on the allocation of profits to permanent establishments, on
the allocation of profits between associated enterprises, and on the
mutual agreement procedure were incorporated in nearly identical
form in the 1963 OECD Model as articles 7, 9, and 25 respectively.120
The portions of the final Commentary prepared in connection with
the 1963 OECD Model relevant to articles 7, 9, and 25 were also
virtually identical to the Commentaries quoted above in the original
reports of the Fiscal Committee.121
In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States, by now the world’s
largest commercial actor, began to fear revenue losses from transfer
pricing abuses, because there were still no clear rules for allocation.122
The U.S. Treasury Department thus acted to promote the adoption of
an international norm in this area: the arm’s length standard.123
Congress, however, also considered the idea of endorsing formulary
apportionment as a means of preventing transfer pricing abuses.  In
1962, a proposed amendment to section 482 would have explicitly
authorized the Treasury Department to use a formula to reallocate
income in the case of sales or purchases between a U.S. corporation
and its controlled foreign subsidiary.124  Although approved by the
House of Representatives, the provision was not included in the
Senate version of the bill (or in the ultimately enacted law).
Nevertheless, the Conference Committee report indicated that both
the House and the Senate conferees believed that the objectives of
the House bill could be realized by amending the regulations under
118. Id.
119. See id. at 4697-98.
120. Compare Third Report of the Fiscal Committee, supra note 108, at 4587-88 and Fourth
Report of the Fiscal Committee, supra note 116, at 4651 with 1963 OECD MODEL, supra note
104, at 45-47, 56.
121. For the relevant portions of the Commentary on the 1963 OECD Model, see 1963
OECD MODEL, supra note 104, at 79-89, 93, 155-56.
122. See Langbein, supra note 38, at 642-43.
123. See id. at 643.
124. See H.R. REP. NO. 1447, at 28-29 (1962).
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section 482.125  They expressed the view that “the Treasury should
explore the possibility of developing and promulgating regulations
under [the] authority [of section 482] which would provide additional
guidelines and formulas for the allocation of income and deductions
in cases involving foreign income.”126
At least partly in response to this invitation, the Treasury
Department began to develop additional substantive guidelines under
section 482 and adopted new regulations in 1968.127  These regulations
did not endorse a formulary approach, as originally suggested by the
1962 Conference Committee report.  Rather, they reiterated, almost
verbatim, the original language from the 1935 regulations
promulgating the arm’s length standard.  They then specified
particular methods for applying that standard to different types of
transactions, including the CUP, cost plus, and resale price methods.128
A few years before the issuance of the 1968 section 482
regulations, the U.S. Treasury Department began an international
campaign to persuade other countries to adopt similar allocation
principles.  In a 1965 speech before the Tax Institute of America,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Stanley Surrey explained why the
United States sought worldwide acceptance of its version of the arm’s
length standard.  Emphasizing that “a unilateral approach by the
United States, or any country, is not sufficient,” and that “the
ultimate goal [must be] an internationally acceptable set of rational
rules to govern the allocation of international income arising through
these transactions,” assistant Secretary Surrey suggested that the new
U.S. section 482 regulations “may prove helpful as a starting point
[for the OECD’s efforts to establish allocation standards] and as a
way of focusing attention on a wide range of issues.”129  It is
noteworthy that Surrey highlighted the problems stemming from the
general lack of clear international norms of any sort, not the
particular shortcomings of formulary apportionment or other
allocation methods.130
In 1971, Stanley Surrey and David Tillinghast co-authored a
general report on responses to a questionnaire circulated by the
125. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 2508, at 18-19 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 1129, 1146-47.
126. Id. at 1147.
127. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1, -2 (as amended in 1968).
128. See id.
129. Secretary Surrey Reports on Developments in Treasury’s Foreign Tax Program, 24 J.
TAX’N 54, 56 (1966).
130. See Langbein, supra note 38, at 648.
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International Fiscal Association (IFA).131  While alleging that
“virtually all of the reporting countries utilize an ‘arm’s length’
standard,” Surrey and Tillinghast emphasized that countries varied in
the extent to which they addressed allocation issues in statutory rules
or regulations.132  Their report acknowledged that, in many cases,
governments were spurred to address the issue of allocation only
because the United States more aggressively applied its own version
of the arm’s length standard in the 1968 regulations, resulting in
negative adjustments to the taxable income of foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. corporations.133
Probably under the influence of the United States, the OECD in
the 1970s publicly advocated the arm’s length standard and decisively
rejected formulary apportionment.  In 1967, the OECD Fiscal
Committee, renamed the Committee on Fiscal Affairs in 1971, began
reviewing and revising the 1963 OECD Model.  In 1977, the OECD
promulgated a new model tax treaty (the “1977 OECD Model”) that
essentially replicated the provisions of the 1963 OECD Model
addressing allocation and the mutual agreement procedure.134
Significantly, the 1977 OECD Model added a new paragraph to
Article 9, which became paragraph 2.  Paragraph 2 dealt with
correlative (or “corresponding”) adjustments to the income of related
corporations.  It provided:
Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise
of that State—and taxes accordingly—profits on which an
enterprise of the other Contracting State has been charged to tax in
that other State and the profits so included are profits which would
have accrued to the enterprise of the first-mentioned State if the
conditions made between the two enterprises had been those which
would have been made between independent enterprises, then that
other State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of
the tax charged therein on those profits.  In determining such
adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other provisions of this
131. See Stanley Surrey & David Tillinghast, General Report, Allocation of Income and
Expenses Between Related Entities Under Common Control, 56b CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL
INTERNATIONALE I/1 (1971).
132. Id. at I/12-13.
133. See id. at I/12.
134. See MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL: REPORT OF
THE OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS 11 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 OECD MODEL].  The
1977 version of paragraph 1 of article 9 was identical to the 1963 version of article 9; the 1977
version of article 7 was nearly identical to the 1963 version.  The 1977 version of article 25,
however, made certain changes to the mutual agreement procedure.  Compare id. arts. 7, 9, 25
with 1963 OECD MODEL, supra note 104, arts. 7, 9, 25.
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Convention and the competent authorities of the Contracting
States shall if necessary consult each other.135
Two years later, the OECD issued a detailed report on transfer
pricing (the “1979 OECD Report”).136  The report first maintained
that “there is a broad consensus among governments of developed
and developing countries and MNEs that arm’s length pricing is the
appropriate approach to adopt in arriving at profits for tax purposes.
Modern bilateral double taxation conventions between OECD
Member States and between OECD Members and other States have
accordingly adopted this principle.”137  In general, the 1979 OECD
Report recommended that member states adopt an approach similar
to the U.S. regulations.
Perhaps most importantly, the 1979 OECD Report adamantly
rejected the permissibility of formulary apportionment under the
OECD Models.  The Report asserted that the use of alternatives that
moved away from the arm’s length approach and towards “global or
direct methods of profit allocation, or towards fixing transfer prices
by reference to predetermined formulae for allocating profits
between affiliates [was] incompatible in fact with articles 7 and 9 of
the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention.”138  The 1979 OECD
Report also criticized formulary apportionment on a number of
policy grounds.  These included the fact that the
uncoordinated use [of formulary apportionment] by the tax
authorities of several countries would involve the danger that,
overall, the MNE affected would suffer double taxation of its
profits.  This is not to say, however, that in seeking to arrive at the
arm’s length price in a range of transactions, some regard to the total
profits of the relevant MNE may not be helpful, as a check on the
assessment of the arm’s length price or in specific bilateral situations
where other methods give rise to serious difficulties and the two
countries concerned are able to adopt a common approach and the
necessary information can be made available.139
In the emphasized sentence, the OECD Report appeared to admit
the possibility of some use of transactional profit split methods and,
perhaps, classic formulary apportionment in very special
circumstances where two countries could agree on their use.140  The
135. 1977 OECD MODEL, supra note 134, art. 9(2) (emphasis added).
136. See generally TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: REPORT OF
THE OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS (1979) [hereinafter 1979 OECD REPORT].
137. Id. ¶ 3, at 8-9 (emphasis added).
138. Id. ¶ 14, at 14.
139. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
140. See id.
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1979 OECD Report also suggested that the limited use of the
comparable profits method could be helpful, but that comparisons of
profits should be used “only as pointers to further investigation.”141
While the OECD revised its model and drafted the 1979 OECD
Report, the U.S. Treasury Department developed its own model
conventions, issuing versions in 1976, 1977, and 1981.142  The model
conventions were based largely on the 1977 OECD Model.  However,
the model conventions included a new paragraph 3 in article 9 on
associated enterprises.  For example, in the 1981 version (“1981 U.S.
Model”), paragraph 3 stated that the provisions of the paragraph
setting forth the arm’s length standard (paragraph 1) “shall not limit
any provisions of the law of either Contracting State which permit the
distribution, apportionment, or allocation of income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between [related] persons . . . when necessary
in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of
any of such persons.”143  This provision was apparently added to
ensure that the IRS could continue to apply the provisions of section
482 and the 1968 regulations in determining an arm’s length price.
Meanwhile, the United Nations was developing its own model
tax treaty between developed and developing countries.  In 1967, the
U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) requested the
Secretary-General to appoint a Group of Experts on Tax Treaties
between Developed and Developing Countries (“Group of
Experts”).144  In the summary of the deliberations at its seventh
session in 1978, the Group of Experts unanimously recognized the
“validity of the arm’s length principle” and affirmed that
governments “should” apply the principle “wherever appropriate.”145
The Group of Experts further stated that
for the time being it did not seem feasible to initiate preparatory
141. Id. ¶ 71, at 42-43.
142. See United States Model Convention on Income and Capital, May 13, 1976, reprinted in
10 WALTER H. DIAMOND & DOROTHY B. DIAMOND, INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATIES OF ALL
NATIONS, 417 (1976); Treasury Department Model Income Tax Treaty of May 17, 1977,
reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) ¶ 208 (Dec. 1999); Treasury Department’s Model Income
Tax Treaty of June 16, 1981, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) ¶ 211 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter
1981 U.S. Model].
143. 1981 U.S. Model, supra note 142, art. 9(3), ¶ 211.09.
144. See E.S.C. Res. 1273, U.N. ESCOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/4429
(1967).
145. U.N. DEP’T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS
ON TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON THE WORK OF
ITS SEVENTH MEETING at 62, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/79, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XVI.1 (1978)
[hereinafter SEVENTH REPORT].
LEPARD.DOC 03/27/00  8:34 PM
78 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 10:43
work for the conclusion of a multilateral agreement that could
cover all the controversial issues involved in transfer pricing.  The
Group agreed that at the present time the matter of transfer pricing
arrangements should be settled . . . in the course of the negotiations
on bilateral tax treaties.146
It further “expressed its readiness to consider a draft model
convention between developed and developing countries.”147
In his report to ECOSOC in 1978, the Secretary-General
endorsed this idea,148 and the Group of Experts began developing a
model.  In 1979, the Group of Experts adopted the final text of the
model convention (“U.N. Model”).149
Article 9 of the U.N. Model was essentially identical to article 9
of the 1977 OECD Model.150  The Group of Experts’ Commentary on
article 9 replicated much of the 1977 OECD Commentary.151  It
reiterated that, under paragraph 1, “the tax authorities of a
Contracting State may, for the purpose of calculating tax liabilities . . .
‘rewrite the accounts of the [separate] enterprises if . . . the accounts
do not show the true taxable profits . . . .’”152
Article 25, which dealt with the mutual agreement procedure,
was also very similar to the 1977 OECD Model, with some minor
differences.153  In its Commentary on paragraph 4 of article 25, the
Group of Experts affirmed that “transactions between related entities
should be governed by the standard of ‘arm’s length dealing’; as a
consequence, if an actual allocation is considered by the tax
authorities of a treaty country to depart from that standard, the
taxable profits may be redetermined.”154  Finally, the report on the
U.N. Model saw the conclusion of bilateral treaties as paving the way
ultimately for a worldwide convention and also for regional or
subregional conventions.155
146. Id.
147. Id. at 61.
148. Work of the Group of Experts on Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing
Countries: Report of the Secretary-General ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/1978/36 (1978).
149. See U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE
TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 4, 13, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/102, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XVI.3 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. MODEL].
150. See id. at 27, 105.
151. See id. at 105-08.
152. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
153. See id. at 40, 234.
154. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
155. See id. at 12.
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In the United States, a 1981 report prepared by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) disputed the 1979 OECD Report’s
categorical rejection of formulary methods.  It acknowledged,
however, that formulary apportionment would be incompatible with
the OECD Models and recommended that the United States not
adopt formulary apportionment unilaterally, but instead educate
other states about its benefits.156
During the mid-1980s, the U.S. Congress expressed renewed
concern about transfer pricing abuses.  In 1986, Congress noted that
“[m]any observers have questioned the effectiveness of the ‘arm’s
length’ approach of the regulations under section 482.  A recurrent
problem is the absence of comparable arm’s length transactions
between unrelated parties, and the inconsistent results of attempting
to impose an arm’s length concept in the absence of comparables.”157
Congress found that the most serious problems involved the case of
“transfers of high-profit potential intangibles,” such as intellectual
property.158  In response to a congressional request for “a
comprehensive study of intercompany pricing rules,” the Treasury
Department issued the 1988 White Paper.159 After reviewing the
history of model and bilateral tax treaties and the practices of major
trading partners, the 1988 White Paper concluded:
The arm’s length standard is embodied in all U.S. tax treaties; it is
in each major model treaty, including the U.S. Model Convention;
it is incorporated into most tax treaties to which the United States
is not a party; it has been explicitly adopted by international
organizations that have addressed themselves to transfer pricing
issues; and virtually every major industrial nation takes the arm’s
length standard as its frame of reference in transfer pricing cases.
This overwhelming evidence indicates that there in fact is an
international norm for making transfer pricing adjustments and that
the norm is the arm’s length standard.  It is equally clear as a policy
matter that, in the interest of avoiding extreme positions by other
jurisdictions and minimizing the incidence of disputes over primary
taxing jurisdiction in international transactions, the United States
should continue to adhere to the arm’s length standard.160
156. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES: IRS COULD BETTER PROTECT U.S. TAX INTERESTS IN DETERMINING THE INCOME
OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 56-57 (1981).
157. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 PREPARED BY THE
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION AND RELEASED MAY 7, 1987 1014 (1987).
158. Id.
159. See 1988 White Paper, supra note 32.
160. Id. at 475.
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Despite its defense of the arm’s length standard as an
international norm, the Treasury Department, like Congress, was
concerned about the difficulty of finding comparable transactions.  It
sought to revise the 1968 regulations in order to refine the general
methods for determining an arm’s length price.  In January 1992 it
proposed amendments to the regulations.  Importantly, and
controversially, the Treasury Department introduced a mandatory
“comparable profit interval” test (reflecting a “comparable profit
method”) designed to serve as a check on the result indicated by the
traditional methods for determining an arm’s length price.161
However, U.S. treaty partners and the OECD protested that an
overly strict application of the comparable profit interval test would
violate the arm’s length standard.162
The Treasury Department issued temporary and proposed
regulations in January 1993 that significantly restructured the 1968
regulations and also attempted to allay some concerns of the OECD
and U.S. treaty partners about the 1992 proposed regulations by
retracting mandatory use of the comparable profit method.  The
regulations reaffirmed the arm’s length standard and required that
the results of a transaction be consistent with arm’s length results.163
An important innovation of the temporary regulations was the
establishment of a more flexible “‘best method rule’ for selecting the
method to be applied to test the arm’s length character of a controlled
transaction.”164  In July 1994, the Treasury Department promulgated
final regulations, which essentially followed the 1993 temporary
regulations with a few minor changes.165  Consistent with these new
regulations, in March 1998 the Treasury Department released
proposed regulations on the allocation of income from global
securities dealing operations that permitted the use of the profit split
method.166
161. See the Treasury Department’s Explanation of Provisions in 57 Fed. Reg. 3574 (1992);
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(5), (e)(1)(iii)-(iv), in id. at 3583-84, 3586.  For the rules on
applying the comparable profit interval test, see Prop. Treas. Reg.  § 1.482-2(f), in id. at 3586-95.
162. See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TAX
ASPECTS OF TRANSFER PRICING WITHIN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THE UNITED
STATES PROPOSED REGULATIONS: A REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS ON
THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 482 IRC 26-36 (1993).
163. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(b)(1) (as amended in 1993).
164. 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5265-66 (1993); see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii)(A) (as
amended in 1993).
165. See Intercompany Transfer Pricing Regulations Under Section 482, 59 Fed. Reg.
34,971, 34,975 (1994); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1 - 1.482-8 (1994).
166. See 63 Fed. Reg. 11,177, 11,181-82 (1998); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-8(e), in id. at
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During the 1990s, the Treasury Department also promoted the
use of “advance pricing agreements” or “APAs.”167  APAs are
agreements under which a U.S. taxpayer, the Internal Revenue
Service, and, in certain cases, authorities of other countries agree in
advance on a particular methodology for establishing transfer prices.
The objective of the program is to satisfy the concerns of all parties,
while avoiding the costs and uncertainties of future litigation over
transfer pricing issues.168
Meanwhile, the Treasury Department and the GAO continued
to study transfer pricing problems and abuses.169  In an appendix
attached to a 1992 report, the Treasury Department reproduced a
joint statement from the tax administrations of France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.  The statement rejected the
use of formulary methods “as a general substitute for the arms length
approach” but indicated that the “use of formulae should not . . . be
entirely ruled out.  In some industries and in some circumstances the
use of a formula might be appropriate assuming that the formula
attempted to approximate an arms length result.”170
In the first half of the decade, the OECD undertook a
comprehensive, systematic effort to update the 1977 OECD Model
and the transfer pricing guidelines of the 1979 OECD Report.  It
issued a revised model in 1992, which the Committee on Fiscal Affairs
decided to review on an ongoing basis, revising the text or
commentary as it deemed advisable.  The most recent major revision
was conducted in 1997 (the “1997 OECD Model”).171  In 1995, the
OECD issued new transfer pricing guidelines (the “1995 Transfer
Pricing Guidelines”)172 that reiterated the organization’s vehement
11,192-95 (1998).
167. See Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526; Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 375.
168. See id.
169. See, e.g., Treasury Department, Report on the Application and Administration of
Section 482, reprinted in 92 TAX NOTES INT’L 16-42 (Apr. 15, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Report on
Section 482]; U.S. General Accounting Office, International Taxation: Problems Persist in
Determining Tax Effects of Intercompany Prices, reprinted in 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 147-46
(July 20, 1992) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of formulary apportionment).
170. Report of Agreed Discussions Between the Tax Administrations of France, Germany,
the United Kingdom and the United States ¶¶ 3.4-3.5, in 1992 Report on Section 482, supra note
169, Appendix E.
171. See 1 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (UPDATED AS OF 1ST NOVEMBER 1997) I-4 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
OECD MODEL].  For the text of the model, see id. at M-1 to M-57.
172. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSFER
PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES].
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opposition to formulary apportionment.173  In particular, the OECD
affirmed that the
most significant concern with global formulary apportionment is
the difficulty of implementing the system in a manner that both
protects against double taxation and ensures single taxation.  To
achieve this would require substantial international coordination
and consensus on the predetermined formulae to be used and on
the composition of the group in question . . . .  Reaching such
agreement would be time-consuming and extremely difficult.174
Further, the OECD argued that by “disregarding intra-group
transactions for the purpose of computing consolidated profits, a
global formulary apportionment method . . . would involve a rejection
of a number of rules incorporated in bilateral tax treaties”
(presumably including rules patterned after article 9 of the OECD
Models).175
However, the 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines did give a limited
endorsement to what they called “‘transactional profit methods’ . . .
that examine the profits that arise from particular transactions among
associated enterprises,” and, in particular, the profit split method.176
They also cautiously endorsed the “transactional net margin
method,” which is similar to the comparable profits method.177  The
Guidelines emphasized, however, that such profit-based methods
can be accepted only insofar as they are compatible with Article 9
of the OECD Model Tax Convention, especially with regard to
comparability.  This is achieved by applying the methods in a
manner that approximates arm’s length pricing, which requires that
the profits arising from particular controlled transactions be
compared to the profits arising from comparable transactions
between independent enterprises.178
In 1996, the Treasury Department issued a new model U.S. tax
treaty (the “1996 U.S. Model”).  In the model’s technical explanation,
the Treasury Department explained that it based the model on both
the 1981 U.S. Model and the latest (1995) revision of the OECD
Model.179  The 1996 U.S. Model made a number of relevant revisions
173. See id. ¶ 3.1, at III-1, ¶¶ 3.58-3.74, at III-19-24.
174. Id. ¶ 3.64, at III-21.
175. Id. ¶ 3.72, at III-23-24.
176. Id. ¶¶ 3.1, 3.5-3.25, at III-1-9.
177. See id. ¶¶ 3.1, 3.26-3.48, at III-1, III-9-16.
178. Id. ¶¶ 3.1-3.4, at III-1-2 (emphasis added).
179. See Treasury Department Technical Explanation of the United States Model Income
Tax Convention (Sept. 20, 1996), reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH), supra note 142, ¶ 214A
(Dec. 1999) [hereinafter 1996 Technical Explanation].
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to the 1981 U.S. Model.180  For example, it eliminated paragraph 3 of
article 9, which had reserved to contracting states the right to apply
their own internal laws on allocation.  It also modified the text of
paragraph 2 on correlative adjustments.
Today, most countries apparently allocate profits between
related enterprises based on the umbrella arm’s length standard, with
a strong preference for the arm’s length method in particular.181  And
there are more than one thousand bilateral treaties among various
countries incorporating the arm’s length standard based on article 9
of the OECD and U.N. Models.182
As this historical account demonstrates, a number of problems
and issues exist concerning the authority of the arm’s length standard
under international law.  To what degree are states obligated to use
the broad arm’s length standard under article 9 of the OECD, U.N.,
and U.S. Models?  Beyond the traditional arm’s length method, what
particular methods qualify as consistent with the standard?  How far
can states go in using classic formulary apportionment or empirical
methods that depart from the arm’s length method, such as the
comparable profits method or profit split methods, without violating
their treaty obligations?  Moreover, the history of attempts to codify
the arm’s length standard raises the question of whether the vast
network of bilateral tax treaties that incorporate provisions closely
tracking article 9 has helped to establish the arm’s length standard as
a norm of customary international law.
As indicated in Part I, these questions provide an opportunity to
explore, at a more theoretical level, the reasons why treaties or
customary international law should be treated as authoritative, and
how standards evolve to become binding treaty or customary
international law norms.  In this connection, Part III will first attempt
to clarify the concept of “authority,” and to develop a normative
theory regarding the authority of international norms.
180. Compare United States Model Income Tax Convention of September 20, 1996,
reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH), supra note 142, ¶ 214 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter 1996 U.S.
Model], with 1981 U.S. Model, supra note 142.
181. For a modern-day survey of transfer pricing practices, including information on use of
the arm’s length standard, see, e.g., CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN RELATED
COMPANIES: A SUMMARY OF TAX RULES (William R. Lawlor ed., 1985).
182. These treaties are reproduced in the multi-volume series including 1 DIAMOND &
DIAMOND, supra note 97.
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III.  A CONCEPTUAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF
AUTHORITY
This Part begins by developing a conceptual model of authority
and a general normative theory of authoritative international norms,
drawing on philosophical and political literature, including insights
from game theory.  It then applies this model and theory to the
history of the arm’s length standard to determine in what ways the
standard has been claimed to be authoritative and to suggest,
normatively, what degree of authority it generally ought to enjoy.
A. Clarifying the Concept of Authority and Developing a Normative
Theory of Authoritative International Norms
1. A Model of Authority.  The immense amount of
philosophical literature exploring the nature of “authority” is rife
with controversy.183  Nevertheless, almost all philosophers and legal
theorists who have studied the notion of authority agree that it
conveys a relationship in which an actor acts in accordance with a
directive or norm out of a sense of obligation.  To act out of a sense of
obligation means that an actor allows its own decision-making
process—that is, the actor’s own “independent judgment”—to be
preempted by an authoritative norm.  In this sense, the actor can be
said to “obey” the norm.184
One way of understanding the concept of authority is through a
model of decision making elaborated by Oxford University legal
philosopher Joseph Raz.185  Raz posits that actors normally make
decisions to act in accordance with the “balance” of what he calls
“first-order reasons” for and against an action.186  Raz implicitly
defines “first-order reasons” as including reasons “on the merits” for
or against the action.  They also can include threats or requests.187  To
take a relevant example, we can consider all the substantive policy
183. For examples of influential essays on the nature of authority, see generally
AUTHORITY (Joseph Raz ed., 1990).
184. On the central significance of preemption in distinguishing authority from other types
of relationships, see Joseph Raz, Introduction, in id. at 1, 5.
185. While the author does not subscribe to all of the details of Raz’s model (or his
philosophy generally), Raz’s model helps to provide insights into the nature of the authority of
international legal norms in general and of the arm’s length standard in particular.
186. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 36 (1990).
187. See Figure 1.  For reasons “on the merits,” see Raz’s example in RAZ, supra note 186,
at 37.  On “content-independent” reasons such as threats or requests, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 35-37 (1986).
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arguments (other than those invoking some notion of an
“obligation”) made in the income allocation debate as first-order
reasons for or against retention of the arm’s length standard.  The
weight that these reasons receive depends on their merits.
Raz also notes that the particular first-order reasons an actor
considers in deciding how to act may be affected by what he calls
“second-order reasons.”188  A second-order reason is “any reason to
act for a reason or to refrain from acting for a reason.”189  In
particular, what he calls an “exclusionary reason” is a “second-order
reason to refrain from acting for some reason.”190  Raz argues that
exclusionary reasons will cause actors to exclude some, but not
necessarily all, first-order reasons for or against a specific action.191
According to Raz, exclusionary reasons are not weighed against the
strength of first-order reasons; rather, by their nature, exclusionary
reasons always prevail over first-order reasons that they exclude.192
Raz uses this model of first-order and second-order reasons to
elucidate the preemptive effect of an authoritative norm.  According
to Raz’s theory, an authoritative norm is both an additional first-
order reason in favor of the norm’s prescribed action and a second-
order reason to exclude some or all of the actor’s existing first-order
reasons against, or in favor of, the action.193  The weight of the norm
as a first-order reason will depend on “the strength of the reasons for
the norm which are reasons for doing what is required by the
norm . . . except those [reasons] which justify its character as an
exclusionary reason.”194
188. RAZ, supra note 186, at 36.
189. Id. at 39.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 39-40.
192. See id. at 40.
193. See J. Raz, Authority and Justification, in AUTHORITY, supra note 183, at 115, 124.
Although Raz’s conception of authority has been subject to debate, a number of other scholars
have generally concurred with it.  See, e.g., J.M. Finnis, Authority, in AUTHORITY, supra note
183, at 174, 176; H. L. A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in AUTHORITY,
supra note 183, at 92, 93.  However, other philosophers argue that Raz’s concept of second-
order reasons is faulty and that all decisions involve a “first-order” consideration and weighing
of all reasons for and against an action.  Under this account, an authoritative norm prescribing
an action is simply another first-order reason in favor of the action.  It thus has no “preemptive
effect” in the sense of reducing the weight that existing reasons otherwise deserve.  See, e.g.,
Chaim Gans, Mandatory Rules and Exclusionary Reasons, 15 PHILOSOPHIA 373 (1986).
194. RAZ, supra note 186, at 77; see Figure 2.  Note that Raz views it as appropriate to
exclude even reasons in favor of the action, apart from the norm, because under Raz’s
conception these existing favorable reasons are taken into account in determining the weight of
the norm as a remaining first-order reason in favor of the action.  The resulting weight must
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For example, under Raz’s model, if the arm’s length standard
were treated as an authoritative norm under existing treaties or under
customary international law, Congress would exclude most of the
existing first-order policy reasons for or against the arm’s length
standard in determining whether to retain it, rather than weigh these
considerations against the additional “weight” of the norm.  The
weight of the first-order policy reasons in favor of the arm’s length
standard (such as its alleged greater flexibility and lower compliance
costs) would in turn determine the weight of the arm’s length norm.
This weight, however, would not include those reasons that may
justify treating the norm as authoritative (that is, as an exclusionary
reason) under treaties or customary international law.  Such reasons
would include, as analyzed in the next section, the norm’s ability to
facilitate coordination of income allocation policies so as to avoid
economic double taxation.
Some legal philosophers, such as Stephen R. Perry, have refined
Raz’s conception of authority.195  Perry regards a norm as
authoritative so long as it has any effect on an actor’s own judgment
of how much weight to give to a first-order reason, even if the norm
does not entirely exclude the first-order reason.196  Thus, some
authoritative norms may “only partially” preempt one’s judgment of
the balance of first-order reasons.197  In addition, while Raz maintains
that authoritative norms affect (and indeed exclude) the weight that
certain first-order reasons objectively merit,198 Perry views
authoritative norms as affecting an actor’s subjective perception of the
weight of various first-order reasons.199
In particular, Perry generalizes the notion of a “subjective
second-order reason” to mean “a reason to treat a reason as having a
greater or lesser weight than the agent would otherwise judge it to
possess in his or her subjective determination of what the objective
balance of reasons requires.”200  Perry considers an exclusionary
reason to be “just the special case of a reason to treat a reason as
having zero weight,” and redefines second-order reasons as
then be compared with the weight of non-excluded reasons against the action in order to
determine what action to take.  See RAZ, supra note 186, at 76-80.
195. See Stephen R. Perry, Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL.
L. REV. 913, 932-33 (1989).
196. See id.
197. See id. at 932.
198. See Joseph Raz, Facing Up: A Reply, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1178 (1989).
199. See Perry, supra note 195, at 927-32.
200. Id. at 932.
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“reweighting” reasons.201  Perry maintains that this conception of
second-order reasons helps explain such phenomena as legal
presumptions and the doctrine of precedent.202  In short, Perry
persuasively argues that a claim in favor of any reduction in the
weight of an existing reason interferes with the independent
reasoning of an actor and therefore asserts a degree of obligation.203
Raz has acknowledged the merits of Perry’s argument and views his
notion of second-order “reweighting” reasons as simply a
generalization of the concept of an exclusionary reason.204
Using Raz’s model of decision making and authority, as refined
by Perry, authority may be distinguished from pure persuasion and
coercion.  This distinction is commonly made by many social scientists
who regard authority, persuasion, and coercion as alternative means
of “social influence.”205  Persuasion differs from authority in that it
does not have preemptive effect.  An actor’s own decision-making
process incorporates and accommodates a persuasive argument.
Social psychologists often say that the target actor has “internalized”
the persuasive argument.206  Once actors are persuaded by an
argument, they change their assessment of the balance and weight of
first-order reasons.  The essence of persuasion is that this process of
“rethinking” first-order reasons is entirely voluntary.207
While persuasion, unlike authority, does not endow a norm with
preemptive effect, persuasion still plays a role in authority relations.
From the perspective of a target actor, the act of allowing a norm to
preempt one’s own decision making is still a voluntary act.  That is, an
actor must be voluntarily persuaded (for some reason or reasons) to
give preemptive effect to a particular norm by treating it as a second-
order reason for excluding or affecting the weight she would
otherwise give to first-order reasons.208  Thus, we might perceive the
“paradox” of authority: it represents an obligation one voluntarily
agrees to accept.209
201. Id.
202. See id. at 933.
203. See id. at 932-33.
204. See Raz, supra note 198, at 1178-79.
205. See, e.g., ELLIOTT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 1-11 (7th ed. 1995).  On authority
and obedience, see id. at 40-46; on persuasion, see id. at 57-117; on coercion, see id. at 103-4.
206. See, e.g., id. at 36.
207. See Figure 3.
208. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 193, at 119-20.
209. On the “paradox” of authority, see, for example, Raz, supra note 184, at 6.
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As will be discussed below, a threat of coercion often is part of
an authority claim.  A particular actor who chooses not to allow such
a claim to have preemptive effect over her own decision making may
nevertheless conform because of the threat of coercion.  In such a
case, however, the actor is not conforming because she voluntarily
accepts the claim of authority, but because of the threatened
coercion.
Although it is common to speak of many norms, or perhaps the
advice of experts, as having “authority,” what is often meant is that
the norms or advice in question are persuasive.  They have what
might be called “persuasive weight” or, more simply,
“persuasiveness” as good first-order reasons for taking an action or
for changing one’s view of the balance of first-order reasons.  But
such norms are not authoritative in the sense just described if they do
not preempt an actor’s own decision-making process, or, in other
words, if they do not also constitute second-order reasons.210
At the other extreme, coercion prompts an actor to act in a
certain way because of a threat of severe harm, which becomes an
overwhelming first-order reason for the demanded action that
outweighs any existing first-order reasons against the action.  The
actor does not voluntarily reduce the weight of these reasons, as in
the case of an authoritative norm.211  Of course, in the case of any
particular authority claim, the claim may be paired with coercive
threats—indeed, the essence of government is just such a union.  And
target actors may demand that in order for them to be willing to
recognize an obligation to obey, an actor claiming authority must also
have the power to coerce others—a nuance explored below.  Yet the
concepts of authority and coercion have too often been regarded as
synonymous, as legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart emphasized in his
1960 classic analysis, The Concept of Law.212
The above conception of authority helps identify two dimensions
of authority on which this Article will focus.  The first is the degree of
preemptive effect exercised by an authoritative norm.  The second
dimension involves the reasons for a norm’s preemptive effect—the
subjective reasons why an actor voluntarily gives a norm some degree
of preemptive effect.  These reasons may be referred to as legitimacy
criteria, because a norm that is considered legitimate by an actor is
210. Raz seems to concur with this distinction by acknowledging that theoretical (i.e.,
expert) authorities “do not impose obligations and there is no obligation to obey them.”  Id.
211. See RAZ, supra note 186, at 83.
212. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 18-20 (1961).
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actually given preemptive effect by that actor.213  Of course, a target
actor can give a norm different degrees of legitimacy, that is, different
degrees of preemptive effect on her decision making.
It is also possible to distinguish among three forms of authority
based on the perspectives of different actors.  The first form is
claimed authority.  This is the authority claimed by an actor for
herself or on behalf of a norm.  The perspective involved is that of the
claiming actor.  A claim usually asserts that the norm has a certain
degree of preemptive effect and that there are particular reasons why
the target actor should give it such preemptive effect.  Relevant
illustrations of claimed authority are the OECD’s and the Treasury
Department’s claims on behalf of the arm’s length standard as an
authoritative norm.
The second form of authority is empirical authority.  Empirical
authority involves the actual acceptance of authority by a target actor.
The perspective involved is that of the target actor.  Empirical
authority relates to the actual degree of preemptive effect a target
actor gives a norm and the reasons the actor actually adopts for giving
it such preemptive effect.
The third form of authority is normative authority.  This is
authority that ought to be recognized by a target actor.  The
perspective involved is that of an outside observer establishing
normative standards for accepting authority.  Normative authority
includes an assertion about the degree of preemptive effect that
should be given to a norm and the reasons that support giving it such
preemptive effect.  The purpose of this Part is to develop a theory of
the normative authority of international norms such as the arm’s
length standard.
It should be noted that the degree of preemptive effect that is
claimed for, that is actually given, or that ought to be given to a norm
(including which types of first-order reasons are to be altered or
excluded) may be affected by the character of the norm as legal,
moral, or social.  This character is usually attributable to the intended
domain of the norm. 214  It is thus possible to distinguish between legal,
moral, and social authority.
213. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 193, at 120.
214. See G. E. M. Anscombe’s emphasis in her definition of authority that authority
involves a claim to a right to be obeyed in a particular “domain of decision.”  G. E. M.
Anscombe, On the Source of the Authority of the State, in AUTHORITY, supra note 183, at 142,
144.
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a. Binding Authority.  Returning to a closer examination of the
concept of preemptive effect, according to Raz, a “mandatory” norm,
as noted earlier, is one that is intended to be adopted not only as an
additional first-order reason for the target actor to take the desired
action (whose weight will depend on the reasons already favoring that
action), but also as a second-order reason for that actor to exclude
(give zero weight) to some or all of the other reasons the actor
already had against or in favor of that action.215
We might refer to mandatory norms as having “binding
authority” and imposing “binding obligations.”  The “degree” of their
preemptive effect will obviously depend on which other reasons, and
how many of them, are excluded.  Thus, there is room for vast
variation in the actual effect of recognizing even “binding”
obligations.  Further, norms imposing binding obligations may
delegate certain powers to particular actors or prescribe, prohibit, or
permit certain conduct.216 In the case of binding prohibitions, for
example, the prohibition is a reason to exclude all (or at least most)
first-order reasons in favor of the prohibited action.  For this reason,
too, all binding obligations that require a particular action (and
therefore exclude all or most reasons against the action, including
reasons in favor of contrary actions) incorporate a binding
prohibition of contrary actions.
Norms that permit certain conduct may be referred to as
authoritative permissions.  Authoritative permissions may in some
cases authorize action that is otherwise prohibited by a norm with
binding authority.  Yet they need not always serve this function.  For
example, norms conferring rights may also be viewed as authoritative
permissions, even in cases where there is no other norm prohibiting
the conduct that is a right.  Regardless of whether or not there is a
preexisting prohibition, the key feature shared by all authoritative
permissions is that they impose binding obligations on certain other
actors (who may be specified or unspecified) to respect the permitted
action and not to interfere with it.217  One should note that binding
obligations logically incorporate authoritative permissions to perform
215. See Raz’s discussion of mandatory norms in RAZ, supra note 186, at 73-84; Figure 2.
216. See Raz’s description of norms in RAZ, supra note 186, at 49-106.  Raz distinguishes
among mandatory (or prescriptive) norms, permissive norms, and power-conferring norms.
217. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, How Are Rights and Duties Correlative?, 16 J. VALUE
INQUIRY 287, 292-93 (1982) (noting that negative liberties, which constitute authoritative
permissions, such as freedom of speech, entail at least a “duty not to interfere with the behavior
authorized and protected by the right”).
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the obligatory act, which in turn require that other actors respect and
permit the performance of the act.
b. Persuasive Authority.  In accordance with Perry’s analysis, it
becomes apparent that there is a second category of authoritative
norms, which, unlike mandatory norms, do not impose binding
obligations.  Instead, norms in this category only partially preempt an
actor’s judgment of the balance of first-order reasons as reasons for
action.  Such norms might be said to have “persuasive authority” and
impose “persuasive obligations.”  The distinguishing characteristic of
these norms is that they do not claim entirely to exclude certain first-
order reasons.  Instead, they require an actor to reduce the relative
weight of reasons against the action called for by the norm and
increase the relative weight of reasons supporting the action.218  The
net effect is the same as maintaining the original weight of first-order
reasons and considering the norm as an additional first-order reason
favoring the action with a weight equal to the net change in weight of
first-order reasons under the conception just described.219
Accordingly, later this Article will often characterize such a norm as
imposing an obligation to give the norm “great weight” in decision
making.220
The degree to which the weight of existing first-order reasons
must be reduced or increased (or, under this alternative conception,
the weight of the norm) will often vary.  Where the proportionate
reduction and increase are relatively large, we might refer to the
norm as having “strong” persuasive authority.  It is important to note
that, in some cases, if the original weight of reasons against an action
prescribed by a norm with persuasive authority was sufficiently high,
even their “discounted” weight will be enough to overcome the
weight accorded to reasons favoring the action prescribed by the
norm and thus will justify contrary action.  Finally, it should be
emphasized that persuasive obligations, like binding ones, logically
entail an authoritative permission to carry out the obligatory act.  Part
IV will argue that, under tax treaties, the arm’s length standard has
strong persuasive authority but not binding authority.
Norms having “persuasive authority” must be distinguished from
norms having “persuasive weight.”  Even though a target actor’s
218.  See Figure 4.
219.  See Figure 5.
220. This characterization of a persuasive obligation is similar to certain legal presumptions,
as Perry notes.  See Perry, supra note 195, at 932-33.
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acceptance of norms having persuasive authority and norms having
persuasive weight is in both cases ultimately “voluntary,” an actor
feels a certain “tension” when it grants a norm persuasive authority.
The actor would prefer to give certain first-order reasons a particular
weight in the absence of the norm, but chooses to discount (or
increase) this weight because of the norm.221  When an actor grants a
norm persuasive weight, it is more willing to incorporate the norm as
part of its own preferences.222
2. Reasons for Accepting the Preemptive Effect of Authoritative
Norms.  We now turn to a more detailed examination of the reasons
(which themselves may be considered second-order reasons) that an
actor may accept for voluntarily giving authoritative norms some
degree of preemptive effect.  In particular, it is helpful to clarify some
of the more common reasons that actors actually adopt when deciding
whether to recognize the authority of a norm.  Similarly, various
normative theories provide recommendations about the reasons that
actors normatively should adopt.  This Part focuses on such normative
theories, but because the reasons they put forward overlap with
empirical reasons for accepting authority, the empirical reasons are
discussed first.
Social and political scientists have asserted that actors adopt,
empirically, a variety of reasons for accepting authority.  We must
first distinguish between reasons for accepting the authority of a norm
(“obedience to a norm”) and the entire class of reasons that may exist
for taking a particular action that is required by a norm (“conformity
to a norm”).  Obedience to a norm is thus a special case of conformity
to a norm.223
There are several empirical reasons, other than obedience, why
an actor may conform to a norm.  These include:
 the target actor independently judges the action demanded by the
norm to be the course it thinks “best” according to its value
system.  It is pure coincidence that the resulting action happens to
be the action required by a norm with claimed authority;224
 the target actor takes the action out of habit or custom, without a
sense of obligation;
221. See Figure 4.
222. See Figure 3.
223. On this distinction, see, for example, 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN
OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 946 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
224. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 193, at 104.
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 the target actor takes the action because of identification with
other actors that are supportive of the norm or to win social
approval;225
 the target actor is persuaded that taking the action is the “best”
course of action in light of its value system; or
 the target actor is coerced (or persuaded) to take the action
through the threat of a penalty or the offer of a reward.
In each of the above cases of conformity, the actor does not act
out of a sense of obligation.  That is, according to Raz’s and Perry’s
theories, it does not accept the norm as a second-order reason for
altering the weight it has decided to give to particular first-order
reasons.
For what reasons, then, might an actor choose to obey a norm
and accept it as authoritative?  Such reasons, which will be referred to
as “empirical legitimacy criteria,” are many and varied.  In general,
they all take the following form: a target actor has a reason to obey
authority to the extent that such obedience is seen as instrumentally
or intrinsically furthering particular values held by the target actor.
The values of the target actor may be (1) self-oriented—relating only
to the target actor’s self-interest; (2) other-oriented—relating to the
interest of other actors, such as members of a community;226 or (3)
principle-oriented—relating to what are regarded by the target actor
as transcendent and universalizable principles.  The latter two of
these categories will be referred to as “moral” values and principles.
There are various ways in which the actor may perceive that the
acceptance of authority instrumentally furthers particular values, and
these become empirical reasons for obeying authority.  For example,
an actor may believe that obedience to a norm can facilitate collective
action, which in turn may be in the target actor’s self-interest or the
interests of others (such as a community).  In some cases, collective
action may be perceived as requiring effective sanctions against
violators of the norm.  In these cases, the power of an authority to
impose such sanctions may be adopted as a reason for obeying the
authoritative norm.  In addition, an actor may believe that it is to its
benefit or to the benefit of others to obey an authoritative norm if
that norm is the product of deliberation by individuals with greater
knowledge, experience or expertise.
225. See, e.g., ORAN R. YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY: A THEORY WITH
INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS 22-23 (1979).
226. This nomenclature has been adapted from philosopher Nicholas Rescher.  See
NICHOLAS RESCHER, INTRODUCTION TO VALUE THEORY 17-18 (1969).
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An actor may also obey a norm with claimed authority for the
reason that doing so directly and intrinsically realizes certain values,
which in this case are usually moral values or principles.  For
example, one posited reason for obeying such a norm is that it
directly fulfills a value of membership in a community; as a
precondition for membership, each must accept the moral authority
of norms accepted by other members.  A second possible reason is
that obedience to an authoritative norm may be mandated by a moral
rule or principle, such as fidelity to promises or fulfilling legitimate
expectations of others created by one’s own behavior.
On the other hand, some target actors may obey authority only if
it does not frustrate an important value to them—most notably, their
autonomy.  Thus, they may require that they have given their consent
to the norm as a precondition to their obedience to it.  Others may
believe that any interference with the autonomy of their own decision
making is never justified, and thus summarily reject all authority.
A target actor may have many motives for obeying an
authoritative norm or directive, including some combination of the
above reasons.  Often the direct motivation for obeying an
authoritative norm is the norm’s compliance with other rules
(“secondary rules”) for determining the authority of the norm.  These
secondary rules in turn may incorporate or be justified by one or
more of these other reasons.
For all of the above reasons for obedience to a norm, an actor
may treat the norm as a second-order reason not to act on its own
independent judgment of the balance of first-order reasons.  At the
same time, in any case where they are not counted as second-order
reasons for giving a norm preemptive effect, these reasons should
then at least count as first-order reasons supporting action in
conformity with the norm.  For example, in a case where (under a
given normative theory) facilitating collective action is not viewed as
a valid reason for giving a norm preemptive effect, it may
nevertheless be treated as a first-order reason for following the norm
and thus as having persuasive weight.  The same conclusion follows if
Raz’s distinction between first-order and second-order reasons is
rejected on philosophical grounds, and all reasons (and all authority
claims) are treated simply as first-order reasons.227
227. As noted above, Chaim Gans has argued that all reasons are first-order reasons.  See
Gans, supra note 193, at 381-94.
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Having initially surveyed some of the empirical reasons that
actors employ when deciding whether to accept the authority of a
norm, this section reviews reasons suggested by various normative
theories as reasons that actors ought to consider when deciding how
to respond to authority claims.  These reasons might be referred to as
“normative legitimacy criteria.”  The list of reasons proposed by
prominent normative theories tends to coincide with the list of
empirical legitimacy criteria just explored.  The following analysis
examines normative theories by reference to each of these reasons
that they may endorse, beginning with the last-mentioned empirical
legitimacy criterion: compliance with secondary rules.
a. Compliance with Secondary Rules.  Empirically, the
preemptive effect of a norm may be accepted because the norm
complies with certain secondary rules, including a “rule of
recognition,” to use the term developed by H. L. A. Hart.228
Secondary rules can include rules identifying the actor promulgating
the norm as having the authority to do so and rules prescribing a
“correct” procedure for formulating, issuing, applying, or interpreting
authoritative norms.229  While secondary rules may be viewed as a
legitimacy criterion for any type of authority, they are especially
important in defining legal authority.230  Indeed, Hart has identified
the existence of secondary rules regarding primary obligations as the
key prerequisite for classifying both primary and secondary rules as
law.231
A number of normative theorists have endorsed the use of such
secondary rules to determine the legitimacy of a claimed authoritative
norm, whether legal or not.232  These theorists have commonly done
so on the ground that obedience to secondary rules either facilitates
collective action233 or directly serves the value of membership in a
community.  Because secondary rules must themselves be justified by
228. See generally HART, supra note 212.  Hart refers to a “rule of recognition” as providing
private persons and officials “with authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules of
obligation.  The criteria so provided may . . . take any one or more of a variety of forms: these
include reference to an authoritative text; to legislative enactment; to customary practice; to
general declarations of specified persons, or to past judicial decisions in particular cases.”  Id. at
97.
229. See id. at 91-96.
230. See, e.g., id. at 91.
231. See id.
232. See, e.g., Finnis, supra note 193, at 188-91.
233. See, e.g., id. at 186-91.
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other legitimacy criteria, and the particular types of secondary rules
endorsed by a normative theory will depend on its view of these other
criteria, the discussion now turns to these more “substantive” criteria
as advocated by various normative theories.
b. Facilitating Collective Action.  A problem of “collective
action” arises whenever two or more actors must somehow cooperate
in order to improve an outcome that might result from their
independent decision making.  A number of international relations
theorists have attempted to explain the evolution of authoritative
norms in global politics and international law as a response to
perceived problems of collective action among states.  In particular,
they have made use of game theory to explicate different collective
action dilemmas, focusing on how states may resort to the
development and acceptance of authoritative norms to help reach a
solution to these dilemmas.234  Under these empirical theories, various
domains of international politics may be assimilated to particular
“games,” including “harmony” games, “assurance” games, dilemmas
of common interests such as “prisoners’ dilemmas,” dilemmas of
common aversions, such as “pure” or “non-pure” coordination
games, and “zero-sum” games.  In almost all of these theories, states
are assumed to be motivated solely by self-interest rather than by
moral principles.  Based on this empirical understanding, many
international political theorists have made certain normative
recommendations about when states ought to accept authoritative
norms in order to facilitate the resolution of collective action
dilemmas.
For example, political scientist Arthur Stein has engaged in a
very useful analysis of how problems of collective action can lead
states to accept the authority of certain norms.235  In particular, Stein
argues that international “regimes,” a term used loosely by many
international political theorists to refer to common principles, norms
234. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and
Strategies, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 1 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986).
235. See Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 115 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
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and rules,236 can best be conceptualized as patterns of inter-state
relations that serve “to circumscribe national behavior.”237
As an empirical proposition, Stein assumes that “[i]nternational
politics is typically characterized by independent, self-interested
decision making, and states often have no reason to eschew such
individualistic behavior.”238  Stein argues that a regime (and therefore
the empirical authority of an international norm) exists only “when
the interaction between the parties is not unconstrained or is not
based on independent decision making.”239  Despite Stein’s
assumption, it is important to recognize as a theoretical matter that
nothing precludes states from using any scale to rank the desirability
of outcomes, including scales that incorporate moral values or
principles.240
i.  Harmony Games.  Stein first identifies situations in which
a regime—that is, an authoritative norm—is not considered
“necessary” and is therefore not created by states.241  The first is a case
in which “each state obtains its most preferred outcome by making
independent decisions.”242  Here, there is “simply no conflict” and
consequently “no need for a regime.”243  This can be referred to as a
“harmony” game.244
To illustrate a harmony game, consider a simple game model in
which there are two states (A and B), each of which can choose
between two courses of action (1 and 2).245  We can label the
respective actions taken by A and B as A1 and A2 and B1 and B2.246
In a pure harmony game, each state has a “dominant strategy” or
236. According to a widely-accepted definition, “international regimes” are “principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a
given issue-area.”  Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 235, at 1.
237. Stein, supra note 235, at 115.
238. Id. at 117.
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 74-75, 120-32 (1984).
241. See Stein, supra note 235, at 117.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 117-18; KEOHANE, supra note 240, at 51-53.
245. See Figure 6.
246. Note that action A1 need not be the same as action B1; the same is true for actions A2
and B2.  On this point see DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 10-12
(1969).
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dominant action.  This means that, in its view, pursuing either action 1
or action 2 will maximize its values regardless of which action the
other state chooses.  For example, “A prefers A1 whether B chooses
B1 or B2, and B prefers B1 regardless of A’s decision.”247
Furthermore, the result of each state pursuing its dominant strategy
(that is, A1 + B1) is the best outcome for each state compared to the
other possible combinations of actions.248  We can refer to A1 + B1 as
an “equilibrium outcome” because “neither actor can shift
unilaterally to better its own position.”249  That is, if A abandons
action 1 and instead pursues action 2, it will be worse off, given B’s
choices.250  The same is true for B.  Furthermore, A1 + B1 is a
“coordination equilibrium” as defined by philosopher David K.
Lewis, or an outcome “in which no one would have been better off
had any one agent alone acted otherwise, either himself or someone
else.”251
If the optimal outcome, A1 + B1, is defined as “cooperation” by
both A and B, which can be represented as “CC” where the first
letter denotes the action of the actor in question and the second letter
denotes the action of the other actor, then mutual cooperation (CC)
results from the independent choices of A and B because both prefer
C (action 1) regardless of what the other actor does.  Even if the
other actor “defects” (i.e., chooses action 2, which we can represent as
“D”), each actor will still choose to cooperate (i.e., perform action 1).
This is because each actor’s preference ordering is CC > CD > DD or
DC.  In a harmony game, then, all actors “prefer unrequited
cooperation (CD) to unilateral defection (DC),” so “no incentive to
cheat exists.”252  The key point is that both states reach their optimum
outcomes (as perceived by them) through independent decision
making.  Accordingly, they would see no need to establish an
authoritative norm requiring them to adopt their dominant strategies.
Normatively, one could argue, no authoritative norm consequently
ought to be established, assuming that the states’ own values are
regarded as legitimate.
247. Stein, supra note 235, at 117.
248. See id. at 117-18.
249. Id. at 118.
250. On the definition of an equilibrium, see LEWIS, supra note 246, at 8.
251. Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).
252. Oye, supra note 234, at 6.
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ii.  Assurance Games.  The so-called “assurance” game is
another situation where states do not recognize the need for an
authoritative norm and where therefore, arguably, an authoritative
norm should not be established.  An assurance game can be pictured
using the story of the “stag hunt.”253  The stag hunt, and its payoff
structure, is described by political scientist Kenneth A. Oye as
follows:
A group of hunters surround a stag.  If all cooperate to trap the
stag, all will eat well (CC).  If one person defects to chase a passing
rabbit, the stag will escape.  The defector will eat lightly (DC) and
none of the others will eat at all (CD).  If all chase rabbits, all will
have some chance of catching a rabbit and eating lightly (DD).
Each hunter’s preference ordering is: CC > DC > DD > CD.  The
mutual interest in plentiful venison (CC) relative to all other
outcomes militates strongly against defection.  However, because a
rabbit in the hand (DC) is better than a stag in the bush (CD),
cooperation will be assured only if each hunter believes that all
hunters will cooperate.  In single-play Stag Hunt, the temptation to
defect to protect against the defection of others is balanced by the
strong universal preference for stag over rabbit.254
It is important to note that in a stag hunt, or any assurance game,
“the actors share a most preferred outcome but neither has a
dominant strategy.”255  Each actor prefers to cooperate only if the
other does so.  If they both cooperate, they achieve their best
outcome, CC.  But if there is uncertainty about whether the other
actor will cooperate, each actor will have an incentive to maximize its
minimum gain by defecting, which will produce either DC or DD,
either of which is preferable to the worst outcome, CD.  However, if
both actors follow this strategy, they will achieve a second
equilibrium outcome, DD, that is less desirable than their optimum
equilibrium outcome, CC.  Accordingly, “as long as both actors are
aware of the other’s preferences, they will converge on the [CC]
outcome that both most prefer” and again, “[n]o regime is needed
since both actors agree on a most preferred outcome, one that they
can reach by acting autonomously.”256
Philosopher Edna Ullmann-Margalit suggests that one example
of a stag hunt situation is the problem of whether states should adopt
253. See Figure 7.
254. Oye, supra note 234, at 8.
255. Stein, supra note 235, at 118.
256. Id. at 118-19.
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policies of free trade or economic isolationism.257  A stag hunt
problem would emerge where all states would be better off by
adopting free trade policies, but where each state also has an
incentive to “play it safe” by defecting and adopting an isolationist
policy.  The analogy has its weaknesses.  For example, even if some
countries engage in isolationism (i.e., defect), it may still be to the
advantage of the others to pursue free trade policies (i.e.,
cooperate).258
The key to achieving mutual cooperation in any assurance game
is the provision of adequate information to each party about the
other’s preferences—the conveyance of “assurances”—so that both
parties know the optimum outcome and can achieve it through
independent decision making.  One way that states can provide
assurances to one another about their preferences is by entering into
treaties.  Stein gives the example of extradition treaties as a type of
agreement designed to provide assurances about how another state
will behave when faced with an extradition request.259
iii.  Dilemmas of Common Interests, Including Prisoners’
Dilemmas.  In contrast to the above situations in which states can
achieve desirable outcomes through independent decision making,
there are situations “in which all the actors have an incentive to
eschew independent decision making: situations, that is, in which
individualistic self-interested calculation leads them to prefer joint
decision making because independent self-interested behavior can
result in undesirable or suboptimal outcomes.”260  There are two
categories of such situations: “dilemmas of common interests” and
“dilemmas of common aversions.”261
Dilemmas of common interests arise “when independent
decision making leads to equilibrium outcomes that are Pareto-
deficient—outcomes in which all actors prefer another given outcome
to the equilibrium outcome.”262  The foremost example of such a
dilemma is the “prisoners’ dilemma.”263  The term “prisoners’
257. See EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 124-27 (1977).
258. See id.
259. See Stein, supra note 235, at 120.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 120-21; Figure 8.
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dilemma” (sometimes abbreviated “PD”) takes its name from the
following hypothetical scenario:
Two prisoners are suspected of a major crime.  The authorities
possess evidence to secure conviction on only a minor charge.  If
neither prisoner squeals, both will draw a light sentence on the
minor charge (CC).  If one prisoner squeals and the other
stonewalls, the rat will go free (DC) and the sucker will draw a very
heavy sentence (CD).  If both squeal, both will draw a moderate
sentence (DD).  Each prisoner’s preference ordering is: DC > CC >
DD > CD.  If the prisoners expect to “play” only one time, each
prisoner will be better off squealing than stonewalling, no matter
what his partner chooses to do (DC > CC and DD > CD).  The
temptation of the rat payoff and fear of the sucker payoff will drive
single-play Prisoners’ Dilemmas toward mutual defection.
Unfortunately, if both prisoners act on this reasoning, they will
draw a moderate sentence on the major charge, while cooperation
could have led to a light sentence on the minor charge (CC > DD).
In single-play Prisoners’ Dilemmas, individually rational actions
produce a collectively suboptimal outcome.264
As this description makes clear, a key feature of a prisoners’
dilemma is that each actor has an incentive to cheat once the unstable
alternative outcome (CC) is achieved in order to obtain its most
preferred outcome (DC).  The problem is that if both actors cheat
they will return to the equilibrium outcome (DD), which is worse for
both of them than the unstable alternative outcome (CC).
Raz has argued that authoritative norms can help solve
prisoners’ dilemma problems.265  Raz maintains that giving a norm
merely persuasive weight is not sufficient to achieve collective action
in these situations.  Instead, the involved actors must give the norm
preemptive effect.266  Further, Ullmann-Margalit has contended that
in any prisoners’ dilemma, “a norm, backed by appropriate sanctions,
could solve this problem.  In this sense it can be said that such
situations ‘call for’ norms.  It can further be said that a norm solving
the problem inherent in a situation of this type is generated by it.”267
According to Ullmann-Margalit, it is important that the
sanctions [be] so severe as to outweigh the temptation to violate
[the norm or agreement] which each participant must
experience . . . .  [I]t is the supplement of sanctions which is
264. Oye, supra note 234, at 7-8.
265. See Raz, supra note 193, at 128.
266. See Raz, supra note 184, at 7-8; Raz, supra note 193, at 138-39.
267. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 257, at 22.  However, Ullmann-Margalit makes clear
that her thesis concerning how norms may arise out of prisoners’ dilemma-type situations is
empirical, not normative.  See id. at 60.
LEPARD.DOC 03/27/00  8:34 PM
102 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 10:43
decisive; an explicit agreement which is not binding in the sense
that it is not backed by appropriate sanctions is an insufficient
condition for solving a PD problem satisfactorily.268
It should be noted that the stag hunt game described earlier
bears a close resemblance to a prisoners’ dilemma problem because,
in both cases, cooperation results in an outcome that is good for all.
However, in the case of a stag hunt, the outcome is a stable
coordination equilibrium.  Thus, if there is general confidence that it
can be achieved, there is no temptation to deviate.269  But the
development of cooperation requires either the existence of trust, a
sense of “obligation to keep co-operating (such as keeping a
promise—explicit or tacit, reciprocating fair play, etc.), or,
alternatively, . . . effective external sanctions.”270  Accordingly, norms
similar to prisoners’ dilemma norms may be generated, but they can
be weaker norms.271
iv.  Dilemmas of Common Aversions, Including Pure and
Non-Pure Coordination Problems.  Dilemmas of common aversions
constitute the second category of situations in which states have an
incentive to avoid independent decision making and to accept the
authority of norms.  According to Stein:
Unlike dilemmas of common interests, in which the actors have a
common interest in insuring a particular outcome, the actors caught
in the dilemma of common aversions have a common interest in
avoiding a particular outcome.  These situations occur when actors
[without dominant] strategies do not most prefer the same outcome
but do agree that there is at least one outcome that all want to
avoid.  These criteria define a set of situations with multiple
equilibria (two equilibria if there are only two actors each with two
choices) in which coordination is required if the actors are to avoid
that least preferred outcome.272
One example of a dilemma of common aversions is a “pure”
coordination problem.273  In a pure coordination problem, there are
two outcomes (say, A1 + B1 and A2 + B2) that both A and B value
equally and two outcomes (say, A1 + B2 and A2 + B1) that both want
to avoid.  The outcomes A1 + B1 and A2 + B2 are both coordination
equilibria because either A or B will make itself worse off by
268. Id. at 116-17.
269. See id. at 121-23.
270. Id. at 124.
271. See id.
272. Stein, supra note 235, at 125.
273. See Figure 9.
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unilaterally changing its strategy.  Neither state has a dominant
strategy because A prefers action 1 only if B prefers it and B prefers
action 1 only if A prefers it.  Similarly, A will prefer action 2 only if B
prefers it and vice versa.  To use the “C” and “D” notation
introduced above, each state’s preference ordering is CC = DD > DC
or CD.  Because neither has a dominant strategy, but rather the
preferred strategy of each is contingent on the strategy adopted by
the other, “they cannot be certain that they will arrive at one of [their
preferred] outcomes if they act independently and simultaneously.
Without coordination they may well end up with one of the outcomes
that neither wants.”274
A pure coordination problem can be solved through any method
of allowing the actors’ expectations to converge on a particular
equilibrium outcome, for example, through the use of “conventions.”
Conventions are “accepted and established solutions to past recurrent
co-ordination problems which—with time—assume the status of
norms.”275  They arise organically, over time, through the
development of shared expectations of regular behavior among the
participants.276  Conventions are typically not codified as law, “are
neither issued nor promulgated by any identifiable authority,” and
“involve in the main non-institutionalized, non-organized, and
informal sanctions (i.e., punishments or rewards).”277
An example of a convention is the norm of driving on the right-
hand side of the road.  We can assume that many drivers (although
not drivers like those mentioned in the Introduction) would be willing
to drive on either the right-hand side or the left-hand side so long as
all other drivers do so as well.  The worst outcome for all drivers
(which may be recognized by most of them, but not necessarily all of
them) would be if some choose to drive on the left and others on the
right.  An arbitrary convention can achieve coordination in such a
situation where the actors do not prefer one equilibrium outcome to
another.278  Conventions can be particularly useful in solving
dilemmas of common aversions arising among many actors; they can
“provide rules of thumb that can diminish transaction and
information costs.”279
274. Stein, supra note 235, at 125.
275. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 257, at 76.
276. See id.
277. Id. at 97.
278. See Stein, supra note 235, at 125.
279. Oye, supra note 234, at 20.
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According to Ullmann-Margalit, an agreement can solve a
coordination problem particularly well.280  “Indeed it is perhaps the
best method of solving co-ordination problems that can be wished for:
an explicit agreement is undoubtedly the firmest rallier of the
participants’ expectations regarding each other’s actions.”281  What is
important is producing shared expectations.  Shared promises are not
necessary.  In the words of David K. Lewis, “[n]o one need bind
himself to act against his own interest.”282  For this reason, agreements
to solve coordination problems are generally self-enforcing.283
Do conventions impose obligations?  Some conventions do not.
In the words of Ullmann-Margalit, “conceptually, there is nothing
normative about a regularity which solves a recurrent co-ordination
problem.”284  Nevertheless, many conventions become authoritative
norms.  That is, a “repeated pattern of behaviour . . . [may] turn into a
binding pattern of behaviour.”285
Why might a convention give rise to an authoritative norm with
binding or persuasive authority?  Ullmann-Margalit posits at least
three factors that can explain such an empirical transmutation.286
First, “a norm is capable of regulating and channeling the
expectations—and hence the choice of actions—of anonymous
participants.”287  It can increase the likelihood that newcomers will
engage in the regular practice.288  Second, a “norm, by fixing on a
unique fitting description of the regularity, provides a unique
guidance for action in normal future cases.”289  Third, “there is a
higher degree of articulation and explicitness associated with a norm
than with a mere regularity of behaviour.”290  Finally,
the fact that a norm is taught and told, and its being supported by
social pressure, enhance the salience of the particular co-ordination
equilibrium it points to; in a sense it even slightly changes the
corresponding pay-off matrix so as to make this particular co-
280. See ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 257, at 116.
281. Id.
282. LEWIS, supra note 246, at 34.
283. See ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 257, at 116.
284. Id. at 85; see also LEWIS, supra note 246, at 97.
285. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 257, at 85.
286. See id. at 85-87.
287. Id. at 85.
288. See id.
289. Id. at 87.
290. Id.
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ordination equilibrium a somewhat more worthwhile outcome to be
aimed at than it would otherwise have been.291
According to Ullmann-Margalit, a norm may be established
through the adoption by some “authority” of a “decree” (which can
include an explicit agreement) that specifies action producing a
particular equilibrium outcome.  Indeed, decrees tend to arise as
“solutions to novel recurrent co-ordination problems which from the
outset are being decreed as norms.”292  Decrees can include decisions
of intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations.293  Moreover,
decree-type coordination norms often form “the substance of
international treaties, conventions, and law.”294
Raz has similarly urged that authoritative norms can reinforce
conventions supported by a majority, and encourage the conformity
of a minority that does not see the situation as a coordination
problem:
[O]ne important function of authoritative directives is to help
establish and sustain conventions.  Conventions are here
understood in a narrow sense in which they are solutions to
coordination problems, that is, to situations in which the vast
majority have sufficient reason to prefer to take that action which is
(likely to be) taken by the vast majority.  Where there is a
coordination problem the issuing of an authoritative directive can
supply the missing link in the argument.  It makes it likely that a
convention will be established to follow the authoritatively
designated act.295
Agreements, decrees, and authoritative norms instituted to solve
coordination problems may be accompanied by sanctions, which may,
in turn, be “organized, institutionalized, and formal, even physical.”296
How can such sanctions be justified in the case of coordination
norms?  Ullmann-Margalit suggests that “[t]heir existence, and the
general awareness of their existence, might enhance the salience of
the particular co-ordination equilibrium the norm is aimed at
attaining, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the norm itself.”297
291. Id.
292. Id. at 76.
293. See id. at 91.
294. Id. at 93.
295. Raz, supra note 193, at 127-28.  Raz specifically argues that authorities and
authoritative norms can play an important role in achieving coordination when particular actors
might not subjectively perceive that a coordination problem exists.  See Raz, supra note 184, at
10.
296. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 257, at 97.
297. Id. at 120.
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But she emphasizes that “above all the mere act of non-conformity to
a co-ordination norm (when the others do conform) is its own
punishment, since it entails failure to meet the others at the
prescribed co-ordination equilibrium.”298  Agreements to solve
coordination problems may also be supported by the moral force of
mutual promises, although the agreements may serve their
coordinating functions even without such promises.299
Whether coordinating norms take the form of conventions,
agreements or decrees, what reasons do actors recognize for
accepting their authority?  The first is the promotion of the actors’
own interests.  At the same time, the satisfaction of individual wants
and desires can be seen as the “joint collective interests of the
community in question.”300  And a particular coordination problem
may involve the realization of certain moral ends or values.301
The preceding analysis has focused on pure coordination
problems in which the alternative equilibria are equally preferred by
the actors (or at least a majority of them).  “Non-pure” coordination
problems exist when actors agree on which outcome or outcomes are
the worst, but each prefers a different equilibrium outcome.302  One
actor’s preference ordering might be CC > DD > CD or DC and the
other’s might be DD > CC > CD or DC.303  For instance, some drivers
like those described in the Introduction might prefer that all drivers
drive on the left, while most drivers prefer that all drive on the right.
In such a case, actors can achieve coordination through arbitrary
conventions that ensure the attainment of one of the preferred
equilibria.304
Although conventions are generally self-enforcing, in a non-pure
coordination problem one actor may unilaterally defect in order to
induce other actors to accept its deviant behavior as a new
convention.  For example, if A prefers CC to DD and B prefers DD
to CC, and the current equilibrium is CC, B may unilaterally defect in
an attempt to force A also to defect, thereby moving to B’s preferred
equilibrium of DD.  Such defections, however, do not constitute
“cheating.”  In the words of Arthur Stein:
298. Id.
299. See LEWIS, supra note 246, at 34-35, 84.
300. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 257, at 102.
301. See id. at 132-33.
302. See id. at 78, 82.
303. See Figure 10.
304. See Stein, supra note 235, at 127.
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Defections do not represent cheating for immediate self-
aggrandizement, but are expressions of relative dissatisfaction with
the coordination outcome.  An actor will threaten to defect before
actually doing so; it may choose to go through with its threat only if
the other actor does not accede to its demands.  Again, such
defection is never surreptitious cheating; it is a public attempt,
made at some cost, to force the other actor into a different
equilibrium outcome.305
v.  Zero-Sum Games.  It is important to underscore that in
some types of games, collective action cannot be achieved.  If the
actors’ aim is not simply to maximize self-interest, but to maximize
the difference between their gains and those of others, no collective
action will result.  Pure conflict results from such “zero-sum” games,
where one actor’s gain is ipso facto another actor’s loss.306  Even if the
other actor cooperates, an actor achieves nothing by cooperating too.
c. The Presence of Effective Sanctions Against Violators.  As
noted in the preceding discussion of collective action problems, many
normative theorists have argued that sanctions are necessary to
address prisoners’ dilemma situations in which there are strong
incentives for defection.  In these cases, the role of sanctions is not
always one of coercion.  Instead, many actors may fear defection by
others.  The existence of a sanctions regime allows the actors to obey
the norm out of “trust” that violators cannot take unfair advantage of
their obedience.  Raz has accordingly expressed the view that, unless
an actor claiming authority can successfully obtain general
compliance, including through coercion if necessary, in some cases
there may be no justification for accepting the authority of the
actor.307
d. The Greater Knowledge, Experience, or Expertise of
Authorities.  Among others, Raz has argued that obedience to an
authority is warranted if, by reason of the greater knowledge or
expertise of that authority, one can better achieve the goals one
otherwise ought to achieve.308  Raz further maintains that,
305. Id. at 130; see also id. at 131.
306. See id. at 134.
307. “Coordination may fail altogether if it does not enjoy a sufficient level of cooperation,
and those who cooperate may face greater burdens than would be otherwise required because
some people prefer to free ride.  In such cases it may be that the right to command depends on
the right to coerce which is necessary to assure all of compliance by all (or nearly so).”  Raz,
supra note 184, at 15-16.
308. See, e.g., id. at 9-10.
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normatively, “experts of all varieties are to give advice based on the
very same reasons which should sway ordinary people who wish to
form their minds independently.  The experts’ advantage is in their
easy access to the evidence and in their better ability to grasp its
significance.”309  The same reasons may justify the granting of
authority to a norm developed by experts.
e. Membership in a Community.  Some “communitarian”
theorists, such as Ronald Dworkin, have argued that, in Raz’s words,
“there is inherent value in conforming to communal authorities just
because in doing so one recognizes the good of community, or
recognizes the duty one owes to one’s community, or to one’s
rulers.”310  Dworkin has contended that there are “obligations of
community,” or “associative obligations,” and that “political
obligation—including an obligation to obey the law—is a form of
associative obligation.”311  According to Dworkin, associative
obligations arise from membership in a community meeting certain
tests and therefore constituting a “true” community.312  A number of
international law theorists have adopted this analysis, asserting that
based on their participation in a community of states, states have
certain obligations to one another.313
In contrast, Raz believes membership in a community is only a
“secondary” reason for accepting authority.  While accepting
authority can be regarded as expressing trust in the authority, that
very trust is justified only when the authority discharges its duties to
the group properly and does not betray the group.314  For example,
because a national community’s government may behave despotically
and persecute community members, membership alone may not be a
good reason to accept the government’s authority.
f. The Moral Principles of Fidelity to Promises and of Fulfilling
Legitimate Expectations of Others.  Many political and legal theorists,
such as philosopher and legal scholar Fernando R. Tesón, emphasize
309. Raz, supra note 193, at 129.
310. Raz, supra note 184, at 13.
311. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 206 (1986).
312. See id. at 195-202.
313. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY 195-207 (1989).  The
work of these theorists will be referred to at greater length in Parts IV and V.
314. See Raz, supra note 193, at 130-31.
LEPARD.DOC 03/27/00  8:34 PM
1999] IS THE UNITED STATES OBLIGATED TO DRIVE ON THE RIGHT? 109
moral principles such as fidelity to promises or fulfillment of
legitimate expectations of others based on one’s own conduct.  They
argue that in order for a norm to enjoy authority and legitimacy,
these moral principles must support its acceptance.315  In this
connection, Tesón has contended that game theory (and its analysis
of how states use norms to facilitate collective action and thereby
maximize self-interest) can explain why states accept the
persuasiveness of certain norms, but not why states give the norms
persuasive or binding authority.316  Such authority, he maintains, can
only be based on moral duties and values.317  Tesón’s views on the
authority of treaties and customary international law will be discussed
in greater detail in Parts IV and V.
g. Consent.  Throughout history, many political theorists have
insisted that unless government enjoys the consent of the citizens, it
has no authority and thus no right to be obeyed.318  In the sphere of
inter-state relations, and consistent with the “positivist” approach to
international law, many theorists have argued that international legal
rules only have legal authority over particular states insofar as those
states have expressed their consent to them.  Consent may be granted
either explicitly, through the conclusion of treaties, or implicitly,
through conduct out of a sense of legal obligation, which gives rise to
customary international law.319  Consent theorists often assume that
consent is a relevant legitimacy criterion because of the value of state
autonomy or state “sovereignty.”
As noted above, however, other theorists question whether
consent alone constitutes a necessary or sufficient normative
justification for government or the authority of international law.  In
the domestic sphere, for example, Raz maintains that people may
have “a duty to obey an authority to the authority of which they did
not consent” if “compliance with [the authority] will ensure that they
stand a better chance of discharging their moral obligations, and
315. See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TESÓN, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (1998).
316. See generally id. at 73-103.
317. See id.
318. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374-75 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960).
319. See, e.g., 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 15-20 (1905)
(describing consent as the basis of obligation in international law); see also ARTHUR
NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 121-22, 222-30 (1947) (reviewing
the historical development of positivism in international law).
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generally will better achieve what they ought to achieve.”320  He
admits, however, that “an argument for a limited role for consent”
can be made in certain areas.321  Likewise, in the domain of inter-state
relations, Tesón has criticized consent-based theories of international
legal obligation, arguing that consent may be immoral.  In particular,
he has contended that “the view that consent is the basis of
international legal obligation is implausible [because] . . . states may
conclude immoral agreements and participate in immoral customs,”322
and thus, “consent alone cannot be the basis of obligation.”323
h. Combinations of Reasons.  Some normative theories
advocate obedience to authority for a combination of the above
reasons.  For example, a normative theory of law may argue that legal
norms have normative authority because they comply with secondary
rules that are supported by the goal of facilitating collective action.
3. Toward a Normative Theory of Authoritative International
Norms.  Thus far, this section has discussed the reasons for accepting
authority that have been promoted by various normative theories in
the case of international norms such as the arm’s length standard.
The question remains as to which of these normative theories, or
some other theory, ought to be adopted.  As emphasized in Part I,
this Article cannot fully resolve this complicated question.  Based on
certain foundational principles, however, it will sketch the outlines of
such a theory.
One of these foundational principles is that, other things being
equal, it is desirable to maximize the welfare (short-term or long-term
self-interest) of individual states, within certain moral bounds, as well
as the welfare of people in all states.  Accordingly, where global
interdependence makes the welfare of one state, or of residents of
one state, dependent on the actions of other states, recognition of the
authority of international norms can, by facilitating collective action,
help states further their interests or the welfare of their residents,
therefore justifying the authority of these norms.324  But a concomitant
principle is that the decision-making autonomy of states ought to be
respected to the greatest extent possible.  Thus, if feasible, collective
320. Raz, supra note 184, at 14.
321. Id.
322. TESÓN, supra note 315, at 92.
323. Id.
324. See ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 257, at 102.
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action should be achieved through persuasion or through the
establishment of authoritative norms according to secondary rules to
which states have freely consented.
These principles are complemented by other foundational
principles of a moral character.  One such principle is that in general
promises are to be honored.  Without elaborating on the
philosophical, religious, and moral bases for holding to such a
principle, it suffices to observe that this principle is widely accepted
and has been promulgated in the revered moral texts of the world
religions and philosophies.325  A related foundational moral principle
is that all human beings are members of one human community that
ought to function in union and harmoniously.  Identification with the
whole of the human race ought to complement identification with a
national or state community.  In light of the moral ideal of a
community of humankind, states morally ought to regard themselves
as participants in a community of states.  At the same time, to the
extent that they have recognized their ongoing interdependence and
used international law to develop a sophisticated set of rules for the
regulation of their mutual relations, states are already participants in
an empirical inter-state community.326
In light of these foundational principles, one may draw certain
general conclusions about the relative merits of prominent normative
theories for accepting authority.  All of the reasons advocated by
these theories have validity in certain contexts.  In the international
arena, for example, because states should be regarded as participants
in a community of states, both empirically and ideally, they ought to
defer to secondary rules for identifying authoritative international
legal norms that have been developed by that community.  Such
secondary rules must provide the primary criterion for determining
the legitimacy of claimed authoritative norms, including the arm’s
length standard.327
325. For examples of this principle in revered moral texts, see Joshua 9, in TANAKH: A NEW
TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ACCORDING TO THE TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT
349-51 (1985); BUDDHIST SCRIPTURES 89 (Edward Conze trans., 1959); E. BRUCE BROOKS &
A. TAEKO BROOKS, THE ORIGINAL ANALECTS: SAYINGS OF CONFUCIUS AND HIS
SUCCESSORS 2:13 at 112 (1998); Matthew 5:33-37, in THE HOLY BIBLE: NEW REVISED
STANDARD VERSION WITH APOCRYPHA 5 (1977); THE KORAN INTERPRETED 2:173 at 50-51
(A.J. Arberry trans., 1955); BAHÁ’U’LLÁH, GLEANINGS FROM THE WRITINGS OF
BAHÁ’U’LLÁH 266 (Shoghi Effendi trans., 2d rev. ed. 1976).
326. See FRANCK, supra note 313, at 195-207.
327. For a discussion of these secondary rules, see Parts IV and V.
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At the same time, the desirability of facilitating collective action
may provide independent reasons for accepting the authority of
international norms like the arm’s length standard.  This factor can
strengthen legal obligations established under secondary rules.  In
keeping with the emphasis that ought to be placed on state autonomy
within a framework of community, however, the legitimacy and
authority of norms instituted to help resolve what states perceive as
dilemmas of common interests should be stronger than norms
addressing situations best characterized as games of “harmony” or
“assurance.”  In the case of situations resembling assurance games, in
the absence of obligations established by secondary rules involving
treaties or customary international law, it usually suffices for states to
signal to other states their intention of taking a particular cooperative
action.  Other states will then have confidence that their preferred
equilibrium outcome will be reached, making it unnecessary to
preempt state decision making.
Likewise, norms established to resolve dilemmas of common
interests, like a prisoners’ dilemma, should have greater legitimacy
and authority than norms established to resolve pure or non-pure
coordination problems.  This is the case for the simple reason that in
dilemmas of common interests acceptance of the preemptive effect of
norms is more critical to the resolution of the problem.
Of course, based on the analyses of Ullmann-Margalit and Raz,
there may be good reasons to accept the binding authority of a
coordination norm.328  But in light of the value accorded to state
autonomy and the natural incentive states have to conform with
coordination norms, these reasons should be regarded as less
compelling than in the case of norms that resolve dilemmas of
common interests.  Thus, except to the extent relevant secondary
rules already establish their binding authority, coordination norms
should not be given such binding authority without careful
consideration.
On the other hand, there is a greater justification for recognizing
the binding authority of a coordination norm in the case of a non-
pure coordination problem, precisely because some states would
clearly prefer another coordination equilibrium and may be tempted
unilaterally to defect from a current equilibrium if they believe that
other states can be induced to follow their lead.  Moreover,
coordination norms with binding authority can be useful where it is
328. See supra text accompanying notes 284-99.
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not clear that all states perceive a coordination problem in the same
way, or recognize that a coordination problem in fact exists.  The
imposition of binding obligations may also be helpful where there is a
risk that states currently perceiving a coordination problem may not
continue to do so in the future.
The above analysis of the concept of persuasive authority
suggests that norms with persuasive authority, as opposed to binding
authority, may be particularly useful in solving coordination
problems.  This is because they can provide the added certainty of
convergence on a convention, and also more easily establish a new
convention, without going so far as to impose a binding obligation to
follow the convention.  Norms with persuasive authority may be
especially effective in resolving non-pure coordination problems.
They can authoritatively “nudge” those states that may be tempted to
threaten unilateral action to establish a new, more favorable
equilibrium to adhere to a current convention.  They can also nudge
states that do not happen to perceive the situation as a coordination
problem to conform with a convention, thus making those states
better off than they would have been had they defected from the
convention.  At the same time, norms with persuasive authority avoid
imposing binding obligations on the majority of states who see the
situation as a coordination problem and therefore have a natural
incentive to conform.  But they do help discourage such states from
arbitrarily abandoning the convention should they “change their
minds” in the future and decide that the situation no longer
constitutes a coordination problem.
In situations with the characteristics of a prisoners’ dilemma, in
general it would be desirable for states to establish a system of
sanctions.  The existence of sanctions should be regarded as a factor
further enhancing the legitimacy of international legal norms that
have been accepted by states under relevant secondary rules of
international law to deal with such prisoners’ dilemma situations.
Nonetheless, sanctions should not be regarded as a prerequisite for
recognizing the authority and legitimacy of legal norms established
under relevant secondary rules.  This is especially true in the case of
coordination norms, precisely because such norms are usually self-
enforcing.
If secondary rules of international law already identify particular
norms as having legal authority, then their authority should be
enhanced to the extent the norms have been developed by experts
with significant knowledge, experience, or expertise in the fields to
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which the norms relate.  Of course, such involvement of experts ought
to be a reason for at least giving such norms persuasive weight, if not
persuasive or binding authority.
As previously noted, states should not only value autonomy; they
should also regard themselves as members of a community of states.
This is the basis for the acceptance of relevant secondary rules of
international law.  Further, the moral principle of fidelity to promises
should be regarded as sacrosanct.  It can serve as a powerful reason
for recognizing the authority of norms contained in treaties that
represent mutual promises.  For example, where coordination norms
are embodied in treaties, the moral principle of fidelity to promises
independently necessitates granting authority to those norms, even if
in the absence of a promise there would be weaker reasons for
recognizing their authority.  The same reasoning may apply where
morally it would be unjust to defeat the legitimate expectations of
other states based on a state’s conduct.
Finally, consent can certainly strengthen the legitimacy of a norm
based on the principle of state autonomy.  Moreover, it can form the
basis under relevant secondary rules for recognizing a norm’s
legitimacy and authority.  However, state consent is not a necessary
or sufficient condition for accepting the legitimacy of a norm, because
it is limited both by moral principles, like fidelity to promises, and by
states’ membership in a community of states.  Accordingly, the simple
withdrawal of consent does not legitimize the violation of a norm
supported by other reasons.
B. The Normative Authority of the Arm’s Length Standard
1. The Authority of the Arm’s Length Standard in Historical
Perspective.  The above conceptual framework helps illuminate
historical attempts to codify the arm’s length standard in international
treaties and various historical views about its authority under
international law.  During the League of Nations era, states pursued
very different policies regarding the allocation of profits of a single
enterprise or between associated enterprises, although at least a
majority of states gave preference to the principle of separate
accounting.  Nevertheless, states disagreed about how to rectify
accounts that did not reflect true profits.
States adopted various methods to rectify the accounts of related
enterprises to reflect true profits.  Some states used an “independent
enterprise” or “arm’s length” standard, however those terms were
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interpreted.329  In applying this standard, some used a transaction-
based “arm’s length method,”330 while others used empirical
methods.331  Still others used outright formulary apportionment of
total combined profits rather than purporting to follow the separate
accounting principle.332
Thus, regarding allocation methods, states were not playing a
“harmony” game in which they all “automatically” converged on use
of the same allocation method based on their perceived interests and
values.  However, to the extent there was some consensus among an
apparent majority of states on the preferred use of methods
consistent with the arm’s length standard, with empirical and
formulary methods as fallback methods, this consensus did reflect a
limited game of “harmony” among these states.  In any case, before
the issuance of the Carroll Report,333 there was no single standard for
which either persuasive or binding authority over states was claimed,
and the arm’s length standard was never claimed to have either form
of authority.
Because the incentives to defect were not very strong, states did
not apparently perceive allocation issues as a prisoners’ dilemma.  In
particular, it does not appear that each state believed that its best
outcome was achieved when it used formulary apportionment (which
we can consider defection, or D) while all other states adopted the
arm’s length standard (which we can consider cooperation or C).
This is not surprising.  The lack of a clear incentive to “cheat” by
unilaterally using formulary apportionment can be explained, in part,
by the competing self-interests that each state had with regard to
allocation.  The interest each state had in allocating as much of the
profit from a multinational corporate group to itself was offset to a
greater or lesser degree by the opposite interest in restraining an
excessive allocation in order not to result in double taxation and
thereby dissuade foreign investment.  Thus, states’ perceived self-
interest did not always pull in favor of “overallocation” to themselves.
Neither the arm’s length standard nor formulary apportionment was
seen as always producing comparatively more revenue.  Accordingly,
neither method appeared uniformly attractive to all states and the
international community did not perceive an urgent need to prevent
329. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. See id.
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states from unilaterally adopting a particular method based on
calculations of self-interest, as would have been the case in a
prisoners’ dilemma.
According to theorists such as Ullmann-Margalit, we also expect
that states that perceive a prisoners’ dilemma will advocate
multilateral solutions and enforcement mechanisms to deter and
punish defectors.334  No such enforcement mechanisms were proposed
during the League period (or thereafter) with respect to income
allocation issues.
At first blush, it appears that the League-era debate on
allocation methods might be viewed as a “stag hunt” assurance game,
in which all (or at least most) states did prefer universal use of the
arm’s length standard (CC), but in which their second-best preference
was unilateral use of formulary apportionment (DC), followed by
universal use of formulary apportionment (DD), and, in last place,
use of the arm’s length standard while other states use formulary
apportionment (CD).  Given the history of the League’s efforts,
however, it is not at all clear that states necessarily preferred DC to
DD.  Indeed, as we have seen, the evidence does not show any
tendency on the part of states to prefer unilateral use of formulary
apportionment over universal use of formulary apportionment.  As
noted in Professor Adams’ report, those states, like Austria, that used
formulary apportionment argued that it should be universally
adopted.335  It also is not clear that all states viewed CD (continued
use of the arm’s length standard in the face of defection by some
states to formulary apportionment) as inferior to DD (universal use
of formulary apportionment), even if many of them did.336
Finally, income allocation during the League era was not
evidently perceived by states as a zero-sum game.  The very desire for
coordination of allocation methods implies that states saw the
adoption of uniform rules as producing benefits (particularly in the
form of enhanced investment through the limitation of double
taxation) and not as inevitably benefiting other states at their
expense.  States were not attempting to outwit each other in a high-
stakes game to use either the arm’s length standard or formulary
apportionment in their income allocation policies.  On the contrary,
whatever “game” existed was singularly low-key.
334. See ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 257, at 116-17.
335. See 1930 Committee Report, supra note 57, at 4218.
336. Recall that Ullmann-Margalit pointed out a similar weakness in regarding trade
practices as a stag hunt game.  See ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 257, at 124-27.
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So what type of “game” best explains the behavior of states
during the League of Nations period?  The League’s efforts can best
be understood as reflecting state perceptions of a pure or non-pure
coordination game.  States did not have strong preferences about the
use of the arm’s length standard or formulary apportionment.  This
lack of a strong preference is confirmed by the model treaty
provisions dealing with allocations to permanent establishments,
which explicitly permitted the use of empirical or formulary methods
as fallback methods.337  Rather, states perceived the need for
coordination.  The worst outcome for each was if it used one general
allocation method (such as the arm’s length standard or formulary
apportionment) while trading partners used other methods, thereby
posing a high risk of double taxation.  Equilibrium outcomes occurred
when all states used compatible allocation methods, whether based on
the arm’s length standard, formulary apportionment, or some
combination of methods that would avoid double taxation.
The evidence does suggest, however, that some states preferred
the arm’s length standard based on certain policy considerations,
while others preferred formulary apportionment.338  This implies that
a “non-pure” coordination game was involved.  The Carroll Report
argued in favor of the arm’s length standard both on certain policy
grounds (namely, that it was more easily applied and accurate) and
because most states already used it.339
In any case, after the issuance of the Carroll Report, states did
evince a preference that all states should use the arm’s length
standard as the primary allocation method, allowing expectations to
converge around it.  The Carroll Report and the League models
represented an attempt to establish the arm’s length standard and the
arm’s length method as conventions, ideally through agreements.
Even if, as Stanley Langbein has argued, Carroll was somehow biased
against formulary apportionment,340 such a bias is irrelevant to the
desirability of having some convention.  To a large extent, the choice
of any convention is always arbitrary.  What matters historically is
that states desired to arrive at some equilibrium point, by whatever
means.  The resemblance of the allocation issue to a non-pure
coordination problem also helps account for the flexible system of
337. See supra text accompanying note 86.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 66-77.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
340. See Langbein, supra note 38, at 637-38; supra text accompanying note 80.
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model treaties and bilateral treaties developed during the League of
Nations era.
Nevertheless, during the League years, there was no recognition
of the arm’s length standard as a norm binding on all states.  Instead,
the Carroll Report and the League of Nations models were attempts
to persuade states that coordination was desirable and could best be
achieved through the adoption of a single general allocation standard,
namely, the arm’s length standard.  Neither the Carroll Report nor
the League of Nations Fiscal Committee claimed that the arm’s
length standard had either binding or even persuasive authority
except, possibly, as to states adopting the models.  The League’s
rejection of a multilateral treaty indicates an attempt to be flexible
and to rely on persuasion, rather than the assertion of any preemptive
effect for the arm’s length standard as to all states.  On the other
hand, perhaps in an effort to establish firmly the arm’s length
standard as a new broad convention, the League of Nations-era
model treaties provided that parties “shall” use the arm’s length
standard.  This implied the imposition of a binding obligation on
parties to an actual convention adopting this language.  However, it is
important to recognize that the model treaties did not mandate a
particular method for implementation of this umbrella standard.
The promulgation of the OECD and U.N. Models, like the
League of Nations models, represented an attempt to persuade
governments to adopt bilateral treaties incorporating similar
provisions, such as those calling for use of the arm’s length standard
to allocate income between associated enterprises.  Neither the
OECD nor the United Nations claimed that the Models had binding
or even persuasive authority in and of themselves.  Rather, they
asserted that the “authority” (if any) of the Models was attributable
to their persuasive weight as models developed by government
officials and tax experts with wide-ranging experience in tax issues
and income allocation problems in particular.341  Moreover, the vast
majority of the treaties themselves provided only that states “may”
make an adjustment in accordance with the arm’s length standard, in
contrast to the imperative “shall” of the League models.  Part IV will
suggest that such a softening of the obligation might have seemed
feasible because the arm’s length standard, and the arm’s length
method, had already become conventions permitting the achievement
of a coordination equilibrium.
341. See, e.g., 1977 OECD MODEL, supra note 134, ¶ 26, at 14.
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Turning to U.S. policy, U.S. legislation and proposed legislation
manifested ambivalence by the United States regarding the use of the
arm’s length standard versus formulary apportionment.  This
ambivalence is reflected in the language of section 482 as well as the
unsuccessful section 482 legislation proposed by the U.S. House of
Representatives in 1962.342  Such ambivalence again points to the
absence of clear self-interested incentives for adopting either
formulary apportionment or the arm’s length standard.  The United
States did not see itself as having an incentive to defect unilaterally
from the arm’s length norm.  The Treasury Department eventually
opted to maintain and promote the arm’s length standard and a
transaction-based arm’s length method in its 1968 regulations.343  But,
as manifested in the public speeches and writings of Stanley Surrey,
the Treasury Department’s emphasis was more on the need for
international coordination, as opposed to the intrinsic merits of the
arm’s length standard itself.344  This confirms that the central problem
was perceived as one of coordination.
The U.S. campaign to “export” the arm’s length standard relied
fundamentally on persuasion, rather than the assertion that the arm’s
length standard was already authoritative.  That is, the United States
attempted to convince its trading partners in the OECD and
elsewhere that it would be a good idea to adopt a uniform standard
and that the arm’s length standard made the most sense for this
purpose.  Again, the emphasis was on reaching a particular
coordination equilibrium around the arm’s length standard, even if its
choice was somewhat arbitrary.
The current attempt by some U.S. political leaders, such as
Senator Dorgan, to have the United States defect from the arm’s
length standard suggests that these officials may also perceive the
situation as a coordination game.345  But leaders advocating defection
may see this coordination game as a non-pure one in which universal
adoption of formulary apportionment is a clearly preferable
equilibrium outcome for the United States that a unilateral defection
could help establish.346  Alternatively, they may not perceive the issue
of income allocation as a coordination game at all, but rather as a
342. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
343. See Treas.Reg. §§ 1.482-1, 1.482-2 (as amended in 1968).
344. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
346. See Stein, supra note 235, at 130-31; see also supra text accompanying note 305.
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dilemma of common interests in which the United States can better
its position by unilaterally abandoning the arm’s length standard.
2. Toward a Normative Theory of the Authority of the Arm’s
Length Standard.  The general normative theory sketched earlier and
the above analysis of the history of the arm’s length standard suggest
certain preliminary conclusions about the authority that the arm’s
length standard ought to enjoy as an international norm.  In
particular, the existence of the norm facilitates collective action to
harmonize allocation methods among states.  Because the norm has
arisen primarily in response to perceptions of a coordination problem
rather than a dilemma of common interests, however, it is important
to be cautious about concluding based on this factor alone that the
arm’s length standard ought to be treated as having persuasive or
binding authority.
Of course, to the extent that the arm’s length standard was
agreed upon as a solution to a non-pure coordination problem, there
is greater justification for treating it as having persuasive, if not
binding, authority.  There is also greater justification for recognizing
its authority to the extent that some dissenting states or leaders—like
the drivers described in the Introduction—fail to perceive income
allocation as a coordination problem at all.  As argued earlier, norms
with persuasive authority can be helpful in “nudging” such dissenters
toward conformity with a convention like the arm’s length standard.
Moreover, the arm’s length standard’s development and
endorsement by fiscal experts over a period of many decades may
warrant giving it either persuasive or binding authority, or at least
persuasive weight.  However, as just noted, because the arm’s length
norm serves as a solution to a coordination problem in which most
states already have great incentives to maintain the norm as a
convention using their own independent judgment, it should not be
treated as authoritative in the absence of other reasons.  By the same
token, precisely because the norm is a solution to a coordination
problem rather than a prisoners’ dilemma, the absence of effective
sanctions for departures from the arm’s length standard should not
adversely affect whatever authority the norm might otherwise be
justified as having based on other reasons.
The primary justification for treating the arm’s length standard
as authoritative depends on secondary rules that establish its
authority under international law, either as a persuasive or binding
obligation under treaties or customary international law.  The moral
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principles of fidelity to promises and fulfillment of legitimate
expectations may support such secondary rules.  In addition, the
participation of the United States in a community of states provides
ultimate support for these rules.  In light of the general principles
outlined here, the next two Parts will develop a normative theory of
the authority of treaties and customary international law that gives
deference to and interprets existing secondary rules, and will apply
this theory to the determination of the authority of the arm’s length
standard.
IV.  THE AUTHORITY OF THE ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD
UNDER INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
A. The Normative Authority of Treaties
Before analyzing in detail the authority of the arm’s length
standard in bilateral tax treaties, this section examines, from a more
legal and theoretical perspective, the normative authority of treaties
that is claimed under secondary rules of international law and U.S.
law as well as under various normative theories.  It then delineates
the broad outlines of a normative theory of the authority of treaties
that takes account of the analysis in Part III.
1. The Authority of Treaties under Secondary Rules of
International Law and U.S. Law.  Secondary rules regarding treaties
are found in relevant customary rules of international law, now
codified and expanded in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“Vienna Convention”).347  According to customary
international law and the Vienna Convention, treaties bind ratifying
states, under the principle of pacta sunt servanda (“treaties are to be
obeyed”).  The Vienna Convention proclaims in article 26: “Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith.”348  In general, therefore, a treaty norm has
authority in accordance with its terms, which may lay down a binding
obligation (including a prohibition), a persuasive obligation, or an
347. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see FRANCK, supra note 313, at 183-207
(characterizing customary rules of treaty formation, interpretation and termination as secondary
rules); see also SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 153
(2d ed. 1984) (describing the status of the Vienna Convention as a “general expression of the
principles of customary international law relating to treaty interpretation”).
348. Vienna Convention, supra note 347, art. 26.
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authoritative permission.  In any of these cases, binding obligations
exist at some level for the parties to the treaty, even if the obligation
is only to give altered weight to first-order reasons for action.  Under
international law, the primary claimed reason for giving preemptive
effect to treaties is compliance with these secondary rules under
either customary international law or the Vienna Convention.
The Vienna Convention also lays down secondary rules for the
interpretation of treaty provisions.  In particular, article 31 states that
a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.”349  For this purpose, the
“context” of a treaty has a specialized meaning; it encompasses the
text, the treaty’s preamble and any annexes, and any supplementary
agreement between all the parties made in connection with the
treaty’s adoption.350  The Vienna Convention further provides:
There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.351
In addition, a “special meaning shall be given to a term if it is
established that the parties so intended.”352
Importantly, the records of the drafting history of a treaty (the
travaux préparatoires) do not figure in these primary rules of
interpretation.  Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides that the
travaux and other “supplementary means of interpretation” may be
used only in order “to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable.”353  The International Law Commission,
which had originally prepared these provisions, took “the view that
what matters is the intention of the parties as expressed in the text,
which is the best guide to the more recent common intention of the
349. Id. art. 31(1) (emphasis added).
350. See id. art. 31(2).
351. Id. art. 31(3).
352. Id. art. 31(4).
353. Id. art. 32.
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parties.”354  However, the Commission simultaneously indicated that
articles 31 and 32 should be treated as dynamically interrelated and
not applied sequentially or mechanically.355
Turning briefly to the authority of treaties under secondary rules
of U.S. domestic law, the “Supremacy Clause” of the U.S.
Constitution provides in part that “all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.”356  Early in the nation’s history, the
Supreme Court distinguished between “self-executing” treaties,
which automatically became the law of the land, and were thus
enforceable by the courts, and “non-self-executing” treaties, which
required some act of Congress in order to be enforceable by the
courts.357  Thus, congressional legislation always prevails over a non-
self-executing treaty that has not been implemented by congressional
legislation.358  In general, treaties are presumed to be self-executing.359
The Supreme Court has further held that treaties cannot
contravene the U.S. Constitution360 and that if there is a direct conflict
between a congressional enactment and a self-executing treaty, the
instrument that was most recently adopted will govern.361  Under this
“last in time” rule, no self-executing treaty norm has any preemptive
effect as to a later federal statute.  It is important to recognize,
however, that the “last in time” rule is solely a rule for determining
the status of treaties under U.S. law; international secondary rules
regarding the authority of treaties do not admit that U.S. treaties can
be overridden by subsequent congressional legislation.362  Although a
later statute may preempt an earlier treaty if it directly conflicts with
the treaty, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that national legislation
is to be construed, if at all possible, so as to comply with U.S. treaty
obligations.363
354. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 627 (4th ed. 1990).
355. See id. at 628.
356. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
357. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
358. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 209
n.* (2d ed. 1996).
359. See id. at 198-204.
360. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1957); see also Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,
267 (1890).
361. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888).  On the Supreme Court’s
decisions in this area, see generally HENKIN, supra note 358, at 209-11.
362. See Vienna Convention, supra note 347, art. 27, which reads in part: “A party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”
363. See, e.g., Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
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The current version of section 894 of the tax code364 embraces
Congress’ commitment to the “last in time” rule with respect to tax
legislation and tax treaties.  It provides, as the general rule, that the
provisions of the tax code “shall be applied to any taxpayer with due
regard to any treaty obligation of the United States which applies to
such taxpayer.”365  The “due regard” language was added by the
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (TAMRA).366
Under prior law, income was exempt from U.S. tax to the extent
“required” by a treaty.367  Section 7852(d)(1) of the tax code, also
revised in 1988, similarly clarifies that for “purposes of determining
the relationship between a provision of a treaty and any law of the
United States affecting revenue, neither the treaty nor the law shall
have preferential status by reason of its being a treaty or law.”368  The
Senate Report on this revision makes clear that section 7852(d)(1)
was intended to codify the “last in time” rule.369  In effect, the “due
regard” language of section 894 and the current version of section
7852(d)(1) combine to claim only persuasive authority for existing tax
treaty obligations, rather than binding authority, vis-à-vis
congressional tax legislation.
In the United States, although tax treaties are considered self-
executing,370 they have not often been given their claimed preemptive
effect, largely because of the congressional policy of considering
treaties as having only persuasive authority.  Congress has frequently
availed itself in recent years of the opportunity to overturn certain
treaty principles through subsequent legislation.  These legislative
acts have explicitly abrogated particular treaty rules and thus have
become known as “treaty overrides.”371  In keeping with this trend,
any future tax legislation that would institute some form of formulary
364. I.R.C. § 894 (1994).
365. Id. § 894(a)(1) (emphasis added).
366. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (TAMRA), Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 1012(aa)(6), 102 Stat. 3342, 3533 (1988).
367. See I.R.C. § 894(a) (1986); see also Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The
U.S. Perspective, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 71, 81 (1995) (observing that the “change to the ‘due
regard’ language serves as a warning by Congress that the existence of a treaty obligation
exempting an item from income may be given due regard but that it nevertheless will give way
to subsequent legislation”).
368. I.R.C. § 7852(d)(1) (1994), as amended by the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988 (TAMRA), Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1012(aa)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 3342, 3531 (1988).
369. See S. REP. NO. 100-445, at 316-28 (1988).
370. See Doernberg, supra note 367, at 120 n.170.
371. See id. at 82-85 (providing examples of treaty overrides in tax legislation, including
proposed legislation involving income allocation).
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apportionment at the federal level would undoubtedly purport to
override existing U.S. treaties.372
It should be pointed out that with respect to treaty
interpretation, U.S. courts have not followed the Vienna
Convention’s treatment of legislative history as merely a
supplementary means of interpretation.  Rather, U.S. courts tend to
place far more emphasis on legislative history in determining the
meaning to be given to treaty provisions, including provisions in tax
treaties.373
2. Normative Theories Regarding the Authority of Treaties.
Prominent normative theories differ sharply about what degree of
preemptive effect states should accord to treaty norms and what
reasons are valid for regarding treaty norms as legitimate and thus
authoritative.  For example, “realists” often maintain that states
should accord treaties persuasive authority, at most, and perhaps no
authority at all.  These realists argue that political leaders ought to
take only calculations of self-interest into account.374  Under the
realist perspective, a treaty may be violated at will if it purports to
require state conduct that runs counter to the state’s perceived self-
interest.  In direct contrast lie the views of “society of states”
theorists, who perceive and emphasize the existence of an
interdependent community of states in the international system.
“Society of states” theorists often argue that states should grant
treaties full preemptive effect in accordance with their terms, as
required by customary international legal norms and the norms of the
Vienna Convention.375
Those normative theories that endorse at least some preemptive
effect for treaties differ in the reasons they proffer for doing so.
Many theorists emphasize compliance with secondary rules.376  Some
theorists justify granting authority to treaties on self-oriented
prudential grounds, such as the fact that treaties can help resolve
dilemmas of collective action.377  For example, such theorists may
372. See id. at 109.
373. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT:
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II: PROPOSALS ON UNITED
STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 28-29 (1992).
374. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE 12 (5th ed. 1973).
375. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 313, at 183-94.
376. See, e.g., id.
377. See Stein, supra note 235.
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believe that if states find themselves in a dilemma of common
aversions, they should adopt a treaty “to signal to each other which of
the available means of cooperation they will adopt: [states
thereby] . . . coordinate their actions.”378  A treaty or other agreement
may thus become, according to Ullmann-Margalit, “the firmest rallier
of the participants’ expectations regarding each other’s actions.”379
Many “game” and “regime” theorists also maintain that acceptance of
the authority of treaties can help resolve prisoners’ dilemmas.380  The
“parties will need the treaty to deter potential violators and free
riders tempted to take advantage of those who comply.”381
Other international law theorists stress that the obligation to
obey treaties derives from consent itself.382  The problem with relying
on consent alone, however, is that to the extent the consent
requirement furthers a value of state autonomy and choice, it could
be interpreted to mean, as some realists have suggested, that a state
ought to be as free to violate treaties as it is to enter into them
voluntarily.383  Accordingly, other theorists maintain that a state’s
obligation to comply with its treaty commitments must flow
ultimately from its participation in a community of states, just as
under Dworkin’s conception of national law, members of a national
community may have “associative” obligations to obey the law that
do not derive from their free consent.384
Finally, some theorists emphasize that the moral principles of
fidelity to promises and fulfillment of the legitimate expectations of
other states must be the ultimate reason for giving treaties
preemptive effect.  For example, Tesón has contended that
[p]acta sunt servanda is a moral rule, not a customary rule.  It stems
from two related moral intuitions.  The first is that, other things
being equal, keeping one’s word is the right thing to do, regardless
of interest and especially when it is against interest.  The second is
that, other things being equal, it is morally wrong to exploit those
who in good faith rely on our promised behavior.385
378. TESÓN, supra note 315, at 82 (describing this view).
379. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 257, at 116.
380. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 235, at 128-129.
381. TESÓN, supra note 315, at 82 (describing this view).
382. Such a view is described in OPPENHEIM, supra note 319, at 519.
383. On the limitations of consent as a basis of obligation, see, for example, FRANCK, supra
note 313, at 187.
384. See id. at 195-207.  See supra text accompanying notes 311-312 (discussing Dworkin’s
approach).
385. TESÓN, supra note 315, at 89 (emphasis in original).
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In this connection, Tesón argues that the pursuit by a state of its long-
term interests “does not create an obligation to obey the treaty.  The
would-be offender refrains from violating the treaty for prudential
reasons, so pacta sunt servanda plays no role whatsoever.”386  He
concludes that “[g]ame theory cannot explain obligation, come what
may.”387
3. Toward a Normative Theory Regarding the Authority of
Treaties.  It would be impossible here to develop a comprehensive
normative theory regarding the authority of treaties.  Nevertheless,
some broad principles can be recognized based on the general theory
of authoritative international norms put forward in Part III.  First,
secondary rules of international law governing the formation,
interpretation, and binding character of treaties ought to be
respected, both prudentially and morally.  They should be respected
for prudential reasons because these rules can help facilitate
collective action to achieve values that are in the immediate and long-
term self-interest of states.  These rules should also be respected for
moral reasons because they likewise can facilitate collective action to
implement moral values, they have been developed by a community
of states, and they reflect the essential moral principles of fidelity to
promises and fulfillment of the legitimate expectations of other states.
Thus, the obligation to respect treaties rests in part on the consent of
states.  But the above-mentioned moral principles place limits on the
extent to which the withdrawal of consent to a treaty can legitimize its
violation.
While secondary rules and moral principles provide sufficient
reasons for respecting the authority of treaties, to the extent that
particular treaties represent a solution to dilemmas of collective
action, these particular treaties should acquire enhanced legitimacy
and authority.  For example, when a treaty norm has been developed
as a solution to a dilemma of common aversions, allowing the treaty
norm some degree of preemptive effect can ensure that coordination
will be achieved, as noted by theorists such as Ullmann-Margalit.388
The argument for granting preemptive effect and legitimacy to
treaties is even stronger when states face a prisoners’ dilemma in
which, based on perceived self-interest, there are strong incentives for
states to defect.  In this case, it may also be desirable to institute some
386. Id. at 84 (emphasis in original).
387. Id.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 284-99.
LEPARD.DOC 03/27/00  8:34 PM
128 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 10:43
form of sanctions against violators of the treaty norm.  These
normative principles will be applied in the following analysis of the
authority of the arm’s length standard under tax treaties.
B. The Authority of the Arm’s Length Standard as a Treaty Norm:
A Norm with Persuasive Authority
The normative model of the authority of treaties outlined above
can shed light on the authority that the arm’s length standard ought to
be regarded as having as a treaty norm.  The balance of this section
focuses on three potential obligations of states parties to bilateral
treaties:
(1)  the obligation of an “initiating state party” making an “initial
adjustment” to the income of a corporation resident in its own
territory to use the arm’s length standard;
(2)  the obligation of an initiating state party making an initial
adjustment to the income of a corporation resident in the other state
to use the arm’s length standard; and
(3)  the obligation of the other state party to make a “correlative
adjustment” to the income of a corporation related to the corporation
whose income is subject to an initial adjustment under (1) to avoid
economic double taxation.
This section first discusses potential obligations (1) and (2), and
then analyzes potential obligation (3).
1. The Existence and Character of an Obligation to Make an
Initial Adjustment Using the Arm’s Length Standard.
a. The Debate on the Existence and Character of an Obligation
to Use the Arm’s Length Standard under Article 9(1) of the Model
Treaties.  The starting point for an analysis of the first two of the
above-mentioned potential obligations is article 9(1) of the 1997
OECD Model, which uses language very similar to article 9(1) of the
U.N. and U.S. Models.  To recall, article 9(1) of the 1997 OECD
Model provides that where conditions
are made or imposed between two enterprises in their commercial
or financial relations which differ from those which would be made
between independent enterprises then any profits which would, but
for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by
reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in
the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.389
389. 1997 OECD MODEL, supra note 171, art. 9(1) (emphasis added).
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On its face, article 9(1) simply entitles a state party to use the
arm’s length standard to adjust the profits of an enterprise resident in
its own territory or in another contracting state (potential obligations
(1) and (2)).  It does not obligate a state party to do so.  Further, the
text itself makes no reference to the arm’s length method in
particular.  But by referring to the “commercial or financial relations”
between the enterprises and to an “independent enterprise” standard,
article 9(1) could be read as supporting the arm’s length method,
which focuses on determining an arm’s length price for particular
transactions.  On the other hand, its reference to inclusion of
“profits” implies that profit-based empirical methods (such as the
comparable profits method or profit split method) might be
permissible.
As noted in Part I, despite the permissive language of article
9(1), many government officials and courts have claimed that bilateral
treaties prohibit the use of formulary apportionment by mandating
the use of the arm’s length standard.390  A number of scholars have
also argued that notwithstanding article 9(1)’s facially permissive
language, treaties incorporating language similar to article 9(1) in fact
impose binding obligations to use the arm’s length standard.  To
arrive at this conclusion, they often interpret article 9(1) in light of
the “object and purpose” of double taxation conventions, as required
by the Vienna Convention, as well as by making reference to
supplementary sources of interpretation, including the OECD
Commentary.  For example, German scholar Klaus Vogel and his co-
authors have argued the following:
[Article 9] is designed to avoid economic double taxation.  This can
be achieved only if the delimitation of profits is subjected to a firm
rule, i.e. one which is binding on both contracting States.  The fact
that the arm’s length clause is more elaborate in Art. 7 [relating to
the allocation of income to permanent establishments] than in Art.
9, cannot be taken to imply that Art. 9 is less binding or not binding
at all . . . Art. 9 is no less definite than sec. 482 I.R.C . . . the direct
applicability of which cannot be doubted.391
390. For example, in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159
(1983), the U.S. Supreme Court stated in dictum: “[T]he United States is a party to a great
number of tax treaties that require the Federal Government to adopt some form of ‘arm’s
length’ analysis in taxing the domestic income of multinational enterprises . . . .”  Id. at 196
(emphasis added).
391. PROF. DR. KLAUS VOGEL ET AL., KLAUS VOGEL ON DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTIONS 422-23 (1991); see also Thomas, supra note 36, at 130-31 (arguing that bilateral
treaties impose an obligation to use the arm’s length standard and therefore help to establish
opinio juris under customary international law).
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The authors support this opinion in part by reference to the 1977
OECD Commentary on paragraph 1 of article 9, which states that
“[n]o re-writing of the accounts . . . is authorized if the
transactions . . . have taken place on normal open market commercial
terms (on an arm’s length basis).”392
Many writers holding a similar view contend that existing treaties
prohibit the use of formulary apportionment.393  Some commentators
distinguish between transaction-based methods that take account of
transactional profits, which they consider to be consistent with the
binding obligation to use the arm’s length standard, and those general
profit-based methods that take account of the total combined profits
of the related corporations, which they consider to be prohibited.394
Likewise, certain supporters of formulary apportionment, such as
Dale Wickham and Charles Kerester, while apparently conceding
that article 9(1) requires the use of an arm’s length standard, argue
that this standard “does not require an arm’s length price.  An arm’s
length price is only one means of satisfying an arm’s-length
standard.”395  They argue that profit split methods should be
understood as consistent with the binding obligation imposed by
treaties to use the arm’s length standard.396
In contrast, other commentators have argued that article 9(1)
should be read literally as permissive or as merely descriptive, and
that article 9(1) imposes no persuasive or binding obligation to use
the arm’s length standard.  For example, Louis M. Kauder, a former
official in the Treasury Department’s Office of International Tax
Counsel and the Justice Department’s Tax Division, has noted that
“[o]ne implication of the phrase ‘may be taken into account’ (or ‘may
adjust’) is that it grants each taxing authority permission to do
something (i.e., make a transfer pricing adjustment to the income of
an affiliate of an MNE) that otherwise it could not do.”397  But he
argues that no other rule in U.S. tax treaties based on the OECD
Models or in national or international law forbidding transfer pricing
392. VOGEL supra note 391, at 423; 1977 OECD MODEL, supra note 134, ¶ 1, at 88.
393. See, e.g., Coffill & Willson, supra note 15, at 1116 (“numerous bilateral treaties between
the United States and other nations preclude the use of formula apportionment”).
394. See, e.g., Frances M. Horner, International Cooperation and Understanding: What’s New
About the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 578-79 (1996).
395. Dale W. Wickham & Charles J. Kerester, New Directions Needed for Solution of the
International Transfer Pricing Tax Puzzle: Internationally Agreed Rules or Tax Warfare?, 56
TAX NOTES 339, 348 (July 20, 1992).
396. See id.
397. Kauder, supra note 37, at 1149.
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adjustments exists.398  Therefore, he concludes, article 9(1) does not
represent even an authoritative permission; rather, it “must be
explained as descriptive.  That is, it simply describes what the tax
authority of one of the treaty countries might do in respect of related
parties and their intercompany transactions.”399
Kauder goes on to suggest that the only function of article 9(1) is
to lay the factual basis for a possible correlative adjustment pursuant
to article 9(2) of the U.S. treaties (which, in turn, is modeled on
article 9(2) of the OECD Models): “[T]he descriptive related-party
language of the treaties does not bind either country to any particular
method of accomplishing adjustments among related parties, but
rather lays the predicate for a possible correlative adjustment that
may follow from an initial adjustment.”400  Kauder concludes that “the
related-party articles of the treaty do not prohibit formulary
apportionment but rather, at most, provide a mechanism for possible
relief from double taxation.”401
A number of other commentators state that under the OECD,
U.N., and U.S. model treaties, countries are “allowed to” make an
adjustment based on arm’s length principles.402  Thus, they imply that
the provision grants an authoritative permission to states parties.
How can we resolve the arguments between those scholars who
contend that tax treaties based on the OECD and U.N. Models
impose a binding obligation on states parties to use the arm’s length
standard and those critics, like Kauder, who maintain that the
language in article 9(1) of these treaties is not only permissive, but
merely descriptive and without any preemptive effect?  Moreover,
what of the possible divergence in meaning between the
“independent enterprise” (or arm’s length) standard explicitly laid
down in the treaties and the “arm’s length method,” understood
traditionally as the use of the CUP, resale price or cost plus methods?
In keeping with the normative approach to treaty interpretation
sketched earlier, this Article will first turn to the Vienna Convention
rules on treaty interpretation as widely-accepted secondary rules that
398. See id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1150.
401. Id. at 1151.
402. See, e.g., PAUL R. MCDANIEL & HUGH J. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 150-51 (4th rev. ed. 1998) (“Most US income tax treaties contain
an article which allows the US to determine the income of persons subject to its taxing
jurisdiction on the basis of an arm’s length principle . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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can provide a common interpretation.403  It is important to note at this
juncture, however, that the OECD, U.N., and U.S. Models contain a
special provision regarding their interpretation.  In particular, article
3(2) of the 1997 OECD Model, which is substantially similar to article
3(2) of the U.N. Model and of the 1996 U.S. Model, provides that
[a]s regards the application of the Convention at any time by a
Contracting State, any term not defined therein shall, unless the
context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that
time under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to
which the Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable
tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term
under other laws of that State.404
Vogel has persuasively argued that article 3(2) does not apply at
all where the term in question has an ordinary meaning and is not a
technical tax term.405  Article 3(2) also indicates explicitly that the
“context” of the use of a term may require some other definition.
Here, because the word “may” in article 9(1) is not a technical
term, it should be concluded that article 3(2) does not apply.
Moreover, even if it did apply, the context of the use of the word
“may” in article 9(1), in a provision dealing with income allocation,
should be understood as requiring resort to internationally accepted
rules of interpretation, such as those contained in the Vienna
Convention.
b. The Ordinary Meaning of Article 9(1) in Context and in Light
of the Object and Purpose of Double Taxation Treaties.  Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention first points to the “ordinary meaning” of the
language in question.  As noted above, the plain language in article
9(1) seems to be merely permissive.  Nevertheless, there are several
possible interpretations of the use of the word “may”: (1) as purely
descriptive, as Kauder contends; (2) as granting an authoritative
permission imposing binding obligations on other states to respect (in
some unspecified way) an initial adjustment based on the arm’s length
403. On application of the Vienna Convention to the interpretation of tax treaties and the
principle of common interpretation, see generally Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their
Interpretation, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 1, 33-39 (1986).
404. 1997 OECD MODEL, supra note 171, art 3(2).  Compare id. with U.N. MODEL, supra
note 149, art. 3(2), and 1996 U.S. Model, supra note 180, art. 3(2).
405. On the inapplicability of article 3(2), and more generally on the problem of
“qualification,” where “a treaty term requires the interpretation of a term that is not a legal
term in the law of the contracting states,” see Vogel, supra note 403, at 61, 68.  Vogel contends
that article 3(2) does not apply if the term in the treaty “has a meaning only outside of the tax
law.”  Id. at 71.
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standard; (3) as imposing a persuasive obligation on an initiating state
to give the arm’s length standard great weight in making an initial
adjustment; or (4) as laying down a binding obligation to use the
arm’s length standard in making such an initial adjustment.  Which of
these possible interpretations should be adopted?
The Vienna Convention provides that a treaty provision’s
ordinary meaning must be ascertained in light of the “context” of the
provision and the treaty’s “object and purpose.”406  Here, the primary
purpose of double taxation conventions is to prevent double taxation.
Thus, an interpretation of article 9(1) as merely descriptive, while
plausible based on the language alone, is not persuasive in view of
this purpose because it would not reduce the risk of double taxation.
Additionally, such commentators as Kauder rely on the existence of
paragraph 2 of article 9, which requires correlative adjustments, to
argue that paragraph 2 does the real “work” of article 9 and that
paragraph 1 is merely prefatory.  Such a view of paragraph 1’s role
does not appear to give sufficient weight to the historical evolution of
article 9 of the 1977 OECD Model and later OECD Models, and to
the fact that the 1963 OECD Model and all previous League of
Nations-era models incorporated only the equivalent of paragraph 1
of article 9.
On the other hand, the other three possible interpretations of
article 9(1) might reduce the risk of double taxation.  For example, as
discussed below, even an authoritative permission to use the arm’s
length standard in making an initial adjustment might require other
states to respect the initial allocation by making correlative
adjustments based on the arm’s length standard.
The language of article 9(1) does provide some support for an
authoritative permission.  In particular, it implies that a state party
has the right to make an adjustment based on the arm’s length
standard, and, if it does so, that the other party has an obligation to
respect that adjustment (presumably by making a correlative
adjustment).  It is certainly true, as Kauder has pointed out, that there
is no other prohibition in the text of the treaties or preexisting
prohibition under customary international law407 against the
reallocation of income among related taxpayers that article 9(1)
relaxes.  But even in the absence of such prohibitions, as established
in Part III, authoritative permissions serve the function of imposing
406. See Vienna Convention, supra note 347, art. 31(1).
407. See infra Part V.
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binding obligations on other parties to allow and respect the
permitted action.  Indeed, in the context of a binding treaty whose
main object and purpose is to prevent double taxation, the “ordinary
meaning” of an authoritative permission is to establish such
correlative obligations.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention also permits the meaning of
a treaty provision to be established by subsequent agreement or state
practice indicative of agreement on its meaning.408  It is not possible
here to carry out a survey of the history of all bilateral tax treaties and
subsequent agreements between their parties, or even a survey
limited to U.S. treaties.  Nevertheless, as we saw in Part I, the
Treasury Department, in its public statements, has implied that,
under article 9 of U.S. tax treaties, the United States has some form
of obligation (whether persuasive or binding) to apply the arm’s
length standard and not abandon it in favor of a system of formulary
apportionment.
c. Supplementary Means of Interpretation.  This analysis of the
text of article 9(1) of the U.N., OECD, and U.S. Models in light of its
context and the object and purpose of preventing double taxation,
together with the scant evidence of subsequent state practice, leaves
doubt as to whether article 9(1) grants an authoritative permission or
imposes persuasive or binding obligations on an initiating state to use
the arm’s length standard.  In a case of such ambiguity, article 32 of
the Vienna Convention allows consideration of supplementary
evidence, which, along with the travaux relating to any particular
treaty, can be considered to include the OECD and U.N. Models, the
official OECD and U.N. Commentaries,409 the U.S. Models, and the
Treasury Department’s official explanations of the U.S. Models.
Indeed, the OECD and U.N. Commentaries explicitly indicate that
they were intended to aid in treaty interpretation.410
408. See Vienna Convention, supra note 347, art. 31(3).
409. See John F. Avery Jones et al., The Interpretation of Tax Treaties with Particular
Reference to Article 3(2) of the OECD Model—II, 1984 BRIT. TAX REV. 90, 96-101.
410. On the status of the U.N. Group of Experts’ Commentary, the United Nations has
stated that “[i]f the negotiating parties decide to use in a treaty wording suggested in the United
Nations Model Convention, it is to be presumed that they would also expect to derive assistance
in the interpretation of that wording from the relevant commentary.”  U.N. MODEL, supra note
149, at 11 (emphasis added).  The 1997 OECD Commentary similarly states that OECD
member countries “should follow these Commentaries . . . when applying and interpreting the
provisions of their bilateral tax conventions that are based on the Model Convention.”  1997
OECD MODEL, supra note 171, ¶ 3, at I-1 (emphasis added).
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When we turn to the official Commentary on the 1963 OECD
Model, we find no explicit guidance on the meaning of the language
in article 9(1).  Instead, the Commentary on article 7 of the 1963
OECD Model, which also addressed the allocation rules in article 9,
implied that articles 7 and 9 were not meant to depart substantively
from the pattern of tax treaties concluded since World War II.411  In
its original report issued in 1960, the Fiscal Committee had affirmed
that the allocation rules incorporated in articles 7 and 9 reflected a re-
adoption of principles appearing in existing bilateral tax treaties, most
of which, it claimed, were “based on the Mexico and London Model
Conventions of the League of Nations.”412
In this connection, it is illuminating to recall that the 1933 Draft
Convention, as well as the 1943 Mexico and 1946 London Models,
provided that diverted profits “shall” be entered in the accounts of an
enterprise in accordance with the arm’s length standard.  Further, the
League Fiscal Committee’s Commentary on article 5 of the 1933
Draft Convention stated that “[a]rticle 5 deals with subsidiaries which
will be taxed as independent enterprises provided no profits or losses
are transferred as a result of the relations between the affiliated
companies.  If such transfers are effected, the administration will
make the necessary adjustments in the balance-sheets.”413  The use of
such imperative language suggests that the drafters of these
conventions intended to impose a binding obligation on states parties
to follow the arm’s length standard in making initial adjustments.  As
indicated in Part III, the drafters may have instituted such a binding
obligation in order to establish more firmly a new convention
involving use of the arm’s length standard.
In any case, as noted in Part II, states almost invariably (with the
primary exception of France’s treaties with the United States) chose
not to adopt this imperative language in their actual bilateral treaties,
but instead replaced “shall” with “may” in their provisions on
allocation of profits between related enterprises.  The Fiscal
Committee, in its original 1960 report, failed to note this critical
discrepancy between the language in the models and actual bilateral
411. See 1963 OECD MODEL, supra note 104, ¶ 2, at 79 (affirming that it was “thought
sufficient to restate” the essential principles already figuring in “a large number of European
double taxation Conventions concluded since the war, . . . with some slight amendments and
modifications primarily aimed at producing greater clarity”).
412. Third Report of the Fiscal Committee, supra note 108, at 4581.
413. 1933 Committee Report, supra note 81, at 4247 (emphasis added).
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treaties, which it claimed were “based on” the models.414  In short, the
Fiscal Committee did not make clear whether it intended to
“readopt” the meaning of the models, which used the imperative
“shall,” or whether it intended to refer to the meaning of the parallel
allocation provision in actual bilateral treaties, which, like the new
proposed OECD model, used the word “may” nearly uniformly.
Because the word “shall” was converted to the apparently
permissive “may” in the 1963 OECD Model and in all subsequent
models, the question arises as to whether this change was meant to
make a clear break with the League of Nations models by changing a
binding obligation into an authoritative permission, or instead was
intended to maintain at least persuasive authority (or perhaps even
binding authority) for the arm’s length standard.  The OECD and
U.N. Model Commentaries and other sources provide evidence for
each of these interpretations, but, as the following analysis
establishes, they best support the conclusion that the post-World War
II models grant the arm’s length standard strong persuasive authority.
d. Supplementary Evidence Supporting an Authoritative
Permission.  There is evidence in the Commentaries supporting the
inference from the ordinary meaning of the text, and the object and
purpose of the double taxation conventions, that article 9(1) grants an
authoritative permission.  For example, the 1963 OECD Commentary
affirmed that article 9 provides that tax authorities “may . . . re-write
the accounts of the enterprises if . . . the accounts do not show the
true taxable profits arising in that country.  It is evidently appropriate
that rectification should be sanctioned in such circumstances, and the
Article seems to call for very little comment.”415  Both the 1977 and
1997 Commentaries employ similar language.416  The 1995 Transfer
Pricing Guidelines indicated that the article “authorizes” a tax
administration to re-write accounts.417  The U.N. Group of Experts’
Commentary on the U.N. Model essentially quoted most of the 1977
OECD Commentary, repeating that the tax authorities “may” re-
write accounts.418
414. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
415. 1963 OECD MODEL, supra note 104, at 93 (emphasis added).
416. Compare 1977 OECD MODEL, supra note 134, ¶ 1, at 88, with 1997 OECD MODEL,
supra note 171, ¶ 2, at C(9)-1.
417. See 1995 TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 172, ¶ 2.3, at II-1.
418. See U.N. MODEL, supra note 149, at 106.
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The 1963 OECD Model, as noted above, appeared to reflect the
practice by states of using similar permissive terminology in their
bilateral treaties.  Indeed, it seems that states intentionally rejected
the imperative “shall” in the League models in favor of permissive
language in their treaties, implying an unwillingness to accept a
binding obligation to use the arm’s length standard.  Thus, the
consistent use of the term “may” in the OECD and U.N. Models, and
in bilateral treaties, along with the use of such terminology as
“sanctioned” and “authorizes” in the supplemental OECD sources,
lends weight to the interpretation that the treaties grant an
authoritative permission to use the arm’s length standard.  Such an
authoritative permission by itself would not prohibit the use of other
methods for determining taxable profits.
e. Supplementary Evidence Supporting a Binding Obligation.
At the other extreme, there is one passage in the OECD
Commentaries suggesting that article 9(1) may impose a binding
obligation to use the arm’s length standard under certain
circumstances.  In particular, the 1963 Commentary affirmed that “[i]t
should perhaps be mentioned that the provisions of the Article apply
only if special conditions have been made or imposed between the
two enterprises.  No re-writing of the accounts . . . is authorised if the
transactions . . . have taken place on normal open market commercial
terms.”419  The 1997 Commentary contains very similar language,
adding (as did the 1977 Commentary) a clarification that normal open
market commercial terms means on an “arm’s length” basis.420  On its
face, this statement suggests that parties have a binding obligation to
apply not only an arm’s length standard, but also an arm’s length
method based on particular transactions.
f. Supplementary Evidence Supporting a Persuasive Obligation.
There are numerous statements in the OECD Commentaries and
other OECD documents suggesting the existence of a persuasive
obligation of an initiating state to use the arm’s length standard.  For
example, as noted above, the 1963 Commentary affirmed that the
new text was not intended to change the substance of earlier model
treaty provisions on allocation, which apparently laid down a binding
obligation.  It is appropriate to interpret the 1963 and later OECD
Models as establishing a persuasive obligation because such an
419. 1963 OECD MODEL, supra note 104, at 93.
420. See 1997 OECD MODEL, supra note 171, ¶ 2, at C(9)-1.
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obligation is more binding than a mere authoritative permission,
which is in keeping with the apparently binding character of the
earlier models.  At the same time, it gives some respect to the “plain
language” of the 1963 and later OECD Models, which employ
permissive terminology, because it does not go so far as to impose a
binding obligation.
In its 1960 report on the predecessors of Articles 7 and 9 of the
1963 OECD Model, the Fiscal Committee stated:
The two Articles incorporate a number of directives.  They do not,
nor in the nature of things could they be expected to, lay down a
series of precise rules for dealing with every kind of problem that
may arise when an enterprise of one State makes profits in
another . . . .  Special cases may require special consideration, but it
should not be difficult to find an appropriate solution if the
problem is approached within the framework of satisfactory rules
based on agreed principles.421
While the Fiscal Committee thus referred to article 9 as containing
“directives,” it simultaneously stressed that the article was not
intended to establish “precise rules” and that, above all, the article
sought to lay down certain “principles.”  This type of language
suggests that the Committee had in mind a strong persuasive
obligation to use the arm’s length standard as opposed to a binding
obligation.
Further, the 1963 Commentary indicated that it is “appropriate”
that rectification should be “sanctioned” if accounts do not show true
taxable profits.422  The word “sanctioned” could be read as “approved
of” or “encouraged,” which in turn could signify that states parties
ought to make such a rectification based on the general arm’s length
standard.  Given the reference to “open market commercial terms”
that follows, the implication is that parties ought to make an
adjustment based on the arm’s length method in particular.  The 1997
Commentary contains similar language (replacing “rectification” with
“adjustment”).423
The 1997 Commentary also added a provision on thin
capitalization, which states in part that the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs considers that “the application of rules designed to deal with
thin capitalisation should normally not have the effect of increasing
the taxable profits of the relevant domestic enterprise to more than the
421. Third Report of the Fiscal Committee, supra note 108, at 4597-98 (emphasis added).
422. See 1963 OECD MODEL, supra note 104, at 93.
423. See 1997 OECD MODEL, supra note 171, ¶ 2, at C(9)-1.
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arm’s length profit, and that this principle should be followed in
applying existing tax treaties.”424  This language implies that, at least
normally, states are under an obligation not to allocate more than
arm’s length profits to an enterprise in cases of thin capitalization.
The insertion of the qualifier “normally” suggests that this obligation
is persuasive, not binding, because certain first-order reasons for not
adjusting profits to an arm’s length amount are not entirely excluded
and may still override reasons for using the arm’s length standard.
The reference to such a “principle” that “should” be followed in
applying article 9 also conveys the sense of a persuasive obligation.
Another new provision in the 1997 Commentary on article 9(1)
notes that a
number of countries interpret the article in such a way that it by no
means bars the adjustment of profits under national law under
conditions that differ from those of the Article and that it has the
function of raising the arm’s length principle at treaty level . . . .
However, in some cases the application of the national law of some
countries may result in adjustments to profits at variance with the
principles of the Article.  Contracting States are enabled by the
Article to deal with such situations by means of corresponding
adjustments . . . and under mutual agreement procedures.425
The first sentence quoted above suggests that many countries
take the position that article 9(1) does not limit their right to adopt
national laws permitting use of an allocation method that is
inconsistent with the arm’s length standard, but only imposes an
obligation to apply an arm’s length “principle” when dealing with
treaty partners under mutual agreement procedures.426
In the following sentences quoted above, the Committee on
Fiscal Affairs appears to imply, on the one hand, that states are
obligated to conform their national laws to the principles of article
9(1).  On the other hand, the Committee suggests that article 9(1)
expresses “principles” rather than binding rules.  And the Committee
contemplates cases in which adjustments may not accord with these
principles.  It states that these cases can be worked out through
negotiations under the mutual agreement procedure.  Together, these
observations imply a view on the part of the Committee that article
424. Id. ¶ 3(c), at C(9)-2 (emphasis added).
425. Id. ¶ 4, at C(9)-2-3 (emphasis added).
426. See in this connection Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies, in
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL TAX
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION: FOUR RELATED STUDIES ¶ 30, at 68 (1987).
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9(1) imposes only a persuasive obligation to use the arm’s length
standard.
Moreover, in its 1979 OECD Report on transfer pricing, the
OECD stated:
It is generally acknowledged that, in taxing the profits of an
enterprise which engages in transactions with associated enterprises
outside the jurisdiction of the relevant taxing authority, the profits
should be calculated on the assumption that the prices charged in
these transactions are arm’s length prices.  This is the underlying
assumption in Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Double Taxation
Convention on Income and Capital (1977) on transactions between
associated enterprises.427
The conclusion that the OECD interpreted article 9(1) as imposing a
persuasive and not a binding obligation is also supported by its
affirmation in the 1979 OECD Report that, in seeking to arrive at an
arm’s length price,
some regard to the total profits of the relevant MNE may . . . be
helpful, as a check on the assessment of the arm’s length price or in
specific bilateral situations where other methods give rise to serious
difficulties and the two countries concerned are able to adopt a
common approach and the necessary information can be made
available.428
The OECD appears, therefore, to leave the door open for the
coordinated use of formulary methods, so long as they are intended to
assist in arriving at an arm’s length price, or in cases where “other
methods give rise to serious difficulties.”429  The report seems to
suggest that what is most important is that the two countries use a
“common approach.”430  This position is consistent with the OECD
Models’ allowance, in article 7, of the use of formulary apportionment
as a fallback method in determining the income allocable to
permanent establishments.431
In 1995, the OECD Council adopted a revised recommendation
that the prices of transactions between associated enterprises
“should . . . for tax purposes be in conformity with those which would
be charged between independent enterprises . . . as provided [in article
427. 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 136, ¶ 3, at 8 (emphasis added).
428. Id. ¶ 14, at 15 (emphasis added).
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. See, e.g., 1997 OECD MODEL, supra note 171, art. 7.
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9(1)].”432  In the 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the OECD defined
the “arm’s length principle” as the “international standard that
OECD Member countries have agreed should be used for
determining transfer prices for tax purposes.”433  The Guidelines
asserted that a “tax administration in an OECD Member country . . .
could not raise an assessment based on a taxable income calculated as
a fixed percentage of turnover and simply ignore the arm’s length
principle.”434
All of the above statements by the OECD in the 1979 OECD
Report and the 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines imply that the
OECD views article 9(1) of the OECD Models as imposing a
persuasive obligation, rather than a binding obligation or mere
authoritative permission, to use not only an arm’s length standard but
also a transaction-based arm’s length method.  To the extent that they
represent the common views of OECD members on how the Models
ought to be interpreted, the 1979 OECD Report and the 1995
Transfer Pricing Guidelines may at least constitute “supplementary
means” of interpreting the OECD Models within the meaning of
article 32 of the Vienna Convention.  Moreover, for this reason, the
1995 OECD Report and the 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines may
also constitute evidence of subsequent agreement or state practice
demonstrating a consensual interpretation of treaty terms within the
meaning of article 31 of the Vienna Convention.435
The U.N. Group of Experts, like the OECD, apparently also
believed that the arm’s length standard should have only persuasive
authority.  For example, at its 1977 meeting (before the U.N. Model
was drafted), the Group reiterated “that the allocation methods
already devised or to be devised were to be construed not as binding
rules but merely as providing the basic framework for an informed
approach by tax authorities to the problems presented to them in the
allocation of profits of taxpayers within their jurisdiction.”436  The
Commentary of the Group of Experts on the U.N. Model similarly
suggests that the drafters viewed the language in article 9(1) of the
model as imposing a persuasive obligation, which necessarily included
432. Revised Recommendation of the Council on the Determination of Transfer Pricing
between Associated Enterprises [C(95)126/Final], reprinted in 1995 TRANSFER PRICING
GUIDELINES, supra note 172, at A-1, A-2 (emphasis added).
433. 1995 TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 172, at G-1 (emphasis added).
434. Id. ¶ 4.13, at IV-5 (emphasis added).
435. See Vienna Convention, supra note 347, art. 31(3).
436. SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 145, at 28.
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an authoritative permission, to use the arm’s length standard and in
particular the arm’s length method.  The Commentary to article 25
stated that “transactions between related entities should be governed
by the standard of ‘arm’s length dealing’; as a consequence, if an
actual allocation is considered by the tax authorities of a treaty
country to depart from that standard, the taxable profits may be
redetermined.”437
Turning to the U.S. Models, the inclusion in the 1981 U.S. Model
of paragraph 3 of article 9 implies that the United States regarded
article 9(1) as imposing a persuasive or binding obligation that
circumscribed the taxing discretion of the United States.  To recall,
paragraph 3 provided that “[t]he provisions of paragraph 1 shall not
limit any provisions of the law of either Contracting State which
permit the distribution, apportionment, or allocation of income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between [related] persons . . . .”438
There would be no need for this reservation of discretion to apply
section 482 principles if the United States considered article 9(1) to
be merely descriptive or merely an authoritative permission and thus
devoid of any preemptive effect.
The 1996 U.S. Model deleted paragraph 3 from article 9.  The
Technical Explanation indicated that the Treasury Department
removed the paragraph because its language “had proven to be
confusing.”439  The Treasury Department noted that the “1981 Model
language does not grant authority not otherwise present.  Regardless
of whether a particular convention includes a version of paragraph 3,
the Contracting States preserve their rights to apply internal law
provisions relating to adjustments between related parties.”440  The
Treasury Department emphasized that such adjustments
are permitted even if they are different from, or go beyond, those
authorized by paragraph 1 of the Article, as long as they accord
with the general principles of paragraph 1, i.e., that the adjustment
reflects what would have transpired had the related parties been
acting at arm’s length.441
The statement that under paragraph 1 the United States is
obligated to make sure that its adjustments at least “accord with the
general principles” of the arm’s length standard suggests that the
437. U.N. MODEL, supra note 149, at 234 (emphasis added).
438. 1981 U.S. Model, supra note 142, art. 9(3).
439. 1996 Technical Explanation, supra note 179.
440. Id.
441. Id. (emphasis added).
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Treasury Department views the obligation as persuasive rather than
binding.  Its explanation of the removal of paragraph 3 implies that it
continues to regard paragraph 1 as limiting U.S. discretion in how it
makes an initial adjustment allocating income among related
enterprises.  Under the U.S. treaty interpretation principle that places
special emphasis on legislative history (including U.S. legislative
history), it is appropriate to give significant weight to the Technical
Explanation.
g. The Case for the Strong Persuasive Authority of the Arm’s
Length Standard and the Moderate Persuasive Authority of the Arm’s
Length Method.  As the above analysis demonstrates, there is
considerable evidence that the OECD, U.N., and U.S. Models were
intended to lay down persuasive obligations on the part of the parties
to apply a general arm’s length standard as well as a transaction-
based arm’s length method.  If so, why did the drafters insist on using
permissive language?  One possible explanation, suggested in Part III,
is that when the OECD and U.N. Models were drafted, there was
already sufficient agreement on the arm’s length standard as a
convention that there was no need to continue explicitly to impose it
as a binding obligation under the treaties, or even to use language
clearly indicating that it should have persuasive authority.
Recognition of the standard as a persuasive obligation, even through
the use of permissive language, would be sufficient to maintain it as a
convention.  The same is true of the arm’s length method as a
particular method for implementing a broad arm’s length standard.
It appears, therefore, that the best interpretation of article 9(1) in
relation to initial adjustments (potential obligations (1) and (2)) is
that it was intended to impose a strong persuasive obligation on
initiating states to use the arm’s length standard.  That is, states
parties have a binding legal obligation to attempt in good faith to use
the arm’s length standard and to give it great weight (but not
necessarily decisive weight) in deciding how to allocate income to
foreign or domestic corporations.  Accordingly, states parties must
significantly discount the weight of the existing first-order policy
reasons they perceive against using the standard in making initial
adjustments and increase the weight they assign to reasons favoring
use of the standard.442
442. See Figures 4 and 5.
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But does the transaction-based arm’s length method in particular
enjoy a similarly strong persuasive authority?  At this point it may be
recalled that the 1997 OECD Commentary prohibits the adjustment
of the income of a corporation where particular transactions have
taken place on arm’s length terms.443  This provision indicates
endorsement of the arm’s length method.  It suggests that even the
arm’s length method ought to enjoy persuasive authority.  But
because the arm’s length method is not explicitly prescribed in the
text of the treaty, states are obligated to accord it less weight than
they must accord to the umbrella arm’s length standard.
In short, the arm’s length method is best regarded as having
moderate persuasive authority under the treaties.  Thus, the treaties
do not necessarily compel the use of the traditional arm’s length
method to the extent that other methods of determining a
corporation’s true profits, including empirical methods like the
comparable profits method and profit split method, produce results
consistent with the general arm’s length standard and to the extent
there are strong policy reasons for using these methods that overcome
the weight accorded to the arm’s length method.  It appears that such
methods may be consistent so long as they are primarily transactional
in focus.
It may be asked how the OECD Commentary’s prohibition
referred to above is consistent with granting the arm’s length method
only moderate persuasive authority rather than binding authority.
On closer examination, this prohibition, which appears in a non-
binding commentary, does not indicate that use of the arm’s length
method is a binding obligation.  This is because the prohibition arises
only if the accounts already reflect arm’s length terms.  It does not
apply in any other case.  This narrow prohibition is fully consistent
with the existence of a persuasive obligation to use the arm’s length
method in making initial adjustments.  That is, where related
corporations have actually used arm’s length prices, states parties
should be precluded from adjusting profits; to do otherwise would
directly violate the obligation to give significant weight to the arm’s
length method.
Regarding the obligation of the United States to use the arm’s
length standard in allocating income to U.S. corporations (potential
obligation (1)), it is important to observe that, unlike its League of
Nations, OECD, or U.N. counterparts, the 1996 U.S. Model included
443. See 1997 OECD MODEL, supra note 171, ¶ 2, at C(9)-1.
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a paragraph 4 in article 1 (whose predecessor is article 1(3) in the
1981 U.S. Model) providing in general that notwithstanding other
provisions of the convention, “a Contracting State may tax its
residents . . . as if the Convention had not come into effect.”444  Under
paragraph 5 of article 1 of the 1996 U.S. Model (paragraph 4 in the
1981 U.S. Model), however, the provisions of paragraph 4 are not to
affect “the benefits conferred by a Contracting State under paragraph
2 of Article 9 (Associated Enterprises) . . . and [Article] 25 (Mutual
Agreement Procedure) . . . .”445
The Treasury Department’s Technical Explanation of the 1996
U.S. Model states that paragraph 4 “contains the traditional savings
clause found in all U.S. treaties.  The Contracting States reserve their
rights, except as provided in paragraph 5, to tax their residents and
citizens as provided in their internal laws, notwithstanding any
provisions of the Convention to the contrary.”446  In particular, these
paragraphs permit the United States to tax corporations incorporated
in the United States that are considered under the model convention
to be U.S. residents447 without regard to the provisions of article 9
other than paragraph 2, relating to correlative adjustments.  Louis
Kauder thus concludes that article 1(3) of the 1981 U.S. Model
(article 1(4) of the 1996 U.S. Model) eliminates any obligation the
United States might otherwise have undertaken pursuant to article
9(1) to use the arm’s length standard in determining the taxable
profits of a U.S. corporation.448
This conclusion must be considered carefully because, although
article 1(4) of the 1996 Model purports to override all other treaty
provisions, it must still be interpreted in light of the treaty’s overall
object and purpose: avoiding double taxation.  Economic double
taxation could easily result if the United States used formulary
apportionment in making an initial adjustment to the income of a
U.S. corporation, while a treaty partner used the arm’s length method
in making a correlative adjustment to the income of a related foreign
corporation.  As indicated by the carving out of correlative
adjustments under article 9(2) from the scope of the savings clause, in
article 1(5), the United States generally intended to avoid economic
444. 1996 U.S. Model, supra note 180, art. 1(4).  A substantially similar provision appeared
in the 1981 U.S. Model.  See 1981 U.S. Model, supra note 142, art. 1(3).
445. 1996 U.S. Model, supra note 180, art. 1(5)(a).
446. 1996 Technical Explanation, supra note 179.
447. See 1996 U.S. Model, supra note 180, arts. 4(1), 4(3).
448. See Kauder, supra note 37, at 1149 n.12.
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double taxation of U.S. corporations that could result from applying
article 1(4) to transfer pricing adjustments.  The best interpretation of
the impact of article 1(4) on initial adjustments, based both on the
treaty’s purpose and the Vienna Convention rules of interpretation, is
that article 1(4) should not affect the strong persuasive obligation of
the United States under article 9(1) to use the arm’s length standard
and its moderate persuasive obligation to use the arm’s length
method, even with respect to U.S. corporations.  Indeed, recognition
of a persuasive obligation simultaneously fulfills the treaty purpose of
reducing the risk of double taxation while allowing the United States,
in keeping with the reservation of fiscal authority in article 1(4), to
adopt formulary apportionment in certain cases where the reasons in
favor of it are quite compelling.
h. Summary of Conclusions About the Permissibility of Various
Allocation Methods in Making Initial Adjustments.  It follows from
the preceding analysis that states, including the United States, may
employ empirical allocation methods, but these methods should
generally be aimed at producing profits that are comparable to those
that would result from the use of the traditional arm’s length method.
In special cases, sufficiently weighty first-order policy reasons may
justify the use of profit-based and other empirical methods that
depart significantly from the traditional arm’s length method.  Even if
these empirical methods do not accord with the arm’s length method,
they may still be consistent with the treaties’ umbrella arm’s length
standard, which enjoys greater persuasive authority than the arm’s
length method.  But classic formulary apportionment ought to be
viewed as violating this umbrella arm’s length standard.  Throughout
the League of Nations’ discussions, these two methods were seen as
relatively bright-line alternatives.  Thus, the application of classic
formulary apportionment, while not absolutely prohibited, would be
justified only in very rare cases and in the face of extremely
compelling first-order policy reasons sufficient to override the
significant weight that must be given to the arm’s length standard.
At the level of U.S. legislation, under article 9(1) of U.S. tax
treaties patterned after the OECD Models Congress is obligated to
ensure that the U.S. tax code and Treasury Department regulations
give great weight to the arm’s length method in the determination of
initial adjustments and, to the extent they permit the use of empirical
methods, that in most cases such methods may be used only as a
means of approximating an arm’s length result.  If there are
sufficiently compelling reasons for not adopting the arm’s length
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standard in particular situations, Congress may require the use of
classic formulary apportionment.  But if it does so, Congress must
also ensure that where related corporations use transfer prices that
can independently be determined to be arm’s length, the tax code and
regulations permit the corporations to “elect out” of the prescribed
formulary apportionment method and to use such arm’s length prices
in determining their tax liabilities, in keeping with the OECD
Commentary on article 9(1).
Even if the arm’s length standard has strong persuasive authority
under U.S. tax treaties, it may have no preemptive effect at all under
the “last in time” rule in the face of a later congressional statute
requiring the use of formulary apportionment and explicitly
overriding existing tax treaties.  But Congress itself considers that it
must show “due regard” for tax treaty obligations, and the courts will
attempt to construe congressional legislation consistently with treaty
obligations.449  Thus, if current treaties remain in force and are not
renegotiated, under existing U.S. law Congress is obligated to give the
arm’s length standard great weight in designing any new legislation.
2.  The Existence and Character of an Obligation to Make
Correlative Adjustments.  A second problem, alongside initial
adjustments, involves the existence and character of an obligation to
make correlative adjustments under article 9(1) or 9(2) of the OECD
and U.N. Models (potential obligation (3) mentioned earlier).  First,
article 9(1) might be read as requiring a non-initiating state to
attempt in good faith to make a correlative adjustment to the taxable
profits of an associated enterprise in order to take account of the
initiating state’s use of the arm’s length standard.  The grant of what
is at a minimum an authoritative permission in the model treaties
implies that other states have some form of obligation to respect the
first state’s application of the arm’s length standard.  It would seem to
require that the system used by the other state not be likely, in
combination with the initiating state’s use of the arm’s length
standard, to lead to economic double taxation, which is the primary
evil that the treaty as a whole seeks to avoid.
Indeed, many states have taken the position that even in treaties
that contain only paragraph 1 of article 9 and omit paragraph 2, there
is a basic obligation to respect another state’s use of the arm’s length
standard, and to engage in negotiations under the competent
449. See supra text accompanying notes 363-69.
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authority procedure with the goal of arriving at some form of
correlative adjustment.450  These views were endorsed by the OECD
in its 1997 Commentary, which states that
the mere fact that Contracting States inserted in the convention the
text of Article 9, as limited to the text of paragraph 1—which
usually only confirms broadly similar rules existing in domestic
laws—indicates that the intention was to have economic double
taxation covered by the Convention.  As a result, most Member
countries consider that economic double taxation resulting from
adjustments made to profits by reason of transfer pricing is not in
accordance with—at least—the spirit of the convention and falls
within the scope of the mutual agreement procedure set up under
Article 25.451
Article 9(2) provides that where, pursuant to the independent
enterprise standard set forth in article 9(1), a state, in calculating the
taxable profits of an enterprise located within its jurisdiction, includes
profits on which an enterprise located in the other state has already
been taxed, then “that other State shall make an appropriate
adjustment to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits.
In determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other
provisions of this Convention and the competent authorities of the
Contracting States shall if necessary consult each other.”452  As
indicated by the imperative “shall,” the ordinary meaning of this
article is that so long as the initial adjustment by the initiating state
was based on the arm’s length standard, the other state has a binding
obligation to make a correlative adjustment.
With respect to state practice, it appears that states parties to
actual bilateral treaties are generally willing to make correlative
adjustments and recognize an obligation to do so where they conclude
that the initial adjustment is based on the arm’s length standard.  For
example, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Technical Explanation of
the 1996 U.S. Model confirms that the United States recognizes such
an obligation.  It notes that, under paragraph 2 of article 9,
[w]hen a Contracting State has made an adjustment that is
consistent with the provisions of paragraph 1, and the other
Contracting State agrees that the adjustment was appropriate to
reflect arm’s-length conditions, that other Contracting State is
450. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSFER
PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THREE TAXATION ISSUES ¶ 75, at 28-29 (1984)
[hereinafter 1984 OECD REPORT].  Other states, however, believe that article 9(1) imposes no
such obligation.  See id. ¶ 76, at 29.
451. 1997 OECD MODEL, supra note 171, ¶ 10, at C(25)-3.
452. Id. art. 9(2) (emphasis added).
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obligated to make a correlative adjustment (sometimes referred to
as a ‘corresponding adjustment’) to the tax liability of the related
person in that other Contracting State.453
The Technical Explanation further confirms that, even in the case of a
U.S. corporation otherwise subject to the savings clause of article 1(4)
of the 1996 Model, if a foreign treaty partner initiates an arm’s length
adjustment to the income of a foreign related entity, the United
States is still obligated, under article 9(2), to make an appropriate
adjustment to the profits of the related U.S. corporation.454
What light does the legislative history of the OECD and U.N.
Models shed on the character of the obligation under article 9(2)?
The Committee on Fiscal Affairs stated in its 1977 Commentary on
article 9(2) that
an adjustment is not automatically to be made in State B simply
because the profits in State A have been increased; the adjustment
is due only if State B considers that the figure of adjusted profits
correctly reflects what the profits would have been if the
transactions had been at arm’s length.455
This statement affirms that the second state has some discretion in
determining whether the initial adjustment is proper, and that the
method the first state should use is a transaction-based arm’s length
method.  The 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines emphasized that the
“non-mandatory nature of corresponding adjustments  . . . is
important to maintaining the fiscal sovereignty of each OECD
Member country.”456  The Commentary of the U.N. Group of Experts
contained language on correlative adjustments similar to the language
in the 1977 OECD Commentary.457
The obligation to make correlative adjustments is intimately
linked with the potential existence of an obligation to engage in the
competent authority process under article 25 of the OECD Model.  In
this connection, the 1977 OECD Commentary stated that “the
competent authority is under an obligation to consider whether the
objection [of a taxpayer] is justified and, if it appears to be justified to
take action on it in one of the two forms provided for in paragraph
2.”458  It affirmed that if
453. 1996 Technical Explanation, supra note 179 (emphasis added).
454. See id.
455. 1977 OECD MODEL, supra note 134, ¶ 3, at 88.
456. 1995 TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 172, ¶ 4.35, at IV-12.
457. See U.N. MODEL, supra note 149, at 237.
458. 1977 OECD MODEL, supra note 134, ¶ 19, at 178 (emphasis added).  Paragraph 2 of
article 25 of the 1977 OECD Model provides that the competent authority “shall endeavour, if
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it appears to that competent authority that the taxation complained
of is due wholly or in part to a measure taken in the other State, it
will be incumbent on it, indeed it will be its duty—as clearly appears
by the terms of paragraph 2—to set in motion the mutual
agreement procedure proper.459
The Commentary then addressed the issue of whether the
approach to the other state constitutes merely a duty to negotiate or
instead a duty to reach an agreement.  It concluded that “the
competent authorities are under a duty merely to use their best
endeavours and not to achieve a result.”460  The Commentary
admitted that this situation “is not yet entirely satisfactory from the
taxpayer’s viewpoint” because it means that “double taxation is still
possible.”461
The Commentary of the U.N. Group of Experts provided
similarly that “[a]t a minimum, the treaty requires consultation and
the obligation to endeavour to find a solution to economic double
taxation.”462  But it asserted that the treaty did not require actual
agreement.463  It noted that “some countries would consider the
formal adoption of such [a] standard as a step possessing significant
juridical consequences and hence would not be disposed to adopt
such a requirement.”464
Accordingly, treaty partners are obligated to determine in good
faith whether the adjustment by an initiating state conforms to a
general arm’s length standard and is consistent with the results of a
transaction-based arm’s length method.  If they conclude that these
tests are met, the treaty partners have a binding obligation to make
an appropriate correlative adjustment, also based on the arm’s length
standard and the arm’s length method.  Thus, the obligation is a
conditional form of binding obligation.  Further, states have a binding
obligation to negotiate the making of such an adjustment in good
faith, but do not have an obligation to reach an agreement that avoids
the objection appears to it to be justified and if it is not itself able to arrive at a satisfactory
solution, to resolve the case by mutual agreement with the competent authority of the other
Contracting State, with a view to the avoidance of taxation which is not in accordance with the
Convention.”  Id. art. 25(2).
459. Id. ¶ 21, at 179 (emphasis added).
460. Id. ¶ 25, at 179.
461. Id. ¶ 42, at 182.  These provisions in the 1977 Commentary were essentially reproduced
in the 1997 Commentary.  See 1997 OECD MODEL, supra note 171, ¶¶ 20, 22, at C(25)-7, ¶ 26,
at C(25)-9, ¶ 45, at C(25)-16-17.
462. U.N. MODEL, supra note 149, at 240.
463. See id. at 240-41.
464. Id. at 241.
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economic double taxation in fact.  The obligation actually to reach an
agreement that avoids double taxation can therefore be viewed as a
strong persuasive obligation.
It should be noted here that the article 9(2) obligation to make a
correlative adjustment if, and only if, the initial adjustment complies
with the arm’s length standard reinforces the earlier conclusion that
article 9(1) establishes strong persuasive authority for the standard.
Article 9(2) clearly indicates that initiating states should, as a general
rule, use the arm’s length standard, because in doing so they will
facilitate correlative adjustments under article 9(2) and thereby help
achieve the primary purpose of the treaty: the avoidance of economic
double taxation.
3.  Understanding Why the Arm’s Length Standard Should Be
Regarded as Having Persuasive Authority under Tax Treaties.  What
reasons merit the conclusions in this Part that the arm’s length
standard has strong persuasive authority under bilateral tax treaties?
First, we have seen that this conclusion follows from an application of
traditional secondary rules regarding the preemptive effect and
interpretation of treaties, which are supported in turn by the moral
principles of fidelity to promises and the fulfillment of legitimate
expectations of other states, and ultimately by recognition of common
membership in a community of states.
At the same time, the persuasive authority of the arm’s length
standard (and, to a lesser extent, of the arm’s length method) is
strengthened because the stated rationale for the models and the
bilateral conventions is the goal of reducing or eliminating double
economic taxation, which requires coordination among the actions of
fiscal authorities.  Realization of this goal is facilitated by recognizing
a strong persuasive obligation to use the arm’s length standard.
Nevertheless, if coordination is the goal, why do the treaties
impose persuasive and not binding obligations?  One reason appears
to be that the treaties emphasize the desirability of preserving the
autonomy of state decision making to the extent possible and of
allowing states to follow different policies so long as doing so does not
significantly undermine the primary goal of preventing double
taxation.  Thus, the treaties attempt to facilitate coordination by
imposing persuasive obligations, but do not mandate coordination by
making the obligations binding.  Indeed, we have seen that the
treaties mandate neither application of a particular allocation method
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nor the making of correlative adjustments in all cases, which would be
necessary to eliminate double taxation completely.
This is consistent with the conclusion in Part III that the
allocation provisions of tax treaties have been adopted in response to
states’ perception that they face a dilemma of common aversions.
They do not see themselves as caught in a dilemma of common
interests, such as a prisoners’ dilemma.  So there is less need to
impose a binding obligation, and certainly no need to require
coercion or sanctions.  What is required instead, at a minimum, is a
convention ensuring that a coordination equilibrium will be reached.
Of course, a convention need not have any authority at all, because it
is usually self-enforcing.  But for reasons articulated by such theorists
as Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Joseph Raz, it can be helpful to make
a convention in some way “obligatory” as a further safeguard to
ensure it will be followed.
Conferring strong persuasive authority on the arm’s length
standard thus serves a convention-reaffirming and signaling function.
States thereby assure treaty partners that they will in good faith
attempt to use the arm’s length standard and prevent the worst
outcome for each treaty partner—the use of inconsistent allocation
methods likely to result in double taxation.  Granting moderate
persuasive authority to the arm’s length method, and strong
persuasive authority to the obligation to reach agreements on income
allocation that avoid double taxation, promotes attainment of the
same goals.  Thus, it is possible to understand why, empirically, states
have conferred persuasive authority on both the arm’s length
standard and the arm’s length method.
More significantly, however, there are good normative
justifications for doing so.  As established in Part III, the imposition
of persuasive obligations can be quite useful in helping to reinforce
conventions that solve non-pure coordination problems or
coordination dilemmas in which there is a risk that some states may
not perceive (or continue to perceive, even if they initially do) the
existence of a coordination problem.  Income allocation poses the
latter type of risk, as evidenced by the many competing allocation
methods utilized by states during the League of Nations era.
In addition, income allocation appears to be a non-pure
coordination problem, as indicated in Part III, because some states
may prefer common use of the arm’s length standard while others
may prefer formulary apportionment.  The structure of article 9
evidently is intended to promote the equilibrium outcome sought by
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states in the arm’s length standard camp.  In effect, it requires that “if
one state uses the arm’s length standard, then the other state must
respect that and make an appropriate correlative adjustment, also
based on the arm’s length standard.”465  But Article 9 does not
absolutely preclude the use by two states parties of empirical
methods, or even classic formulary apportionment, as established by
the preceding analysis, especially if the two parties can adopt an
alternative  “common approach” (constituting a different equilibrium
outcome) that would reduce the risk of double taxation.466
The legitimacy of the treaty rules conferring strong persuasive
authority on the arm’s length standard is also enhanced by virtue of
the agreement of numerous fiscal experts serving on League of
Nations, OECD, and U.N. committees.  These experts concur that the
arm’s length standard is workable and effective and merits
application as the international allocation norm.  As established by
such theorists as Joseph Raz, often states can better achieve their
goals (here, the avoidance of double taxation) by relying on the
advice of experts, especially in such a technical area as income
allocation.467
Treaties incorporating the equivalent of article 9 of the OECD
and U.N. Models represent mutual promises to give great weight to
the arm’s length standard in income allocation.  The moral principle
of fidelity to promises thus directly supports the persuasive authority
of the standard.  Recognizing the persuasive authority of the arm’s
length standard also helps fulfill the legitimate expectations of treaty
partners.  As argued above, there would be no point to the inclusion
of article 9 in the treaties if it did not establish some degree of
obligation to use the arm’s length standard.
Finally, recognition of the persuasive authority of the arm’s
length standard is supported by the consent of states, because the
parties to tax treaties have themselves recognized that a coordination
problem exists and that it is desirable to impose a persuasive
obligation on themselves, and on their treaty partners, to use the
arm’s length standard as a means of solving this problem.  By
accepting a persuasive obligation they reassure treaty partners that
they will not have a “change of heart” and later reject the arm’s
length standard.  Further, recognition of the strong persuasive
465. 1997 OECD MODEL, supra note 171, art. 9(2).
466. See supra text accompanying note 428.
467. See supra text accompanying notes 308-09.
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authority of the standard continues to allow states some residual
decision-making autonomy on allocation issues.
An additional question remains, however.  Do states that have
not entered into treaties granting persuasive authority to the arm’s
length standard have absolute discretion in matters relating to income
allocation?  Or are they in some way obligated to use the standard
under customary international law?
V.  THE AUTHORITY OF THE ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD
UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Normative Authority of Customary International Law
This Part turns to an analysis of the authority of the arm’s length
standard under customary international law as a means of exploring
certain larger theoretical and normative issues concerning the
authority of customary international law and the means for
determining when a norm has become a norm of customary
international law.  The question at issue is whether all states, including
the United States, are in some way bound to apply the arm’s length
standard under customary law, whether or not they have entered into
particular treaties imposing persuasive obligations to use the arm’s
length standard and arm’s length method.
This section initially examines the normative authority of
customary international law under traditional secondary rules of
international law and U.S. law and under normative theories of
international law.  It goes on to suggest a new normative theory for
determining when norms ought to be regarded as having attained the
status of customary international law.  Section B then applies this
normative theory to shed light on the customary law status of the
arm’s length standard, and concludes that the standard has not yet
achieved this status.
1. The Authority of Customary International Law under
Secondary Rules of International Law and U.S. Law.  Legal theorists
have long recognized that under national legal systems, as well as
international law, customary practices can come to be regarded as
authoritative norms.468  The Statute of the International Court of
Justice provides in this connection that the Court may apply
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
468. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 193, at 107.
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law.”469  A norm may achieve the status of customary international
law and impose obligations on all states if it satisfies certain
traditional criteria.  These criteria themselves have the status of
customary law and can be viewed as secondary rules for determining
the content of primary rules of customary international law.470
According to these criteria, a norm rises to the level of customary
international law if: (1) the norm involves a uniform and consistent
practice among states, or at least a large majority of them; and (2)
most states regard themselves as under a legal obligation to engage in
the practice (a requirement often referred to as opinio juris).471  Once
most states recognize a practice’s obligatory character, the practice
can thus bind all states, including those that have not explicitly
consented to the practice (unless they qualify as “persistent
objectors” to the practice).472
The precise meaning of opinio juris has been much debated
among courts and legal theorists, as explored in more detail below.  In
the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,473 the International Court
of Justice explained the requirement as follows:
Not only must the acts concerned [constituting state practice]
amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be
carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.  The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris
sive necessitatis.  The States concerned must therefore feel that they
are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.  The
frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself
enough.  There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of
ceremonial and protocol, which are performed almost invariably,
but which are motivated only by considerations of courtesy,
convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty.474
There are a variety of traditional sources of evidence of uniform
and consistent practice as well as of opinio juris, including diplomatic
statements and correspondence, domestic legislation, and judicial
469. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(1)(b) (1945).
470. On custom as a secondary rule, see ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 41-44 (1971).
471. See generally J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 59-62 (6th ed. 1963) (describing the
circumstances in which custom becomes a source of international law).  On traditional views of
the requirements for customary law, see also D’AMATO, supra note 470, at 47-72.
472. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 354, at 512-15.
473. (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
474. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
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decisions.475  Importantly, treaties can often evidence both state
practice476 and opinio juris.
Treaties can provide evidence of opinio juris in at least two ways.
First, a treaty provision can codify a norm that has already been
accepted as legally binding customary law.477  Second, because of the
widespread acceptance of treaty norms, states (including non-parties)
may come to regard these norms as binding on all states as part of
customary international law.478  In the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, for example, the International Court of Justice stated that the
contention of Denmark and the Netherlands involved treating article
6 of the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf479
as a norm-creating provision which has constituted the foundation
of, or has generated a rule which, while only conventional or
contractual in its origin, has since passed into the general corpus of
international law, and is now accepted as such by the opinio juris,
so as to have become binding even for countries which have never,
and do not, become parties to the Convention.  There is no doubt
that this process is a perfectly possible one and does from time to
time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by
which new rules of customary international law may be formed.  At
the same time this result is not lightly to be regarded as having been
attained.480
In this connection, the American Law Institute’s Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States takes the
following position:
Some multilateral agreements may come to be law for non-parties
that do not actively dissent.  That may be the effect where a
multilateral agreement is designed for adherence by states
475. See generally BRIERLY, supra note 471, at 59-62; BROWNLIE, supra note 354, at 5-6.
476. Anthony D’Amato emphasizes that agreeing to be bound by a treaty is a custom-
creating act like any other: “When a state makes a commitment to act under a treaty, the
commitment, rather than the subsequent act, is significant in terms of customary law.”
D’AMATO, supra note 470, at 90.
477. See, e.g., article 43 of the Vienna Convention, which provides that the termination of a
treaty or the withdrawal of a party does not “impair the duty of any State to fulfil any obligation
embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under international law independently of
the treaty.”  Vienna Convention, supra note 347, art. 43.
478. The potential for treaties to create customary norms is recognized in the Vienna
Convention.  Article 38 provides: “Nothing in articles 34 and 37 precludes a rule set forth in a
treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law,
recognized as such.”  Id. art. 38.  For a more detailed analysis of how treaty norms may become
customary norms, see Anthony D’Amato, Treaty-Based Rules of Custom, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW ANTHOLOGY 94-101 (Anthony D’Amato ed., 1994); D’AMATO, supra note 470, at 103-66.
479. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
480. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41
(Feb. 20) (emphasis added).
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generally, is widely accepted, and is not rejected by a significant
number of important states.  A wide network of similar bilateral
arrangements on a subject may constitute practice and also result in
customary law.481
What degree of preemptive effect do established secondary rules
of international and U.S. law claim for customary international law?
Under traditional rules of international law, customary norms
generally have binding authority.  Customary norms that are
considered peremptory norms, or jus cogens, even have preemptive
effect with respect to contrary treaty norms.482
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that under U.S. law
customary international legal norms have the same preemptive effect
as federal common law; that is, they constitute laws of the United
States.483  Customary international law, like treaties, cannot
contravene the U.S. Constitution.484  And while federal legislation is
to be interpreted consistently with customary norms where possible,485
a “last in time” rule appears to prevail.486
2. Normative Theories Regarding the Authority of Customary
International Law.  This subsection examines various normative
theories that interpret the opinio juris requirement and that posit
reasons for according customary international law preemptive effect.
First, regarding normative theories that interpret the opinio juris
requirement, legal scholar Anthony D’Amato, in his influential 1971
book on customary international law, contended that the concept of
opinio juris amounts to a “qualitative” requirement for custom
(alongside the “quantitative” requirement of state practice) that
involves the articulation of a legal rule before or concurrently with
state action consistent (or inconsistent) with the articulated rule.487
Such articulation “gives a state notice that its action or decision will
have legal implications.”488  In particular, for articulation of a legal
rule to occur, there “must be a characterization of ‘legality’;” this
permits “states to distinguish legal actions from social habit, courtesy,
481. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102 cmt. i (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
482. See Vienna Convention, supra note 347, art. 53.
483. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
484. See HENKIN, supra note 358, at 237.
485. See MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913).
486. See HENKIN, supra note 358, at 241.
487. See D’AMATO, supra note 470, at 74-87.
488. Id. at 75.
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comity, moral requirements, political expediency, plain ‘usage,’ or any
other norm.”489  D’Amato maintains that “[t]reaties do this better
than any other practice of states.  Any generalizable provision in a
treaty is a statement of a rule of law.  As such it meets all the
requirements of articulation specified previously.”490
Some scholars have taken the position that the “necessary
subjective element does not consist of any feeling or any conviction
on the part of the acting states, but simply of an express, or most
often presumed, acceptance of the practice as law by all interested
states.”491  Others, like Arthur M. Weisburd, have argued that “the
opinio juris requirement means that a state must believe that if it
breaches a rule the states toward which it owes the duty may inquire
into its conduct and that it will be obliged to make those states whole,
in some fashion, for its breach.”492
While the existence of a process by which treaty norms can
evolve into norms of customary international law is generally
accepted, the precise mechanism by which this process works is rather
mysterious and the subject of much academic speculation.  It is
worthwhile to examine theories about this process because of their
relevance in determining whether the extensive network of bilateral
treaties following the OECD or U.N. Models has given rise to a
customary norm imposing at least a persuasive obligation on all states
to use the arm’s length standard and the arm’s length method.
A number of scholars have taken the position that because
treaties are analogous to contracts that bind only the parties, they can
generate new customary norms only to the extent that non-parties
accept the norms in the treaty.493  These scholars accordingly stress
that multilateral treaties may engender new norms of customary law
so long as this condition of acceptance by non-parties is satisfied. 494
Some legal experts have argued that while customary norms may
more easily be generated by multilateral treaties, a network of
bilateral treaties among a similar number of states may likewise
489. Id. at 75-76.
490. D’Amato, supra note 478, at 101.
491. KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2d rev. ed. 1993).
492. Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 10 (1988).
493. See, e.g., Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 1970-I RECUEIL DES COURS 25.
494. See, e.g., id. at 57-74; see also R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of
Customary International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 275 (1968).
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create customary international law.  For example, D’Amato has
affirmed that
if we look at the matter mathematically, a multilateral convention
among ten states is the equivalent of forty-five similarly worded
bilateral treaties among the same ten states.  Surely there can be no
legal difference between the exact same treaty language contained
in a single instrument signed by ten states, and forty-five bilateral
treaties, all of which contain the exact same language.  To be sure,
multilateral treaties are more likely than bilateral treaties to
contain generalizable provisions that are capable of being
subsumed into customary law (witness the recent proliferation of
multilateral human-rights conventions.)  But there can be no
theoretical difference between a multilateral and a bilateral treaty
in terms of their effect upon customary law.495
Legal scholar Chantal Thomas, in an article contending that the arm’s
length standard has achieved the status of customary international
law, has similarly maintained that “a series of bilateral treaties
establishing the same rule, if extensive enough, can also provide
important evidence of customary international law.”496
Other writers have disputed the argument that bilateral treaties
may establish customary law as easily as multilateral treaties.  For
example, Malcolm N. Shaw, while acknowledging that “a series of
bilateral treaties containing a similar rule may be evidence of the
existence of that rule in customary law,” has emphasized that “this
proposition needs to be approached with some caution in view of the
fact that bilateral treaties by their very nature often reflect discrete
circumstances.”497
Under traditional customary law principles, in order for the
opinio juris requirement to be satisfied the norm need not be
enforceable or enforced.  Some scholars, however, argue that for a
norm to be considered “obligatory” some social sanction must usually
be triggered by its violation.  Thus, the highly regarded international
legal scholar J.L. Brierly affirmed that for a norm to constitute
customary international law “[t]here must be present a feeling that, if
the usage is departed from, some form of sanction will probably, or at
any rate ought to, fall on the transgressor.”498  Similarly, Thomas
argues that for a norm to qualify as a customary international legal
495. D’Amato, supra note 478, at 99.
496. Thomas, supra note 36, at 122.
497. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (4th ed. 1997).  Shaw further points out
that “great care has to be taken in inferring the existence of a rule of customary international
law from a range of bilateral treaties.”  Id. at 581.
498. BRIERLY, supra note 471, at 59.
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norm “a high probability of ‘punitive action’—which may include a
wide range of negative responses—must attach to its violation by any
nation.”499  This requirement, she believes, when added to the
traditional requirement that states acknowledge that they have some
obligation to observe the norm, helps to establish when a norm truly
has the force of law and to “distinguish customary international law
from other rules.”500
The conventional understanding of opinio juris, as reflected in
the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, can give rise to a paradox.  According to this
understanding, in order for a particular common practice to be
considered legally binding, states must already perceive themselves to
be under a legal obligation to follow it.  Legal philosopher John
Finnis contends that this understanding of opinio juris is paradoxical
“for it proposes that a customary norm can come into existence (i.e.,
become authoritative) only by virtue of the necessarily erroneous
belief that it is already in existence (i.e., authoritative).”501
Finnis proposes a solution to this paradox.  He argues that at the
root of opinio juris are two related practical judgments.502  The first is
that in some domain of human affairs “it would be appropriate to
have some determinate, common, and stable pattern of conduct and,
correspondingly, an authoritative rule requiring that pattern of
conduct” and that “to have this is more desirable than leaving
conduct in this domain to the discretion of individual states.”503  The
second is that “this particular pattern of conduct . . . is appropriate, or
would be if generally adopted and acquiesced in, for adoption as an
authoritative common rule of conduct.”504  Finnis maintains that when
the contents of a multilateral treaty, or the resolutions of an
international body representative of states, are spoken of as sources
or evidence of custom, what is really (or, at any rate, justifiably)
being said is that the treaty or resolutions are evidence not of an
opinion about what the law already is, but of opinio juris in the
limited sense expressed in these two judgements . . . .  They affirm
that something is desirable (a) in general, (b) in particular.505
499. Thomas, supra note 36, at 114.
500. Id. at 119.
501. Finnis, supra note 193, at 180.  Other writers have also identified this paradox.  See, e.g.,
D’AMATO, supra note 470, at 8, 13.
502. See Finnis, supra note 193, at 181.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 181-82.
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A key element of Finnis’ explanation of the formation of
customary international law is a practical premise, or framework
custom, holding that
the emergence and recognition of customary rules (by treating a
certain degree of concurrence or acquiescence in a practice and a
corresponding opinio juris as sufficient to create such a norm and to
entitle that norm to recognition even by states not party to the
practice or the opinio juris) is a desirable or appropriate method of
solving interaction or co-ordination problems in the international
community . . . .  Both the framework custom and the particular
customs which become authoritative within its framework derive
their authoritativeness directly from the fact that, if treated as
authoritative, they enable states to solve their co-ordination
problems—a fact that has normative significance because the
common good requires that these co-ordination problems be
solved.506
What reasons are advanced for giving customary international
law preemptive effect under various normative theories?  Some legal
philosophers have argued that the consistent state practice
requirement ensures that states are abiding by a customary rule out of
their own free consent.  Under these theories, consent then becomes
a reason supporting the authority of customary international law.507
Other theorists, such as D’Amato, have pointed out that by its very
character customary international law binds even those states that do
not consent to the rule, unless they qualify as “persistent objectors.”508
Some theorists argue that custom may be viewed as “the way in
which states, through their behavior, identify one equilibrium point
among several possible, just as a treaty does.  If other states follow
suit, then the point of equilibrium has been reached and a customary
norm emerges.”509  These theorists further contend that a norm must
be considered binding if the existing states that follow the norm as a
solution to a coordination dilemma “wish to channel the behavior of
newcomers . . . .  Opinio juris emerges, therefore, when the original
participants in a spontaneous regularity of behavior start treating that
behavior as legally required in order to secure the adherence of new
506. Id. at 184-85.
507. One such consent theorist is Karol Wolfke, who maintains that the consent of a
particular state is the basis of the binding authority of customary rules over that state, even if
the state has manifested its consent indirectly, such as simply by participating in the
international society of states.  See WOLFKE, supra note 491, at 160-68.
508. See, e.g., D’AMATO, supra note 470, at 187-99.
509. TESÓN, supra note 315, at 86 (describing this view).
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states and governments.”510  According to these theorists, customary
law is not likely to emerge where the initial situation is a prisoners’
dilemma because of the rational incentive of governments to defect.511
Instead, “[b]inding customary law is the result of an initial
Coordination matrix that later mutates into a PD matrix by the arrival
of new states or governments.  The emergence of custom requires a
Coordination matrix; the endurance of custom requires that the
participants find a solution to a PD matrix.”512
Other normative theories advocate moral reasons for giving
customary international law preemptive effect.  For example,
Fernando R. Tesón argues that “international customary law cannot
be simply inferred from state practice.  To say that X is a customary
rule is to condemn, for moral reasons, self-interested deviation.”513
According to Tesón, the self-interest that may lead states to adopt a
customary practice in order to solve a coordination problem “does
not and cannot generate obligation.”514  Legal philosopher Finnis also
acknowledges that “there are direct ‘moral’ arguments of justice for
recognizing customs as authoritative (for example, arguments against
unfairly defeating reasonable expectations or squandering resources
and structures erected on the basis of the expectations).”515  However,
he maintains that
the general authoritativeness of custom depends upon the fact that
custom-formation has been adopted in the international community
as an appropriate method of rule-creation.  For, given this fact,
recognition of the authoritativeness of particular customs affords all
states an opportunity of furthering the common good of the
international community by solving interaction and co-ordination
problems otherwise insoluble.  And this opportunity is the root of
all legal authority, whether it be the authority of rulers or (as here)
of rules.516
3. Toward a Normative Theory Regarding the Authority of
Customary International Law.  This subsection outlines the rudiments
of a normative theory regarding the authority of customary
international law.  The first principle under this theory is that states
should respect traditional secondary rules for identifying customary
510. Id. at 86-87 (describing this view).
511. See id. at 88 (describing this view).
512. Id. (emphasis in original).
513. Id. at 90.
514. Id. at 89.
515. Finnis, supra note 193, at 184-85.
516. Id. at 185.
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international law and for giving it preemptive effect.  These rules are
supported by a number of reasons, including membership in a
community, as argued by Finnis.517  Moreover, recognition of the
existence of a community of states implies that each state ought to
abide by morally justifiable norms accepted as authoritative by a large
majority of state members of that community (or that such a majority
believes ought to be accepted as authoritative).  Doing so helps to
fulfill legitimate expectations of other members of the community.
At the same time, traditional secondary rules, by focusing on
state practice as well as the views of states about the desirability of
instituting an authoritative norm, give significant voice to states in the
creation of customary international law, thus respecting the
fundamental principle of state autonomy.  Because, for these reasons,
customary norms can (and should) bind even states that have not
voluntarily consented to them or promised to obey them (unless the
states are persistent objectors), the moral principle of fidelity to
promises should not prominently figure as a reason for accepting the
authority of customary international law.  Moreover, it is difficult to
infer “consent” or a “promise” merely from practice.  But, as Finnis
notes, the principle that a state’s conduct may give rise to reasonable
expectations about its continued conduct on the part of other states
supports the traditional secondary rules.518
It may prove useful to elaborate a particular interpretative
approach to the traditional secondary rule requirements of consistent
state practice and opinio juris.  First, the consistent state practice
requirement is essential to ensure that a customary international law
norm is not simply a norm that states regard as desirable in the
distant future to implement as a legal rule; rather, it is a desirable
norm to which states actually conform.  The requirement of
conformity prevents the transformation of every norm regarded as
desirable into an immediately binding rule.
Second, in light of the conceptual analysis in Part III, it becomes
clear that the opinio juris requirement is designed to justify the
recognition of the legal authority—as opposed to the mere
persuasiveness—of a consistent practice by virtue of the empirical
acceptance of the practice’s authority by a large number of states.
Under this conception, the opinio juris requirement is supported by
the need to prove that states are acting out of acceptance of the
517. See id.
518. See id. at 184-85.
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authority of the norm, rather than purely out of “comity,” tradition,
or other first-order reasons.
Finnis’ account of opinio juris is an insightful analysis into the
opinio juris requirement.  But in view of the conceptual and
normative framework laid out in earlier Parts, his analysis warrants
clarification in several respects.
First, two of the practical judgments that he identifies as the core
of the concept of opinio juris (relating to a perception among states
that an authoritative rule would be desirable) require the caveat that
such a rule is desirable now or in the near future.  States may agree
that many rules would be desirable to implement in the long term,
and their practices may even coincide with the action required by
these norms. However, such a vague sense of long-term “desirability”
does not provide the immediate sense of desirability (and ultimately
obligation) required to conclude that a norm should already and now
be considered a customary legal norm.
Second, as emphasized above, states must view as desirable the
immediate imposition of an authoritative rule that requires a
particular practice—that is, a rule that preempts independent state
decision making about the matter concerned.  States must be
convinced that the practice in question ought to have binding or at
least persuasive authority, and not merely persuasive weight.
This second requirement is consistent with the normative ideal,
expressed in Part III, of exercising caution in recognizing the
existence of persuasive or binding obligations among states
confronting only a coordination problem.  Such problems can often
be solved by self-enforcing conventions.  Nevertheless, as established
in Part III, there can be good reasons for imposing obligations
(especially persuasive ones) to reinforce a convention.  The above
interpretation of opinio juris posits that imposition of such obligations
is warranted only where a majority of states themselves believe that
doing so is helpful to prop up and solidify a convention.
Third, states must be convinced that the practice ought to be
binding as a legal norm and not, for example, merely as a moral norm.
Otherwise, the norm could legitimately be described as being a
“customary norm” but not a “customary legal norm.”
Fourth, states must believe that it is desirable, now or in the near
future, to apply this authoritative rule to the conduct of all states,
whether or not they have specifically consented to the application of
the rule (unless they have, through clear and recurring protests,
established their status as “persistent objectors”).  Accordingly,
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where treaties are used as evidence of practical judgments among
states relating to the desirability of establishing an authoritative rule,
those treaties must demonstrate that states have already formed or
are forming the judgment that it is now desirable to institute an
authoritative legal rule binding on all states.519  Some treaties, such as
multilateral treaties with potentially universal membership, will
provide the best evidence of such a judgment.
But treaties that were never intended to be ratified by as many
states as possible—especially bilateral treaties—will necessarily
provide weaker support for the existence of a judgment among states
that a particular rule ought to be applied to all states even in the
absence of explicit treaty obligations.  Indeed, the prevalence of a
system of bilateral treaties, unaccompanied by a multilateral treaty of
potentially universal membership, may indicate a popular judgment
that, in the absence of voluntarily accepted treaty obligations, states
should not be bound by rules contained in those treaties.520  The mere
abundance of treaties incorporating a particular norm “does nothing
to prove a rule of customary international law” if those treaties do not
evidence a belief that the norm should be binding on all states apart
from the treaties.521
Of course, a judgment that there should now be a universal
authoritative rule may also be evidenced by bilateral treaties, but only
if those bilateral treaties point to a practical judgment that all states
ought to be bound by the rule.  For example, in the 1955 Nottebohm
Case,522 the International Court of Justice held that there existed a
customary state practice under which states refrained from
“exercising [diplomatic] protection in favour of a naturalized person
when the latter has in fact, by his prolonged absence, severed his links
with what is no longer for him anything but his nominal country.”523
This practice manifested “the view of these States that, in order to be
519. D’Amato’s concept of “generalizable” norms may correspond with what this Article
has described as norms that most states believe are desirable to implement immediately as
authoritative legal rules binding on all states even in the absence of voluntarily incurred treaty
obligations.  On “generalizable” norms, see D’Amato, supra note 478, at 95; D’AMATO, supra
note 470, at 105-7.
520. In the words of legal scholar Richard Baxter, “the very existence of the [bilateral]
treaties may indicate that the parties had assumed duties to which they would not have been
subject in the absence of agreement.”  Baxter, supra note 493, at 81.  See also WOLFKE, supra
note 491, at 71; MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 196-
97 (1985).
521. Baxter, supra note 493, at 84.
522. (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
523. Id. at 22.
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capable of being invoked against another State, nationality must
correspond with the factual situation.”524  In this connection, the
Court noted:
A similar view is manifested in the relevant provisions of the
bilateral nationality treaties concluded between the United States
of America and other States since 1868, such as those sometimes
referred to as the Bancroft Treaties, and in the Pan-American
Convention, signed at Rio de Janeiro on August 13th, 1906, on the
status of naturalized citizens who resume residence in their country
of origin.525
Without explaining its precise reasoning, the Court apparently
took the bilateral Bancroft Treaties (which had since been
terminated) as evidence of a sense among states that a factual
“nexus” test should be applied to limit states’ free right to naturalize
and thereby exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of other
individuals.526  In his dissent, Judge Read reached the opposite
conclusion—that the treaties evidenced the existence of a common
belief that states generally have full freedom to decide their own tests
for naturalization:
The fact that it was considered necessary to conclude the series of
bilateral conventions [the Bancroft Treaties] and to establish the
multilateral Convention referred to above [the Pan-American
Convention] indicates that the countries concerned were not
content to rely on the possible existence of a rule of positive
international law qualifying the right of protection.527
It should be emphasized that, in assessing the views of states
about the desirability of a legal rule, the judgment of all states should
count, including both parties and non-parties to a particular treaty.
This follows from the general requirement that there be a consensus
among states generally on opinio juris.  In this connection, the views
of the parties alone may help establish a customary norm if a
multilateral treaty attracts sufficient ratifications such that its
members constitute a majority of states, and the treaty’s structure and
content support an inference that the parties to the treaty judge it
desirable that there should now be established a legal rule binding on
all states, including non-parties.  But this is only because the states
parties constitute a preponderance of all states sufficient to produce
the requisite quantity of state practice and opinio juris.  To establish a
524. Id.
525. Id. at 22-23.
526. See id.
527. Id. at 34, 41 (Read, J., dissenting).
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general judgment along these lines in the case of treaties with a
smaller membership would clearly require the determination of the
views of non-parties as well.
Finally, because the formation of customary international law is
contingent on a widely-shared judgment among states that the
imposition of a universal authoritative rule is immediately desirable,
the likelihood of enforcement or retaliation in the event of a violation
is relevant to the identification of customary norms only if states
themselves condition their evaluation of the immediate desirability of
instituting an authoritative legal rule on the likelihood of its
enforcement.  In dilemmas of common aversions (as opposed to
dilemmas of common interests such as a prisoners’ dilemma, where
states have an incentive to cheat), states will not usually see the
presence of enforcement measures as necessary to legitimate
adoption of the rule.  Thus, the availability of enforcement action or
the likelihood of retaliation should not be a precondition in every
case for the recognition of a norm as an authoritative norm of
customary international law.
B. The Authority of the Arm’s Length Standard as a Customary
Norm: A Norm without Binding or Persuasive Authority
Few observers have claimed that the arm’s length standard is a
norm of customary international law; more typically, states and
international organizations such as the OECD or the United Nations
assert that it is a norm of treaty law.528  However, as noted in Part I,
Chantal Thomas has put forward a sophisticated argument that all
states are now bound to apply the arm’s length standard under
customary international law.529  Thomas bases this claim on two
assertions.  First, she observes that the actual practice of states is to
apply the arm’s length standard, as evidenced by the model treaties,
over a thousand bilateral treaties, and the widespread and uniform
administrative practice of applying the standard.  Second, she argues
that the opinio juris requirement is met because, as demonstrated by
the extensive network of bilateral tax treaties, states perceive
themselves as legally obligated to apply the standard.530  Thus, with
respect to opinio juris, Thomas contends that
the sheer abundance of bilateral agreements that faithfully
implements the separate accounting principles of the OECD and
528. See discussion supra Parts I, IV.
529. See Thomas, supra note 36.
530. See id. at 129-31.
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United Nations model treaties provide strong evidence of . . . a
sense of obligation . . . .  This vast network of bilateral treaties
militates strongly in favor of a conclusion that separate accounting
is a general rule of international law.  Thus, there would appear to
be a very persuasive general acknowledgment of a binding
obligation to practice the separate accounting method.531
As noted earlier, Thomas has also put forward the view that a
customary legal norm must likely be enforced or provoke retaliation
if it is violated.  She argues that threats of European retaliation in
connection with the Barclays Bank case meet this test and help to
confirm the status of the arm’s length standard as a customary
norm.532  Furthermore, Thomas maintains that the United States
cannot use the persistent objector exception to exempt itself from a
customary norm requiring the use of the arm’s length standard.533
This is because the “United States federal government has acted on
numerous occasions to evince a belief that the separate accounting
method represents a binding legal standard.”534
In light of the normative theory outlined above, should the arm’s
length standard be regarded as a norm of customary international
law?  If so, what degree of preemptive effect should it have as a
customary norm?
First of all, the arm’s length standard does appear to meet the
test of a uniform and consistent practice, particularly where state
practice is understood as including the practice of agreeing to the
arm’s length standard in treaties.535  The widespread acceptance of the
standard in over a thousand bilateral treaties is truly remarkable.
Certainly this proliferation of treaties recognizing the norm makes it,
initially, a strong contender for the status of customary international
law.  Further, there is significant evidence, as we saw in Part II, that in
practice states do attempt to apply the standard—and the arm’s
length method in particular—and only resort to empirical methods or
classic formulary apportionment as fallback methods.
Nevertheless, it is not at all clear that the arm’s length standard
satisfies the opinio juris requirement as interpreted by the revised
version of Finnis’ analysis advocated above.  The question is whether
states believe that it is desirable (not at some distant time, but now)
to have a general universally binding legal rule requiring the use of
531. Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added).
532. See id. at 131-32.
533. See id. at 133.
534. Id.
535. See D’AMATO, supra note 470, at 90.
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the arm’s length standard even in the absence of a bilateral treaty
imposing some form of obligation to use the standard.  The evidence
strongly suggests that they do not.
Most importantly, states, including members of the United
Nations and the OECD, have persistently rejected the idea of
adopting in the near future a general multilateral and potentially
universal tax treaty that would address allocation issues and include
the arm’s length standard.  Instead, the trend has been for
international organizations like the League of Nations, the OECD,
and the United Nations, and for states generally, to regard such a
multilateral treaty as politically unlikely and as undesirable.
For example, during the League of Nations years, states
vacillated over the ultimate desirability of producing a multilateral
convention, but in any case showed themselves unprepared to accept
such an immediate and generalizable obligation.  To recall, in 1927, a
League committee recommended a bilateral model convention,
believing that it would be “practically impossible” to draft an
acceptable multilateral convention, although also expressing the view
that it might at some point in the future become possible to do so
after a “certain measure of uniformity” had been achieved.536  Three
years later, the League of Nations Fiscal Committee recommended
the adoption of a multilateral convention on double taxation,
contending that “it would materially encourage the movement to
reduce double taxation by uniform law—a method which in
important respects is obviously superior to the method of reducing
double taxation through the instrumentality of bilateral
conventions.”537  It made a similar recommendation in 1933.538  In
1935, after only a few states indicated their willingness to become
parties to a multilateral convention, the Fiscal Committee concluded
that “progress is more likely to be achieved by means of bilateral
agreements” and that “[g]overnments consider . . . that bilateral
agreements are likely to prove more appropriate.”539
Twenty-three years later, in 1958, the Fiscal Committee of the
OEEC attempted to revive the goal of achieving a multilateral
convention, recommending the eventual replacement of bilateral
conventions with a multilateral convention.540  In its 1963 report, after
536. See 1927 Report on Double Taxation, supra note 47, at 4122.
537. 1930 Committee Report, supra note 57, at 4210.
538. See 1933 Committee Report, supra note 81, at 4242.
539. 1935 Committee Report, supra note 88, at 4251-52.
540. See 1958 Report of the Fiscal Committee, supra note 106, at 4460-61.
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noting that the European Economic Community as well as the
European Free Trade Association had both endorsed the desirability
of a multilateral European convention, the Fiscal Committee of the
OECD indicated that it also believed that the conclusion of a
multilateral convention among all OECD member countries “would
have definite advantages.”  However, the Committee emphasized the
importance of first improving the existing 1963 Model “in order to
permit its use in even greater numbers of bilateral Conventions
between Member countries and to facilitate the subsequent
conclusion of a multilateral Convention among all Member
countries.”541
By 1977, when the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs issued
the second revised OECD Model, the Committee stated that the
“elaboration and conclusion of a multilateral double taxation
convention . . . would meet with great difficulties.”542  The Committee
did note, however, that “[i]t might . . . be possible for certain groups
of Member countries to study the possibility of concluding such a
convention among themselves on the basis of the Model Convention,
subject to certain adaptations they may consider necessary to suit
their particular purposes.”543  Indeed, at the suggestion of the
Committee, the OECD Council adopted a recommendation that “the
Governments of Member countries which consider it appropriate
examine the feasibility of concluding among themselves multilateral
conventions based upon the Model Convention.”544  Notably, the
Council only recommended a study of the feasibility of such
agreements.  And rather than an OECD-wide multilateral
convention, the Council contemplated agreements among relatively
small groups of countries.  In its 1997 Commentary, the OECD
repeated these observations and noted the adoption of two regional
conventions: the Nordic Convention on Income and Capital
concluded in 1983 with subsequent revisions, and the Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, which was drawn
up within the Council of Europe and entered into force in 1995.545
The OECD concluded:
541. 1963 OECD MODEL, supra note 104, ¶¶ 60-61, at 29; see also id. ¶¶ 52-61, at 26-29.
542. 1977 OECD MODEL, supra note 134, ¶ 32, at 15.
543. Id.
544. Recommendation of the Council Concerning the Avoidance of Double Taxation
(Adopted by the Council on Apr. 11, 1977), Part II, in 1977 OECD MODEL, supra note 134,
app. 1, at 193-94.
545. See 1997 OECD MODEL, supra note 171, ¶¶ 38-39, at I-12-13.
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Despite these two conventions, there are no reasons to believe that
the conclusion of a multilateral tax convention involving all
Member countries could now be considered practicable.  The
Committee therefore considers that bilateral conventions are still a
more appropriate way to ensure the elimination of double taxation
at the international level.546
The OECD has also repeatedly affirmed that it is not desirable
to establish a general binding obligation on states to agree in all cases
on adjustments that would eliminate double taxation.547  In particular,
it has contended that a mandatory arbitration scheme “would involve
an unprecedented surrender of fiscal sovereignty,” and that, in
practice, most cases were resolved satisfactorily through voluntary
negotiations.548  Nevertheless, the European Union has adopted a
multilateral convention requiring arbitration in transfer pricing
disputes.549  In light of the European Union convention’s entry into
force and the growing use of arbitration provisions in bilateral
treaties, the OECD’s 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines indicated that
it would be appropriate to analyze again the advisability of a tax
arbitration procedure and that the Committee on Fiscal Affairs would
undertake a study on arbitration.550
From the perspective of the United Nations, the U.N. Group of
Experts stated in its report on its seventh session in 1977 that there
was a general consensus within the Group that the idea of an
international agreement should be considered as premature and too
ambitious for the foreseeable future . . . .  The Group therefore
took the view that a multilateral tax agreement would not seem
feasible during the forthcoming decade but, . . . it agreed that it was
imperative that those issues be dealt with through an adequate
network of bilateral tax treaties.551
Similarly, the U.N. report on the U.N. Model affirmed that the
creation of a network of bilateral tax treaties based on a common
model will be an important step . . . leading to the eventual
conclusion of a world-wide multilateral tax convention for the
avoidance of double taxation . . . .  In the meantime, as an
intermediate step, groups of countries might consider the possibility
of negotiating regional or subregional multilateral tax
546. Id. ¶ 40, at I-13.
547. See, e.g., 1984 OECD REPORT, supra note 450, ¶¶ 41-63, at 20-25.
548. See id. ¶¶ 55-56, at 23.
549. See Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the
Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, 1990 O.J. (L225) 10.
550. See 1995 TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 172, ¶ 4.171, at IV-55.
551. SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 145, at 61.
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conventions . . . .552
In 1997, a U.N. Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International
Cooperation in Tax Matters considered a proposal to establish
binding transfer pricing rules.  Most members rejected the proposal,
believing that “[e]nshrining a common set of transfer pricing
principles in binding rules or regulations could be perceived as a
derogation from national sovereignty.”553  However, the Group
expressed the view that in bilateral negotiations countries could
consider appropriate arbitration or dispute settlement provisions.554
States entering into bilateral tax treaties have thus consistently
refused to negotiate, let alone ratify, a potentially universal
multilateral treaty.  This refusal constitutes compelling evidence that
member states do not see the bilateral treaties as reflecting the
desirability of recognizing an existing obligation owed to all other
states in the absence of treaties.  On the contrary, such expressions of
hesitation, coupled with the exclusive conclusion of bilateral or
regional treaties rather than a universal treaty, seem to indicate that
states believe that it is desirable to have a rule allowing them to use
whatever allocation system they deem best unless they agree to do
otherwise in a treaty.
In fact, it has generally been understood that states have
regarded this freedom as a longstanding rule of customary
international law.  For example, one respected commentator has
taken the following position:
[C]ustomary international law does not forbid double taxation
[citations omitted].  Double taxation, resulting from the interaction
of the domestic laws of two (or more) States, will be consistent with
international law as long as each individual legislation is consistent
with international law.  If the relevant tax provisions of all the
States involved were held to be inapplicable only when and because
they give rise to double taxation, a system of loopholes could be
created which would be no more acceptable than multiple taxation.
Consequently, international law can decrease the incidence of
double taxation only through the introduction of rules establishing
which of the States involved must withdraw its tax claim.  General
552. U.N. MODEL, supra note 149, at 12 (emphasis added).
553. U.N. DEP’T FOR DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT & MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN TAX MATTERS: REPORT OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF
EXPERTS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN TAX MATTERS ON THE WORK OF ITS
SEVENTH MEETING ¶ 47, at 10, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/250, U.N. Sales No. E.96.XVI.2 (1997).
554. See id. ¶ 50, at 12.
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international law does not as yet contain such rules.  For the most
part, only bilateral double tax treaties exist to fulfill this role . . . .555
This norm allowing freedom of action, then, appears to be the
customary norm.  Bilateral treaties are adopted to vary that norm in
the bilateral relations of a certain (although a truly impressive)
number of individual states.556
Even if bilateral tax treaties did evidence a common judgment
that use of the arm’s length standard should now be an obligation for
all states, thus satisfying the opinio juris test, the character of this
obligation would still need clarification.  Would it be merely
persuasive, or would it be binding?  We have seen that the character
of the obligation in bilateral treaties is best viewed as a persuasive
obligation, not a binding one.  Thus, any customary norm deriving
from bilateral treaty obligations would have only persuasive authority
and would merely require that states in good faith give great weight
to the arm’s length standard and the arm’s length method in their
legislation and administrative practices.
Indeed, precisely because the bilateral treaties only grant
persuasive authority to the arm’s length standard, the treaties
manifest a reluctance by states to recognize the desirability of
imposing a general binding obligation to use the standard.  That is,
the substantive content of article 9 of the OECD and U.N. Models
implies that the arm’s length standard should not be recognized as a
norm of customary international law.
555. VOGEL, supra note 391, at 4 (emphasis in original); see also Martin Norr, Jurisdiction to
Tax and International Income, 17 TAX L. REV. 431, 431 (1962) (contending that no “rules of
international law exist to limit the extent of any country’s tax jurisdiction” or “to require a
country to grant relief from international double taxation . . . except to the extent they may be
provided by treaty in any particular case”); RESTATEMENT, supra note 481, § 413 cmt. a (“states
have been reluctant to admit an international obligation to avoid double taxation except on the
basis of an agreement and in accordance with its terms”); Jonathan I. Charney, International
Agreements and the Development of Customary International Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971, 980-
83 (1986) (endorsing the Restatement’s position on the grounds, inter alia, that tax treaty
obligations “are more closely the result of a quid pro quo arrangement that may not permit their
use outside the fabric of the agreement” and are more technical in nature; therefore “it is
difficult to merge a generalized principle of this sort into international law without the
accompanying detail that must be negotiated individually”).
556. It appears that Anthony D’Amato might reach the same conclusion on the ground that
the arm’s length standard is not a “generalizable” norm.  This is suggested by his argument that
trade treaties, including GATT, do not contain generalizable norms because states are always
free to trade or not to trade with other states.  See D’AMATO, supra note 470, at 105-6.
D’Amato might argue that the same freedom exists with regard to the use of income allocation
methods.
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The issue here is very similar in this respect to the issue in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.  There the International Court of
Justice held that article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental
Shelf did not give rise to a customary norm because, by its terms,
article 6 first only provided that the continental shelf boundary should
be determined by agreement, and only if agreement was unavailing
were parties potentially obligated to use the equidistance method.557
In the words of the Court, it was open to doubt that the equidistance
method was of a “fundamentally norm-creating character such as
could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law,”
because in the first place “[a]rticle 6 is so framed as to put second the
obligation to make use of the equidistance method, causing it to come
after a primary obligation to effect delimitation by agreement.”558
In other words, the language of the treaty indicated that states
did not view a binding rule mandating use of the equidistance method
as desirable even under the treaty.559  For the same reason, states
parties certainly did not view it as desirable to institute such a rule as
a customary norm binding on all states without regard to the treaty.
In short, even though the network of bilateral tax treaties
mentioning the arm’s length standard has become quite extensive, the
network consists only of bilateral, individually negotiated agreements
that do not reflect a sense among states that, even in the absence of
these treaties, they are obligated to apply the arm’s length standard.
Thus, the arm’s length standard does not appear to have any legal
authority (whether persuasive or binding) under customary
international law.
Declining to recognize the arm’s length standard as having
persuasive or binding authority under customary international law is
consistent with the normative principles articulated earlier.  Most
557. Article 6, paragraph 2, reads:
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States,
the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them.
In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each State is measured.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 24 (Feb. 20)
(quoting Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 316).
558. Id. at 42.
559. According to the Court, the Convention reflected a belief that “no one single
method . . . was likely to prove satisfactory in all circumstances, and that delimitation should,
therefore, be carried out by agreement (or by reference to arbitration)” and that it “should be
effected on equitable principles.”  Id. at 35-36.
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importantly, it follows from existing secondary rules as just
interpreted.  Moreover, given states’ natural incentives to follow the
arm’s length standard as an established convention, it is reasonable
for them to be reluctant to recognize the arm’s length standard as an
authoritative norm outside of treaties.
States appear content to persuade one another voluntarily to
undertake treaty obligations that in turn establish persuasive
obligations on parties to use the arm’s length standard.  Such treaties,
states evidently believe, can help reinforce the arm’s length standard
by rendering it a persuasive obligation for parties.  Presumably
because the arm’s length standard already enjoys worldwide support
as a convention, states are not yet convinced that they all should have
such a persuasive obligation even in the absence of consensual treaty
commitments.
Of course, the conclusion that the arm’s length standard does not
currently have authority under customary international law does not
imply that, normatively, it should not become a customary norm or be
incorporated in a multilateral treaty.  Indeed, as strongly suggested by
the analysis in Part IV, states ought to view the universal recognition
of at least a persuasive obligation to use the arm’s length standard as
immediately desirable because income allocation appears to be a non-
pure coordination problem as well as an issue area in which there is a
risk that not all states will perceive it, or continue to perceive it, as a
coordination problem.
What authority should the arm’s length standard have as a
customary norm under U.S. domestic law?  Under U.S. secondary
rules, even if the standard were a norm of customary international
law, Congress under the Constitution could override it through
domestic legislation adopting formulary apportionment, although
Congress would have a legal obligation to give it some respect as
federal common law.  However, because there is no such
authoritative rule under customary law, Congress has no obligation to
refrain from instituting formulary apportionment by revising existing
treaty obligations with the consent of treaty partners.
VI.  CONCLUSION: WHY THE UNITED STATES IS
OBLIGATED TO DRIVE ON THE RIGHT
This Article and the patient reader have traversed a long road.
Along the way, we have partaken of vistas from the disciplines of
legal philosophy, social psychology, international relations theory,
game theory and the jurisprudence of international law.  By viewing
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the problem from these many different perspectives and by focusing
on the legal status of the arm’s length standard as a case study, the
Article has attempted to shed some light on the problem of
determining the degree of authority that treaties and customary
international law ought to enjoy and what reasons justify giving them
such authority.
The Article has suggested that there are a number of compelling
reasons for states to refrain from exercising their own independent
judgment and instead to comply with international treaty norms as
well as norms of customary international law.  These reasons include
the ability of authoritative international legal norms to help solve
dilemmas of collective action, the capacity of legal rules developed by
experts to help states better achieve both self-oriented and moral
goals, the moral principles of fidelity to promises and of fulfilling
legitimate expectations of other states, and finally, the fact that
international legal obligations are established by certain secondary
rules that, in turn, have been formulated by a community of states of
which every state is a member, and that also give significant deference
to state autonomy and consent.
The Article has also highlighted the concept of persuasive
authority and the ability of international legal norms with persuasive
authority to resolve certain coordination problems particularly well,
while simultaneously respecting the fundamental autonomy of state
decision making.  And it has sketched a methodology for ascertaining
whether certain practices have risen to the level of customary
international law.
This extensive tour has led to a number of conclusions relating to
the authority of the arm’s length standard.  First, under existing
treaties the general arm’s length standard should be regarded as
having strong persuasive legal authority, but not binding legal
authority.  To have strong persuasive legal authority means that
Congress is legally obligated to give the arm’s length standard great
weight, regardless of the degree of weight it otherwise judges that the
standard should be given on the “merits” of the policy arguments
reviewed in Part I.  In formulating appropriate income allocation
legislation, Congress must give significantly reduced weight to those
policy arguments against retention of the standard, and significantly
enhanced weight to those reasons favoring it.
Because the treaties impose only a persuasive obligation (albeit a
strong one) to use the arm’s length standard, if there are extremely
compelling policy arguments in favor of the limited use of classic
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formulary apportionment in certain situations, Congress could
lawfully adopt such a legislative provision.  Nevertheless, it appears
that such a provision would have to be limited to particular situations,
such as cases with a high potential for abuse of the arm’s length
standard or in which other methods consistent with the arm’s length
standard cannot be made to work.560  The treaties thus should be
interpreted as precluding the wholesale revision of the law to require
formulary apportionment in all cases, as has apparently been
proposed by Senator Dorgan and other supporters of classic
formulary apportionment.
Second, the arm’s length standard should be regarded as having,
at present, neither persuasive nor binding authority as a norm of
customary international law.  The United States is thus free to
renegotiate tax treaties to permit or require formulary
apportionment.
The above analysis has also demonstrated that there are good
reasons for recognizing the persuasive authority of the arm’s length
standard under tax treaties.  In particular, the Article has suggested
that income allocation is best understood as a non-pure coordination
problem as well as an issue area in which there is the potential for
some states to fail to perceive it (or continue to perceive it) as a
coordination problem.  Most states themselves have understood
income allocation in this way, which is why they have chosen to
promote the arm’s length standard as a convention that can help
avoid double taxation and promote international economic growth.
Indeed, parties to bilateral treaties have promised one another to
give the arm’s length standard great weight.  They have done so
precisely because they wish to guard against the risk that they, or
their treaty partners, will in the future change their minds and
attempt to shift to a conflicting allocation method, either because
such a method is perceived as producing a more favorable
equilibrium outcome for the party involved, or because that party
ceases to recognize income allocation as a coordination problem at
all.
Perhaps most importantly, all states should be viewed as
members of a community of states that has established secondary
rules regarding the binding force and interpretation of treaties that
lead to the conclusion that parties to tax treaties have thus committed
560. The question of which situations might merit the application of classic formulary
apportionment deserves further study.
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themselves to grant strong persuasive authority to the arm’s length
standard.   These secondary rules give significant deference to the
voluntary decision of states to recognize income allocation as a
coordination problem and to solve it by accepting an obligation to
give great weight to the arm’s length standard in their allocation laws
and practices.
In short, the United States, in numerous bilateral tax treaties,
has, like its treaty partners, recognized income allocation as a
coordination problem and has agreed to give great weight to a
convention of driving on the right-hand side of the highway (that is,
of following the arm’s length standard).  It has agreed to do so to
minimize the risk that at some future time it, or its treaty partners,
will unilaterally decide to drive on the left-hand side (that is,
implement a comprehensive system of classic formulary
apportionment), resulting in the potential for a damaging economic
collision.
Even if Congress strongly believes, like the drivers referred to in
the Introduction, that the view is much better on the left-hand side of
the highway, that the United States (and perhaps all countries) would
be better off if all countries drove on the left-hand side, and that the
United States consequently ought unilaterally to begin driving on the
left-hand side to induce treaty partners to do likewise, Congress
should refrain from doing so for all the reasons outlined above. The
United States’ solemn treaty commitments, and ultimately its
membership and participation in a community of states, require the
use of persuasion, not unilateral action, to effect such a change.
Moreover, Congress should heed the United States’ own
assessment, evidenced by the treaty obligations it has willingly
incurred, of the risks of unilateral action.  It may take more work
(and time) to negotiate a switch to driving on the left-hand side of the
highway, if that is what Congress ultimately decides is preferable, but
at least there will be a community of drivers alive to enjoy the view.
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APPENDIX
Example 1.  Assume that a U.S. manufacturer of high-priced
children’s dolls owns 100% of the stock of a foreign subsidiary, which
sells the dolls outside the United States.  The cost of each doll
manufactured in the United States is $25, and the retail sales price in
foreign countries is $50.  Under the separate accounting principle, the
U.S. parent has an incentive to sell each doll to its foreign subsidiary
for as close to $25 as possible, leaving little taxable profit in the U.S.
parent and shifting most of the profit to the foreign subsidiary, where
it will be taxed at the foreign country’s low tax rate.
Example 2.  Assuming the same facts as in Example 1, if the
comparable uncontrolled price between unrelated corporations
manufacturing and selling similar dolls is determined to be $40, then
$15 of income ($40 minus $25) would be allocated to the U.S. parent,
and $10 ($50 minus $40) would be allocated to the foreign subsidiary.
Example 3.  Assuming the same facts as in Example 1, the
formulary apportionment method treats both parent and subsidiary as
engaging in a single business of manufacturing and selling dolls.
Their combined income per doll would be $25 ($50 retail selling price
less the $25 cost for the group).  Let us assume that a formula takes
into account only payroll.  If the U.S. parent and foreign subsidiary
payrolls are $600,000 and $400,000, respectively, then 60%
($600,000/$1,000,000) of the group’s combined income of $25 per doll
($15) would be allocated to the U.S. parent.  The other  40% of the
income per doll ($10) would be allocated to the foreign subsidiary.
Example 4.  Assuming the same facts as in Example 1, if the
gross profit percentage earned in comparable uncontrolled
transactions is 20% of revenue from sales, then the transfer price
between the U.S. parent and foreign subsidiary would be the resale
price of $50, less 20% of $50 ($10), or $40.
Example 5.  Assuming the same facts as in Example 1, if the
gross profit markup earned in comparable uncontrolled transactions
is 60% of production costs, then the transfer price between the U.S.
parent and foreign subsidiary would be determined to be the parent’s
manufacturing costs of $25, plus 60% of $25 ($15), or $40.
Example 6.  This example assumes the same facts as in Example
1, and also that the foreign sales subsidiary sells 50,000 dolls per year,
generating total sales of $2,500,000, and reports an operating profit of
$25 per doll ($1,250,000).  If the ratio of operating profit to sales is the
most appropriate profit level indicator for the subsidiary and this
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ratio ranges from 15% to 25% for comparable uncontrolled
taxpayers, then an arm’s length range of operating profits for the
subsidiary would be $375,000 (15% x $2,500,000) to $625,000 (25% x
$2,500,000).  Because the reported operating profit of $1,250,000 falls
outside this range, the IRS would adjust the price the subsidiary pays
its U.S. parent so that the operating profit falls within the acceptable
range.  The IRS would likely aim for the range’s midpoint of
$500,000, which would be produced by a transfer price of $40 per doll.
Example 7.  Assuming the same facts as in Example 1, under the
comparable profit split method, the combined operating profit of $25
per doll would be split between the U.S. parent and foreign subsidiary
based on the ratio used by uncontrolled corporations engaged in
similar transactions.  If the ratio were determined to be 60%
(manufacturer) to 40% (seller), then $15 of profit per doll would be
allocated to the U.S. parent and $10 of profit per doll would be
allocated to the foreign subsidiary (comparable to a transfer price of
$40 per doll).
Example 8.  Assuming the same facts as in Example 1, if the
United States established a transfer price of $40 per doll (producing
$15 of taxable profit to the U.S. parent), and the foreign country
determined that the transfer price should be $30 (resulting in $20 of
taxable profit to the foreign subsidiary), then the total profits taxable
by the two countries, $35 ($15 + $20), would exceed the actual
combined economic profit of $25.  In effect, the excess of $10 would
represent combined economic profit that is taxed twice.
Figure 1
A Graphic Interpretation of 
Raz’s Model of Decision Making
According to the Balance of First-Order Reasons
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A = Weight of first-order reasons in favor of the action (1)
B = Weight of first-order reasons against the action (-3)
Balance of first-order reasons = -2 (Do not take action)
Figure 2
A Graphic Interpretation of 
the Preemptive Effect of an 
Authoritative Norm According to Raz
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Excluded first-order reasons
In determining how to act, the actor excludes existing first-order reasons in favor of
and against the action and reduces their weights (A and B, respectively) to 0.  The
norm is treated as an additional first-order reason in favor of the action with a
weight, C (1), equal to the weight of the excluded first-order reasons in favor of the
action, A (1), less the weight of those reasons that justify treating the norm as an
exclusionary reason (a reduction which is disregarded for purposes of this
illustration).
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Figure 3
Persuasion
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The actor is persuaded to change the weight of first-order reasons in favor of the
action (A) from 1 to 3 and the weight of first-order reasons against the action (B) from
-3 to -1.  The actor’s old assessment of A and B (see Figure 1) disappears.
Figure 4
Persuasive Authority
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The actor’s own subjective perception of the weight of first-order reasons in favor of
the action, A (1), and first-order reasons against the action, B (-3), remains
unchanged.  However, in response to a norm with persuasive authority, the actor, in
determining how to act, increases the weight of first-order reasons in favor of the
action to C (3) and decreases the weight of first-order reasons against the action to D
(-1).
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Figure 5
An Alternative Conceptualization of the 
Effect of a Norm with Persuasive Authority
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The actor’s own subjective perception of the weight of first-order reasons in favor of
the action, A (1), and first-order reasons against the action, B (-3), remains
unchanged.  However, in response to a norm with persuasive authority, the actor, in
determining how to act, gives the norm great weight, C (4), as an additional first-order
reason in favor of the action.
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Figure 6
A Harmony Game
For each actor, CC > CD > DD or DC
Adapted from Stein, supra note 235, at 118.  In this and all subsequent figures, the
number in the lower left corner of each cell refers to A’s preference in rank order,
with 4 as the best outcome and 1 (or 0, in Figures 9 and 10) as the worst.  The
number in the upper right corner of each cell refers to B’s preference, also in rank
order.  “C” means “cooperate” and “D” means “defect.”  The pair of letters in the
lower left corner of each cell refers to the strategies of A and B, respectively.  The
pair in the upper right corner of each cell refers to the strategies of B and A,
respectively.
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Figure 7
An Assurance (“Stag Hunt”) Game
For each actor, CC > DC > DD > CD
Equilibrium
Outcome
Adapted from Stein, supra note 235, at 119.
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Figure 8
A Prisoners’ Dilemma
For each actor, DC > CC > DD > CD
Equilibrium
Outcome
Adapted from Stein, supra note 235, at 122.
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Figure 9
A Pure Coordination Problem
For each actor, CC = DD > DC or CD
Equilibrium
Outcome
Equilibrium
Outcome
Adapted from Stein, supra note 235, at 126.
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Figure 10
A Non-Pure Coordination Problem
A’s preference ordering is CC > DD > CD or DC
B’s preference ordering is DD > CC > CD or DC
Equilibrium
Outcome
Equilibrium
Outcome
Adapted from Stein, supra note 235, at 126.
